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In the past two decades, media consumption has changed not only in terms of breadth and 
amount, but also in terms of availability and accessibility. Shows that once could only be viewed 
at their scheduled time on their scheduled network may now be streamed across several 
platforms at almost any time. Further, audiences have begun to connect with characters beyond 
the shows and films they inhabit, building websites, following related social media pages, 
recording podcasts and more to continue and expand these parasocial relationships. The social 
scientific community has only begun to scratch the surface of how these changes affect audience 
members and society at large—particularly regarding the political impact of entertainment 
media. Through focus groups, a survey experiment, media content analysis, and a laboratory 
experiment, I explore the impact of entertainment television media on political attitudes and 
social perceptions within the context of contemporary media consumption patterns. In particular, 
I examine the efficacy of narrative persuasion and mediated intergroup contact within the context 
of single exposure, accumulated exposure to outgroup members, and binge watching. I find that 
mediated intergroup contact appears to have a much stronger impact on audience members than 
narrative persuasion, regardless of exposure amount. I also find that binge watching episodic 
shows—watching multiple episodes back-to-back in one sitting—leads to different media effects 
on political attitudes and social perceptions in viewers than watching the same episodes in the 
traditional weekly format. Overall, my findings suggest that contemporary consumption patterns 
of entertainment media render it less influential in terms of narrative persuasion of political 
attitudes, but the regular consumption of entertainment media may still have lasting effects from 
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1 INTRODUCTION  
In the first quarter of 2020, the video content streaming platform Netflix gained nearly 16 
million new subscribers, bringing them to a global total of 182.8 million subscriptions (Lee 
2020). While the 2020 pandemic led to unprecedented numbers of individuals staying home and 
out of work beginning during this time period, the numbers overall point to a major shift in 
recreation over the past few decades toward entertainment—specifically streamed entertainment 
television. The Nielsen Company (2020) reports: “Year-over-year, streaming among people 25-
54 has increased almost 100%.”  Even before shelter-in-place orders popped up around the U.S., 
Nielsen reported that American adults over 18 spend more than 11 hours per day connected to 
linear and digital media (Nielsen 2018). Nearly four of the approximately six hours American 
adults spend each day watching video content is dedicated to watching live and time-shifted 
television (Spangler 2020). Additionally, consumers used a streaming platform for 19 percent of 
all TV viewing in the fourth quarter of 2019—up from ten percent in the first quarter of 2018—
and Netflix made up 31 percent of all connected-TV viewing (Spangler 2020). 
Put simply, Americans watch a lot of video content, and they increasingly watch that 
content online and through streaming services like Netflix, Amazon Prime, and Hulu. While 
some streaming platforms offer access to news programming via live TV (e.g. Hulu 2020), 
Netflix and others only provide entertainment shows and movies. Not only are consumers 
watching more media overall and watching more entertainment than news content, they are also 
increasingly engaging in binge watching multiple episodes of a show in one sitting (Netflix 
2017). A 2018 Morning Consult survey of 2,044 TV watchers indicates rates of “73 percent of 
TV watchers ages 18-29 and 69 percent of those ages 30-44 binge-watching television at least 
once a week” (Sabin 2018). How does this shift toward greater consumption of entertainment 
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media over news media, and especially the shift toward binging on entertainment media, affect 
its influence over our social and political attitudes?  
Markus Prior (2005) observed that increased choice in media would also increase the gap 
in political knowledge between those with interest in politics and those without. He argued that 
entertainment media has little to offer its viewers in terms of political information. Matthew 
Baum (2004) rejected this notion, pointing to non-traditional, “soft” news programs that do 
include political information. Not only do soft news programs like daytime and late night talk 
shows garner much higher viewership, they can influence viewers on public policy and vote 
choice (Baum and Jamison 2006). As Baum and Jamison (2011) point out, “television allows 
individuals to learn passively,” and “individuals are more likely to accept information presented 
in a non-conflictual manner that does not arouse excitement”—a much different scenario from 
the arguing pundits we see on entertainment news and infotainment shows (124-125; see also 
Otto, et al. 2017). 
Because more individuals engage with non-news/entertainment media, and because these 
media hold significant influence over their viewers, researchers must continue to explore 
entertainment media effects and dramatic narrative persuasion. The communication field has 
spent decades understanding the causal mechanisms behind narrative persuasion, but only a 
small percentage of these studies—either in communication or political science—are dedicated 
to understanding how entertainment media affects political attitudes. Political science, in 
particular, has been slow to examine the effects of entertainment media on political attitudes. 
Entertainment media effects research in other fields provide clear evidence of priming (Holbert 
2003; Holbrook and Hill 2005), framing (Holbert, et al. 2005; Lane, et al. 2013; Mulligan and 
Habel 2011; Slater, et al. 2006), and behavioral influence (Gierzynski and Eddy 2013; Hether, et 
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al. 2008; Paluck and Green 2009) over political attitudes and values. However, only a few of 
these studies have been published by political science journals (e.g. Paluck and Green 2009 in 
the American Political Science Review). 
Following the trailblazing efforts of political scientists such as Donald P. Green, who 
worked with psychologist Elizabeth Levy Paluck to study the effects of dramatic, fictional radio 
programming on political behavior in post-genocide Rwanda (Paluck and Green 2009), and 
Anthony Gierzynski, who published Harry Potter and the Millennials with help from sociologist 
Kathryn Eddy (Gierzynski and Eddy 2013), this manuscript seeks to further our knowledge of 
how dramatic narratives in fictional entertainment influence political attitudes in the 
contemporary media environment. As a culture, Americans are no longer limited to a few 
programs on the radio or television. We are no longer limited, even, to a specific provider or to 
accessing programs from a single device. As the media landscape available to consumers, 
namely the American electorate, grows and diversifies, it becomes increasingly important to 
understand the effects these changes have on public opinion. Furthermore, to understand the full 
breadth of media’s influence today, we must include the effects of entertainment media and 
dramatic narrative persuasion. 
1.1 Why Dramatic Entertainment Media? 
I use the term dramatic entertainment media to refer to non-news media consumed for 
entertainment purposes that would be categorized in the drama genre. Entertainment media 
covers the gamut of genres and motivations for engaging with media—from escapist media like 
action movies and first-person-shooter video games to mood-boosting media like music and 
situational comedy shows. However, the literature provides greatest evidence for dramatic shows 
and films influencing their audience members through narrative persuasion, which Hamby, 
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Brinberg, and Jaccard (2018) conceptualize as a process by which a dramatic narrative, or story, 
may alter audience members’ beliefs, attitudes, and/or intentions. 
Deictic shift theory states that absorption into the narrative and reflection following the 
narrative are necessary for narrative persuasion to occur (Hamby, et al. 2018; Hamby, et al. 
2017). Further research provides evidence that certain perceptions of the media, such as 
identification with a character and high perceived realism of the story, also play key roles in 
increasing both absorption and reflection while simultaneously diminishing reactance and 
counterarguing, which are forms of resistance to messaging embedded in storylines (Hamby, et 
al. 2018; Moyer-Gusé and Nabi 2011). However, individuals do not engage with dramatic 
entertainment media—or any media—within a vacuum. People come to their screens not only 
with specific motivations for engaging with media but also with personal circumstances, current 
mindsets, and myriad potential distractions (Oliver and Raney 2011). They may leave their 
media experience with certain impressions to reenter their own lives, often moving straight into 
engagement with other narratives and other media formats. 
What is the key component to holding a viewer’s attention and inducing enough 
retrospective reflection to evoke narrative persuasion? More importantly, which factor will 
encourage a lasting attitude change? While examining the extant literature, I notice that many 
studies reveal statistical results with small coefficients, and very few studies look at lasting 
change (e.g. Bahk 2010; Hether, et al. 2008; Moyer-Gusé and Nabi 2010; Slater, et al. 2006). 
Moreover, we tend to examine specific attitudes rather than perceptions of social norms; one 
exception being Paluck and Green’s (2009) longitudinal study of a dramatic radio program’s 
effects on Rwandans’ acceptance of dissident behaviors in a political context. This provides 
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evidence that exposure longer than a single episode or two, as with Paluck and Green’s (2009) 
study, may be key to understanding greater, accumulative effects. 
1.2 Mediated Intergroup Contact 
In addition to inducing reflection and decreasing reactance to narrative persuasion, 
dramatic narratives in entertainment media may diminish prejudice through facilitating mediated 
intergroup contact. Building upon Allport’s social contact hypothesis and the subseuent 
intergroup contact theory, contemporary social scientists have begun to examine intergroup 
contact depicted in entertainment media for its potential to diminish intergroup bias. This 
mediated intergroup contact has been shown to decrease intergroup prejudice in majority 
members who watch a dramatic narrative that depicts a fellow ingroup member having positive 
interactions with an outgroup member (Ortiz and Harwood 2007). Moyer-Gusé and Ortiz (2019) 
find that mediated intergroup contact both reduces anxiety toward interacting with an outgroup 
member and increases empathy toward the depicted outgroup. 
This manuscript examines two potential benefits of understanding the impact of mediated 
intergroup contact to political science research. First, I explore whether political attitudes toward 
policies that affect a specific outgroup may also be affected by mediated intergroup contact. 
Second, I explore the impact of contemporary consumption patterns on narrative persuasion and 
mediated intergroup contact: Accumulative effects and binge effects. 
1.3 Contemporary Consumption Patterns 
One episode of a show in a saturated media environment will likely impact its viewers 
very little, though including an epilogue may increase immediate effects (Lane, et al. 2013). 
Continued messaging in one show or across multiple shows increases the likelihood that 
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narrative persuasion will occur, as evidenced by studies of accumulative effects (e.g. Hether, et 
al. 2008). What happens, though, when you watch multiple episodes at once? 
Binge watching, that is consuming audio-visual media for greater than two hours in one 
sitting and/or watching an entire season of a multi-episode program in less than seven days, has 
become increasingly popular—especially with young consumers (Netflix 2017). In 2013 Netflix, 
which considers itself an “internet television network” (Neflix 2016), revealed survey results that 
indicate 73 percent of users have favorable views toward and engage in binge watching, which 
survey respondents collectively defined as “watching between 2-6 episodes of the same TV show 
in one sitting” (Netflix 2013). By 2016, Netflix could pinpoint the average watch-times of 
bingers for entire seasons, noting that bingers consume sci-fi and horror shows like “American 
Horror Story” or “Breaking Bad” in four days, while political thrillers such as “House of Cards” 
or “Homeland” take six days (Neflix 2016). In a more extreme example, the Nielsen Company 
confirmed that 824,000 Netflix users binged the eight one-hour episodes of the third season of 
sci-fi show Stranger Things on the first day it was released (Tassi 2019). 
Although the literature offers insight to explain the effects on political attitudes of 
engaging regularly with episodic dramas (i.e. cultivation theory or “drip, drip” effects; e.g. 
Hether, et al. 2008; Paluck and Green 2009) or engaging with high-impact media (i.e. the drench 
hypothesis: e.g. Bahk 2009; Slater, et al. 2006), we have yet to explore the impact of these 
theories in a contemporary media context. Do bingers demonstrate the same accumulative effects 
reported in traditional weekly watchers? Do they report the same levels of absorption, reflection, 
and identification? If there is evidence of narrative persuasion after binge watching, do these 
effects last? These questions are imperative to understanding how the contemporary media 
environment affects consumers’ social and political attitudes. 
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1.4 Dissertation Layout 
This dissertation seeks to use empirical research to more deeply understand the 
relationship between narrative persuasion, the way we consume entertainment media, and our 
sociopolitical attitudes. The next chapter discusses the interdisciplinary literature related to my 
theory of binge effects. Much of the research on narrative persuasion, even as it relates to 
political attitudes, lies in the communication literature. I explore the previous research of the 
interdisciplinary literature and tie the theories and assertions made in communication, social 
psychology, and other social sciences to similar concepts in political science. In Chapter 3, I 
build upon the deictic shift theory and cultivation theory to explore accumulative effects and 
consumption type effects regarding entertainment media and present my theory of binge effects. 
I posit that binge watching episodic dramas (television and streamed shows) is the least likely 
method to induce lasting attitude change on viewers, making Prior’s forecast of a public with a 
steadily increasing political knowledge gap ever more prophetic. 
To examine the effects of dramatic entertainment media in the contemporary media 
environment, I begin by exploring the findings from two focus groups to assess the internal 
process of narrative persuasion and its effect on intergroup bias (Chapter 4). These findings 
inform the design and analysis of two experiments I conduct to investigate the impact of 
mediated intergroup contact, accumulative effects, and binge watching on sociopolitical attitudes 
related to counterterrorism policies and perceptions of Muslims. The first study (Chapter 5) 
surveys the broader effects of dramatic entertainment media consumption—via cultivation 
theory—on political attitudes and social perceptions. The second study, a seven-week laboratory 
experiment (Chapter 6) scrutinizes the more specific effects of dramatic shows depicting 
outgroup members on individual attitudes and perceptions over time. This experiment features 
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random-assignment of participants to four groups with two conditions: Watching one of two 
treatment shows and watching episodes weekly vs. binge watching. 
Finally, Chapter 7 discusses the implications of the combined efforts of these studies and 
offers recommendations for continued research. This manuscript presents a very small step in 
understanding the importance of consumption method and time spent engaging with dramatic, 
entertainment media. It is but the first piece of a rapidly expanding puzzle that is media 
consumption in contemporary society. However, it is an incredibly important piece of that puzzle 




2 Reviewing the Interdisciplinary Literature 
Markus Prior (2005) made an astute observation in the early years of the massive changes 
in technological advancement in the 21st century: As media choice grows, interest in—and, 
therefore, knowledge of—political information wanes. Although his own initial study offered 
marginal results, his overall premise may prove frighteningly true, albeit due to a slightly 
different causal mechanism. Rather than simply more channels distracting Americans from 
watching the news, the growing choice in types of media and in means of consuming said media 
make it less likely for Americans either to seek out political information from reputable news 
sources or to absorb political information from news and non-news sources alike. This 
manuscript focuses on how dramatic, fictional media affects political attitudes, which 
contemporary changes in media consumption patterns may alter most.  
When I note that the types of media and means of media consumption have changed, I 
refer to the fact that Americans—really, most of the world—can now access news and non-news 
media through many formats on multiple devices. Nielsen’s (2019) Total Audience Report for 
2018 notes that U.S. adults have maintained an average of ten-and-a-half hours of media usage 
per day for several years. Around 40 percent of that usage is spent watching live and time-shifted 
television (Nielsen 2019). However, an additional 34 percent is spent engaging with media on 
tablets, smartphones, and other internet-connected devices through streaming services and 
applications. In fact, in the past year, time spent watching live television has decreased while 
engaging with internet-connected devices and smartphones has increased to seven and 14 
percent, respectively (Nielsen 2019). 
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2.1 Why Does Media Matter?  
As a mediator of information, news media can have strong effects on audiences by 
highlighting some pieces of information while ignoring others, and by framing that information 
in a certain way (see Iyengar and Kinder 2010). The introduction of Fox News Channel, for 
instance, increased voter turnout and raised Republicans’ share of the vote in towns across 
America at the end of the twentieth century (DellaVigna and Kaplan 2007). In another example, 
news media’s use of abstract frames and unfavorable language to discuss U.S.-Mexico 
immigration encourages unfavorable attitudes toward Latinos (Mastro, et al. 2014). As Iyengar 
and Kinder (2010) put it, the press “may not be successful much of the time in telling people 
what to think, but it is stunningly successful in telling its readers what to think about” (2). These 
agenda-setting and framing effects influence the political attitudes and perceptions of social 
norms of their audience members. Yet, we live in a world where traditional hard news media are 
not the only purveyors of information. 
Strömbäck, Falasca, and Kruikemeier (2017) explain how using mixed media to shape 
one’s news repertoire influences political participation. This is similar to Prior’s (2007) 
description of the differences between “news junkies” and the rest of the populace. And both 
theories are reflected in Djerf-Pierre and Shehata’s (2017) evidence that high-choice media 
environments have decreased the ability of news media to influence the political agenda in 
Sweden. However, this does not render news media’s influence entirely impotent. Far from 
Bennett and Iyengar’s (2008) prediction that the stratification and fragmentation of the American 
public through selective exposure in a newly high-choice media environment would lead to a 
“new era of minimal effects,” we see instead an active, polarized public (Prior 2013). Mass 
media remains influential at the societal and individual levels (see Shehata and Strömbäck 2013). 
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Prior pointed out early on that consumers would decrease the number of news programs 
they watched on television as the number of entertainment media options increased. However, he 
had no way of knowing just how many forms of non-traditional news and entertainment media 
options there would be. Nor did he recognize the impact of these media formats on Americans’ 
political knowledge and attitudes. Non-traditional, soft news programs like daytime and late-
night talk shows can encourage voter turnout and consistency (Baum 2004; Baum and Jamison 
2006), increase political knowledge (Baumgartner and Morris 2006), and influence voters’ 
opinions of candidates (Baumgartner, et al. 2012). Primetime fictional shows can affect viewers’ 
political and sociopolical attitudes (Hether, et al. 2008; Lane, et al. 2013; Quick 2009; Quick, et 
al. 2013) and even inspire political activism (Kearns and Young 2017). 
Why examine dramatic, fictional media? Though political science has largely focused on 
news in its media research, other social science fields have found that dramatic, fictional media 
shows an impressive ability to persuade audiences (see Hamby, et al. 2017; Hamby, et al. 2018; 
Moyer-Gusé 2008b; Moyer-Gusé 2015). Similar to news media, dramatic narratives use priming 
and framing to impact audiences (e.g. Holbrook and Hill 2005; Mulligan and Habel 2011). In 
contrast to news media, dramatic narratives display increased evidence of diminished 
counterarguing in viewers (Moyer-Gusé and Nabi 2011). I use the term dramatic media effects 
throughout this manuscript to refer to media effects present in audiovisual programming that is 
viewed primarily for entertainment and classified within the drama genre. Although the term 
could apply more broadly, I choose to limit this term as a subclassification of entertainment 
media effects, which include all media accessed for the purpose of entertainment. The literature 
includes both terms when addressing the attitudinal effects of dramatic films and shows, the key 
concept in my theory. More regularly, however, neither are used, as many authors opt instead to 
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speak around this concept instead of giving it a term. I choose to utilize the term to simplify its 
discussion. As such, I am condensing “entertainment media effects present in dramatic 
audiovisual programming” to “dramatic media effects,” and provide context throughout 
explaining to which dramatic media I am referring. I find it imperative to separate first news 
from non-news media, and then to narrow non-news media into the subcategory entertainment 
media. While all media can affect attitudes, political science offers news media studies with 
greater depth and breadth than non-news media, giving even less attention to entertainment 
media. Considering individuals are far more likely to select a news program when looking for 
political information, this not only makes sense, but it also means entertainment media effects on 
political attitudes are more likely to be altered by these changes in media consumption patterns. 
Television viewing comprises the bulk (40 percent) of media consumption (Neilsen 
2019), news audiences have long been declining (Djerf-Pierre and Shehata 2017), and evidence 
indicates that dramatic shows are particularly adept at persuasion (see Hamby, et al. 2018). 
Because of this, my dissertation focuses on the media effects present in dramatic, fictional 
audiovisual programming, which I refer to as dramatic media effects or entertainment media 
effects in dramatic narratives. This situates the term within the political science literature on 
media effects while making clear connections to the study of narrative persuasion in 
communication and social psychology. This review of the interdisciplinary literature delves into 
the known effects of dramatic, fictional media consumption on political attitudes and political 
knowledge, and it exposes the need for deeper exploration of the role consumption patterns play. 
In particular, this chapter provides key background information from the political science, 
communication, and social psychology fields exhibiting important persuasive effects present in 
dramatic, fictional shows and films that may be lost when binge watched. 
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2.2 Dramatic Media Effects 
Much like news media effects, entertainment media effects present in the dramatic 
narratives within films and shows impact viewers by exposing them to specific topics in a 
specific context, thereby making the information accessible (agenda-setting and priming) and 
then providing a way to apply that information in a real-world context (framing). Whereas the 
news media does this through compelling fact-based stories, dramatic film and shows provide 
fictional narratives that viewers may relate to situations in their own lives. Both affect viewers 
through three basic models: Agenda-setting, which describes how when media highlight certain a 
topic, the topic becomes a primary talking point in the public arena; priming, which refers to 
when the media highlights a certain topic, it can become the standard the public uses to evaluate 
a political actor or group; and framing, which explains how the context provided by media when 
discussing a certain topic can shape viewers’ opinions on that topic (see Iyengar and Kinder 
2010; Scheufele 2000; Scheufele and Tewksbury 2007). These models are examined in depth in 
the news media effects literature (see Scheufele and Tewksbury 2007), but have also begun to be 
studied in non-news media content like satirical or humorous political content, various 
entertainment media like video games and music, and dramatic narratives present in films and 
television. 
2.2.1 News Media Effects 
In their updated edition of News That Matters, Iyengar and Kinder (2010) look back over 
more than two decades of advancements in political communication since their ground-breaking 
1987 book of the same title, and they affirm that “agenda-setting, priming, and framing seem to 
be thriving” (135). These primary concepts used to describe media effects models can be 
categorized in terms of how individuals process the mediated information provided and how they 
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store it in their memory (Scheufele and Tewksbury 2007). This section on news media effects 
looks at the first piece of the puzzle: How individuals process mediated information—or, 
information previously sorted through, repackaged, and delivered by the news media to the 
public. The second piece of this assertion will be discussed at greater length in the section on 
attitude change, which covers how new information is compared with previously held beliefs 
before being stored in one’s memory. 
Scheufele and Tewksbury (2007), in an introduction to a special issue of the Journal of 
Communication, examine agenda-setting, priming, and framing as belonging to models of either 
accessibility or applicability, which provides a deeper understanding of how the processes these 
models portray actually work in an individual’s mind. Although scholars in political science, 
communication, and psychology may use these terms differently, there is general agreement that 
the underlying mechanisms of media effects are accessibility and applicability (Druckman and 
Bolsen 2011; Scheufele and Tewksbury 2007). Because this manuscript builds upon models 
situated in the communication literature, I will be using definitions for these terms provided by 
communication scholars as well as political science scholars. Where these two fields differ, I will 
explain to the best of my ability their differences as well as my decisions to prefer one context to 
another. 
2.2.1.1 Accessibility: Agenda Setting and Priming 
Accessibility models assume memory-based information processing, meaning that people 
will express opinions based on what they can remember about the topic at a given point in time 
(Scheufele and Tewksbury 2007). Iyengar and Kinder (2010) consider that “a person’s judgment 
depends in part on what comes to mind—on considerations that are, for whatever reason and 
however briefly, accessible” and that “what information is accessible… and what is not is a 
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matter of circumstance” (65). In other words, whatever information is cognitively accessible to 
an individual in a given moment will have greatest priority when they express an opinion (Zaller 
1992). Television news makes such information accessible through frequent coverage and 
context. Because of this, television news can play an important part in what happens to be 
circumstantially on a citizen’s mind (Iyengar and Kinder 2010). News media affects this 
circumstantial information through setting the agenda and priming (i.e. Cappella and Jamieson 
1997; Holbrook and Hill 2005; Iyengar and Kinder 2010; Pfau, et al. 2001; Scheufele and 
Tewksbury 2007). 
Agenda-setting, put simply, explores how “the content that we are most exposed to 
shapes our view about the world around us (Alitavoli and Kaveh 2018, 58). More specifically, it 
is “the idea that there is a strong correlation between the emphasis that mass media place on 
certain issues… and the importance attributed to these issues by mass audiences” (Scheufele and 
Tewksbury 2007, 11). Agenda setting is grounded in memory-based models of information 
processing, like that of Zaller’s (1992) RAS model. The RAS (Receive-Accept-Sample) model 
asserts that people will receive new information, accept or reject it based on whether it complies 
with their predispositions, and then provide an opinion on a given topic based on information at 
the “top-of-the-head” that they can readily sample from their memory at the given moment. Like 
Zaller’s RAS model, agenda-setting influences the information an individual will recall from 
memory by first bringing up the topic and second continuing to address it. By focusing on a 
certain topic and continuing to address it, media makes it easier for the individual to recall more 
information about some topics than others (Scheufele and Tewksbury 2007). 
What we are exposed to through the media, much like exposure through experience, 
affects what we believe about the world. For example, the more news media covers crime stories, 
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the more likely audiences are to believe crime is on the rise in America (Alitavoli and Kaveh 
2018). While other factors do influence individual opinion (i.e. personal life circumstances, 
where the story is placed in the news hour, and how detailed or vivid the story is), the stories that 
news media choose to focus on versus those they choose to ignore influence what the American 
public believes is most important on the political agenda (Iyengar and Kinder 2010). 
Priming, while similar to agenda setting in its capacity to affect the focus of audience 
attention, is discussed in the field of communication as pertaining specifically to the standards by 
which individuals may evaluate a political actor or group. Political scientists Iyengar and Kinder 
(2010) reflect this perspective when they define priming as referring to “changes in the standards 
that people use to make political evaluations” (63). They note that the topics on which television 
news choose to focus influence the standards individuals will use when judging governments, 
presidents, public policies, and political candidates (63). 
The media, therefore, may set the agenda by continually discussing certain topics over 
others. In doing so, they may also prime audiences to judge political players based on how well 
they believe those players are handling that topic. To continue using the crime example, media 
may set the public agenda through continually reporting on crime—either locally or nationally. 
Alitavoli and Kaveh (2018) presume that the media’s focus on crime stories has influenced 
Americans into believing that crime in the country has increased when in fact crime rates have 
decreased. However, when an issue—in this example, crime—becomes the most frequently 
mentioned problem area in the news, audiences are then primed to “incorporate what they know 
about that problem into their overall judgment of the president” or other political entity (Iyengar 
and Kinder 2010, 65). 
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In a natural experiment studying the difference in voter turnout and choice between 
presidential elections in 1996 and 2000, when the Fox News Channel became available in 20 
percent of the U.S., DellaVigna and Kaplan (2007) found that “Fox News exposure induced a 
generalized ideological shift, as opposed to a candidate-specific effect” (1217). Their study 
compared changes in voting patterns between districts who did not have access to the Fox News 
Channel and those that did. They saw significant shifts in favor of the Republican Party in 
districts who had received access to Fox News. They used recall rates of media viewing to 
provide evidence that their results depict not only more previously Republican voters coming out 
to vote but also persuasion in three to eight percent of the Fox News audience, shifting from 
previous voting patterns toward the Republican Party (DellaVigna and Kaplan 2007, 1223). 
These results would appear to show both agenda setting, in that more voters went to the polls 
following their exposure to Fox News Channel, and priming, in that what they saw on Fox News 
led them to evaluate candidates in a way that favored Republicans. 
Exposure alone cannot account for these shifts, however, nor for a willingness in some 
voters to change party preference. Miller (2007) asserts that in order to set the agenda, 
individuals also must be paying attention to the content of news stories, and “to the extent that 
the content arouses negative emotions, national importance judgments follow” (689). Miller 
points to what she calls importance judgments as a key factor in whether individuals give 
importance to a topic. These judgments come from whether an issue is given importance by a 
politician in the story or the journalist relating the story, a cue to audience members as to 
whether the issue is worth their attention (Miller 2007). Iyengar and Kinder (2010) similarly 
point to placement of the story as a key factor in garnering audience members’ attention, 
claiming that placement is a cue for how important editors believe a story to be. Emotion 
18 
(Bartsch, et al. 2014; Bartsch and Schneider 2014; Miller 2007) and personal circumstance 
linking an issue to one’s own situation (Iyengar and Kinder 2010) play arguably the largest roles 
in whether a story will set the agenda or prime its audience. In the epilogue added to their 
updated edition of News That Matters, Iyengar and Kinder (2010) admit that “Priming effects are 
augmented when television news coverage frames problems in such a way as to imply that an 
official or institution is responsible either for causing a problem or for failing to solve it” (135). 
2.2.1.2 Applicability: Framing 
Once news media have made a topic accessible to the public, they may also affect how 
individuals apply this new information. By providing a specific context, or frame, they make 
certain aspects of the topic or pertaining to the topic more salient. Framing “is based on the 
assumption that how an issue is characterized in news reports can have an influence on how it is 
understood by audiences” (Scheufele and Tewksbury 2007, 11). Framing is applied in media by 
using existing schemas to portray complex ideas, and is used by individuals to break down 
information to form an impression of the complex topic (Scheufele and Tewksbury 2007). In 
other words, at the macrolevel the way journalists characterize an issue influences their 
audience’s understanding of it. At the microlevel, framing occurs when individuals consider 
various aspects of an issue, giving more weight to a particular aspect, before expressing an 
opinion. 
Chong and Druckman (2007a) state that framing effects occur “when (often small) 
changes in the presentation of an issue or an event produce (sometimes large) changes of 
opinion” (104). It is not necessarily that media induces a change in its audience members’ 
values, but that framing affects the weight, or priority, they may give to different aspects of an 
issue (Chong and Druckman 2007b). The way an issue is framed may evoke certain 
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considerations. Chong and Druckman (2007a) give the example associated with Nelson, 
Clawson, and Oxley’s (1997) study in which participants are asked about whether a hate group 
should be allowed to hold a political rally. In the study, 85 percent of respondents said yes when 
the question was associated with free speech, but only 45 percent said yes when the question was 
associated with public safety. Depending upon which frame the question is set within—free 
speech versus public safety—respondents answer with that frame in mind (Nelson, et al. 1997). 
To put it very simply, agenda setting effects demonstrate the media’s ability to shape 
what we think about, but framing effects model the media’s ability to shape how we think about 
something. Priming has been linked by communication scholars more closely with agenda-
setting (see Scheufele and Tewksbury 2007), while it is often conflated with framing by political 
scientists (see Chong and Druckman 2007a). When first used in political science, however, 
priming was linked to agenda setting in that both affect issue accessibility (Iyengar and Kinder 
2010). Because of this, and because the study of dramatic media effects occurs largely within the 
communication field up to this point, I also link priming more closely with agenda setting while 
keeping the terms distinct. To put it very simply, then, priming effects exhibit the media’s ability 
to shape what we use to evaluate our political leaders and groups. 
2.2.2 Moving Beyond Traditional News Media 
Considering the current hyperpolarized American political climate (Iyengar and 
Westwood 2015; Levendusky 2013; Prior 2013), and the ambivalence of young voters in the 
Millennial generation (Maniam and Smith 2017), addressing media effects in entertainment, 
particularly dramatic television, could represent an important step in understanding how media 
on the whole affects change in individual political attitudes. Traditional news media are not the 
only means by which Americans receive political frames. Between 2013 and 2017, the average 
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American aged 15 and older watched 2 hours and 46 minutes of television per day, making up 
more than half of time spent on leisure activities(Bureau of Labor Statistics 2018). Yet, Prior 
(Prior 2005) notes that the upsurge in media choices has pushed many Americans to opt out of 
news entirely, especially with regard to political news. 
Baum and colleagues argue that political content does not only come in the form of 
traditional news media, however, but also in what he terms soft news (Baum 2004; Baum and 
Jamison 2006). Soft news media refers to talk shows like Oprah and infotainment like The Daily 
Show that bring political information into the public eye through avenues that either are not 
usually political (e.g. Oprah) or are satirical (e.g. The Daily Show). However, even non-news 
media is increasingly important for understanding political attitude formation and change.  
2.2.3 Entertainment Media Effects 
Similar to news media effects, entertainment media primes its audiences using non-verbal 
cues and frames complex topics through dialogue and narrative. Unlike news media, however, 
consumers turn to entertainment media for very different motivations and with very different 
expectations. Where news is expected to provide real-world information, entertainment is 
expected to offer an escape, a thrill, a shift in mood, or food for thought. This does not, however, 
mean that entertainment avoids affecting its audience. Quite the opposite, in fact. Many 
narratives are written and produced specifically to be though-provoking and/or to critique 
societal and political norms (e.g. George Orwell’s 1984 or Jordan Peele’s Get Out). Yet, research 
indicates that even media produced solely for entertainment purposes may still affect social and 
political attitudes. 
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2.2.3.1 Priming Effects in Entertainment Media 
Taber and Lodge (2016) see priming as the “key mechanism” to activate the deliberation 
process that informs our conscious and unconscious choices. Primes are the spark for the 
considerations the audience thinks about during engagement with a piece of media. Primes can 
influence generalized feelings toward the government (Baumgartner and Morris 2006; Holbert 
and al 2007) or a particular office or administration (Holbert 2003; Holbert, et al. 2005)They can 
also influence more specific concerns about public policy (Holbrook and Hill 2005; Pfau, et al. 
2001).This is evident across several forms of entertainment (and dramatic) media with regard to 
influencing political attitudes in myriad ways.  
For instance, The Daily Show is a satirical soft news show with a cynical outlook on the 
government, its policies, and the traditional news media that covers it. Baumgartner and Morris 
(2006) executed an experiment which asked participants to watch a news clip of the 2004 
presidential campaign, either from the traditional hard news source, CBS Evening News, or the 
soft news source, The Daily Show with Jon Stewart. They found that although the coverage was 
edited to be very similar in time and content, the group who watched The Daily Show had a 
significantly higher likelihood of cynicism toward the electoral system (Baumgartner and Morris 
2006). Pfau, Moy, and Szabo (2001) saw similar correlations between watching various 
television genres and perceptions of the federal government. For example, they saw a consistent 
negative correlation between individuals who watched science fiction shows, like the conspiracy-
filled show The X-Files, and confidence in different arms of the federal government. 
The dramatic fictional show The West Wing, which ran for seven seasons in the early 
2000s and depicted the lives of key figures in the Bartlet1 presidential administration, inspired 
                                                 
1 Josiah Bartlet is a fictional character on the show The West Wing played by Martin Sheen. During the seven-year 
run of the show, Bartlett is elected to the American presidency and serves two terms as president. Other key offices 
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quite different effects on viewers who watched a single episode (Holbert 2003). Holbert et al. 
(2003) asked participants to take a pretest questionnaire the morning of the original airing of an 
episode before attending the viewing treatment that evening. Directly after watching the episode, 
participants completed a posttest questionnaire designed to compare responses to their pretest 
questionnaire regarding their thoughts on character traits of the fictional president, the real-life 
sitting President George W. Bush, and former President Bill Clinton. The authors found that the 
positive images of fictional President Bartlet primed audience members to view the real-life 
presidents more positively. However, these effects were not only related to political leaders.  
Scholars have also noted the impact of these types of shows on increasing trust and positive 
perceptions of health professionals. For instance,  repeated viewing of medical dramas correlates 
with more positive perceptions of medical personnel in real life (Quick 2009). However, as 
Holbert et al. (2003) point out, the priming effect observed toward characters only relates to 
personality traits and not to actual policy. 
Slater, Rouner, and Long’s (2006) study of two dramas gives mixed evidence for priming 
effects on policy attitudes. The experiment involved participants watching either one episode of 
the crime drama Law and Order or the short feature film If These Walls Could Talk II, which 
primed its audience to consider the death penalty or same-sex marriage, respectively. The 
authors saw an increase in support for the death penalty among participants who watched Law 
and Order relative to those who watched If These Walls Could Talk. However, the results were 
more nuanced regarding views on same-sex marriage, where ideology was a stronger indicator 
than if the participant watched If These Walls Could Talk. The authors submit that suppression of 
ideology could be key in producing a persuasive effect. The results themselves do not discount 
                                                 
portrayed are that of the White House chief of staff, deputy chief of staff, press secretary, communications directors 
and speechwriters, national security advisors, aides, etc. 
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the priming effects of both dramas, but rather support the theories of attitude change as a 
complex process with various pathways of persuasion (see Bartsch and Schneider 2014; Hamby, 
et al. 2017; ; Slothuus 2008; Milton Lodge 2013). 
Chory-Assad (2004) explains that verbal aggression depicted on a show can influence 
aggressiveness in members of the audience, similar to the study of Rwandans emulating the 
political discourse they heard on the radio program (Paluck and Green 2009). This prime serves 
as an activation of aggressive thoughts, but does not necessarily result in aggressive behaviors. 
Holbrook and Hill (2005) see a comparable priming effect in their examination of exposure to 
the crime drama Law & Order. They find that being exposed to a single episode alters 
participants’ opinions on crime in America, believing it is more prevalent than do participants 
who were not exposed to the show. 
2.2.3.2 Framing Effects in Entertainment Media 
As previously discussed, framing effects are similar to priming in that both shape how we 
think about a topic at the individual level. A key example of framing effects in dramatic 
narratives on political attitudes is Mulligan and Habel’s (2011) experiment on frames in the film 
Cider House Rules. In the experiment, participants were asked to watch the film Cider House 
Rules, which depicts several points in a man’s life where he takes firm stances regarding 
abortion. As a boy, an aspiring physician is taught that life is sacred, and upon learning that his 
mentor performs illegal abortions to ensure the safety of the mothers, he is appalled and vows to 
never perform an abortion under any circumstance. However, as a young adult he is faced with 
the difficult situation of a young woman who becomes pregnant after repeated incestuous 
encounters with her father. After much deliberation, he decides that this is an extenuating 
circumstance and performs the abortion himself. The authors refer to this explicit message as the 
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abortion frame. Throughout the film, there is also what they call the morality frame, which is a 
more implicit message about needing to follow one’s own conscience in making day-to-day 
moral decisions—moral relativism as opposed to moral absolutism. Mulligan and Habel (2011) 
find that views in favor of legalized abortion were 17 percent higher in the treatment group over 
the control group. Views in favor of moral relativism were 11 percent higher in the treatment 
group over the control group. In all, both frames showed a significant impact on the audience. 
This is especially noteworthy because abortion is a deeply entrenched political issue and one that 
is not easily swayed.  
Although framing effects in dramatic narratives have not been extensively examined in 
political science, the Mulligan and Habel (2011) study provides clear evidence that framing 
effects in dramatic narratives are important to the study of political attitudes. Furthermore, the 
Slater, Rouner, and Long (2006) study demonstrates the importance of understanding why 
certain frames and primes are more influential than others. Mechanisms discussed in the 
psychology and communications literatures could be used to examine why, for example, the 
abortion frame in Cider House Rules was more effective than the same-sex relationship prime in 
If These Walls Could Talk. 
2.2.4 Dramatic Media Effects: TV and Film 
This dissertation manuscript looks more specifically at the role of media effects in 
dramatic narratives, using episodic shows as the primary context to examine the factor of time. 
Up to this point, television shows—I prefer the term episodic shows as many are watched online 
through streaming platforms rather than on a television set—are discussed in the literatures in 
their capacity to have immediate effects on attitudes toward America’s most important problem 
(typically crime: e.g. Holbrook and Hill 2005), perceptions of political roles (Holbert 2003; 
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Holbert, et al. 2005), or specific policy issues (Kearns and Young 2017; Mulligan and Habel 
2011; Quick, et al. 2013; Slater, et al. 2006). They examine the potential for attitude shifts in 
individuals who have been exposed to messaging through dramatic shows and films. 
Dramatic media effects make up a large part of communication’s study of how 
entertainment affects attitudes because dramas are more likely to induce this change than other 
forms of entertainment, and possibly even news media. To fully examine this assertion, this 
literature review continues on to briefly address the attitude change literature in political science 
and the entertainment-education literature on decreasing resistance to narrative persuasion in 
communication. 
2.3 Attitude Change 
This manuscript centers on the idea that dramatic narratives can influence audience 
members to change their attitudes toward a topic or object. First, however, it is important to relay 
the definitions and developments involved in this process as they are discussed in both the 
political science and communications literatures regarding attitude formation and attitude 
change. As with many concepts in this dissertation, the two fields are very similar in their study 
of attitudes and attitude change, but they are not identical and, at times, use different terminology 
for akin concepts.   
While the study of attitudes goes back much further, I will begin this discussion in the 
field of psychology with Martin Fishbein’s theory of reasoned action, which political science 
built upon in more recent decades. Fishbein’s theory of reasoned action, expanded from 
expectancy value theory (EVT), avers that attitudes are a factorial function of an individual’s 
beliefs and values; or, as Palmgreen (1985) explains, they are the result of an individual 
weighing their expectations that a given object or behavior will provide a certain result against 
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their positive or negative affective evaluations of those results. Fishbein and Azjen (1972) build 
upon the EVT to assert that it is not simply a matter of evaluations, but of behavioral intentions 
toward potential action. This theory of reasoned action (TRA) states that an individual’s 
intention to execute a certain behavior is comprised of both their own attitude about that 
behavior and their perception of social norms regarding the behavior (Ajzen and Fishbein 2008). 
The intention is further determined by the weight, or significance, the individual assigns to 
each—attitude vs. norm.  
In political science, Chong and Druckman (2007b) build on the EVT assertion to say that 
an attitude is the sum of all considerations regarding the topic times the weight the individual 
gives to each consideration. Much like Fishbein’s TRA, the authors claim that the weight, or 
significance, given to a specific consideration is a key factor in the opinion that will be 
expressed. Attitudes, which I will use interchangeably with opinions, are therefore a collection of 
EVT’s considerations (expectations considered with affective evaluations/predispositions) times 
the weight that the individual gives to each of these considerations available at the “top of the 
head” (see: R-A-S Model, Zaller 1992) based on the present information externally provided. 
Combined, these theories could be depicted as the following attitude formula:2 
𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒 = Σ(𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛) ∗ 𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡 
where weight is 
𝑓(𝑛) = 𝑒𝑥𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 ∗ 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 
More plainly stated, an attitude is a function of the collection of previously held values 
and beliefs on a subject added to the current information being considered and how important 
                                                 
2 This formula is a combination of the aforementioned theories on attitude formation, but its key basis comes from 
Chong and Druckman’s (2007b) preference formation model (𝑨 = Ʃ𝒗𝒊𝒘𝒊) with the factor of weight (𝒘) broken 
down to reflect Zaller’s (1992) explanation of attitudes as a combination of information and predisposition. 
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each consideration is to the individual at the moment they are providing the attitude. Political 
attitudes, then, are attitudes that relate to the role of government and other political topics, 
objects, and actors.  
2.3.1 Attitude Formation 
Zaller (1992) states that opinions are “a marriage of information and predisposition” (6). 
Each attitude or opinion presented by an individual is the result of combining the incoming 
information that the individual has been given with their predisposition toward the topic at hand. 
Zaller’s work maintains that opinions are given based on information available at the “top of the 
head” at the time of producing the opinion. Attitudes, then, are not stable tenets that individuals 
carry with them from conversation to conversation, but are instead nuances of stable values and 
are subject to change based on the current conversation. 
The formation of an attitude, political or otherwise, is “the initial change from having no 
attitude toward a given object to having some attitude toward it, either positive or negative” 
(Oskamp and Schultz 2005, 161). Theories on political attitude formation center on the idea that 
political socialization begins in the years of childhood and is primarily absorbed through 
exposure to the attitudes of close family members (Oskamp and Schultz 2005). This exposure 
and acceptance of new attitudes extends to political values, party identification, and interest in 
politics in general. Beyond the family unit, schools offer additional exposure to new political 
attitudes, as do a child’s peers and community. In the formation stage of political socialization, it 
is these first instances of exposure that may result in initial political attitudes. However, exposure 
to political attitudes that differ from those already held cannot result in attitude formation, as an 
initial attitude has already been formed. 
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2.3.2 Attitude Change 
Attitude change, on the other hand, requires first that an individual holds an existing 
attitude toward the given object, and second that something occurs which causes the attitude to 
become a different one. Druckman and McGrath (2019) state that there are three potential 
reactions to receiving new information: “no effect (that is, no movement of belief), 
persuasion/learning that involves updating in the direction of the information… or a back-lash 
effect, where belief moves in the direction opposite to the new information” (111). This 
resembles Zaller’s (1992) RAS model in that Zaller posits that new information will be accepted 
(persuasion) or rejected (no effect), but adds the additional layer of the potential for a “back-lash 
effect. This stipulates that the recipient not only rejects the new information but also updates his 
current belief to be stronger/closer to the previous information. Bonnette (2015) extends Zaller’s 
model to entertainment media, specifically music. She notes that incoming information via lyrics 
may either bolster a previous attitude when the new information concurs or invoke Zaller’s 
accept-or-reject step to attitude change, wherein the listener may choose to override their prior 
beliefs by accepting the new or to reject the new information in favor of prior beliefs. 
As Oskamp and Schultz (2005) explain, the processes of attitude formation and attitude 
change are often discussed synonymously, and indeed the processes can be similar. However, the 
literature on attitude change includes methods and theories quite distinct from attitude formation. 
Theories of attitude change include consistency theories, dissonance theory, and reactance 
theory. Consistency theories are cognitive-based and center on the presumption that people try to 
maintain consistent attitudes. New, inconsistent attitudes are likely to be met with skepticism and 
criticism because attitude inconsistencies tend to make individuals feel uncomfortable (Oskamp 
and Schultz 2005) This is not to say that individuals only hold congruent attitudes. Converse 
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(1964) explores the erratic nature of belief systems in the American public, asserting that most 
Americans hold logically inconsistent attitudes within their political ideology. Whereas the 
highly politically sophisticated hold belief systems largely unidimensional along the traditional 
left-right spectrum, mass attitudes tend to be more complex and less constrained by liberal and 
conservative ideologies (Lupton, et al. 2014). 
Cognitive dissonance theory, first proposed by Leon Festinger in 1957, states that when 
individuals hold two or more differing—dissonant—thoughts about a given object, they will feel 
discomfort; however, CDT does not imply that individuals will always revert back to initial 
attitudes. Instead, they will “resolve this state by altering their cognitions”—either compromising 
or changing their initial attitudes (Hinojosa, et al. 2016, 171). Individuals may also resolve this 
state by complying with new cues from party elites (Converse 1964) or softening under influence 
from their social network (Lupton, et al. 2015). Reactance theory, on the other hand, insists that 
when cognitive dissonance arises from multiple contradictory explicit attitudes, it will only 
bolster the individual’s initial attitude. Psychological reactance theory was initially developed to 
explain why individuals are attracted to those things that are “forbidden” to them (Van Petegem, 
et al. 2015). However, reactance theory has since been used to examine why individuals resist 
outside pressure toward attitude change, even in cases where the new information may be highly 
beneficial (Andersen, et al. 2017; Moyer-Gusé, et al. 2012; Moyer-Gusé and Nabi 2011; Taber 
and Lodge 2016).3 
In political science, reactance is discussed instead within the context of motivated 
reasoning. Taber and Lodge (2016) discuss motivated reasoning as the process underlying 
                                                 
3 Reactance theory later fed into self-determination theory, which claims that individuals push back against new 
information out of a need for autonomy (Van Petegem, et al. 2015). However, the studies foundational to my theory 
reference reactance and not SDT, so I chose to omit it from this paper. 
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confirmation and disconfirmation biases. When processing new information, individuals may be 
influenced not only by their previous attitudes and opinions related to the information, but also 
their attitudes and opinions about where the information is coming from. Taber and Lodge 
(2006) note that individuals form opinions about new information—whether as part of attitude 
formation or attitude change—with either a directional or an accuracy goal. Motivated reasoning 
involves a directional goal, in that individuals perceive the new information through a lens that 
pushes them toward a specific direction, like aligning with their favored party; whereas an 
accuracy goal involves individuals seeking to find the “right” answer (Bolsen, et al. 2013; 
Druckman and Bolsen 2011). 
 Further, Taber and Lodge (2006) see rational skepticism as being different from 
motivated reasoning, questioning the tipping point between skepticism and irrational bias. It is 
this irrational bias, as motivated by political partisanship, which has most captivated political 
scientists. Bolsen, Druckman, and Cook (2014) explain that partisan motivated reasoning 
happens when “individuals interpret information through the lens of their party commitment” 
(235). A democrat may not trust new information when it is relayed by a member of the 
Republican Party, or a republican may not trust new information when it is heavily associated 
with the Democratic Party. As is noted in studies of reactance, Bolsen, Druckman, and Cook 
(2014) find that overt cross-partisan endorsement of a particular policy leads individuals to 
disagree with the policy. Their solution was to trigger an accuracy motivation to cancel out the 
directional goal, and their results led them to acknowledge that “the motivation driving opinion 
formation clearly matters and this has been a topic lacking in study” (Bolsen, et al. 2013, 252).  
The topic is not lacking in study in other social sciences, however. Entertainment-
education studies have shown success in reducing reactance through dramatic narrative (e.g. 
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Moyer-Gusé, et al. 2012; Moyer-Gusé and Nabi 2010). Moyer-Gusé and Nabi (2010; 2011), for 
example, found that teens who watched a video portraying a dramatic narrative that included 
negative consequences for the protagonist’s risky sexual behavior were more likely to express 
intent toward safe sex practices than those who watched an informational video on the 
consequences of risky sexual behavior. Moyer-Gusé, Jain, and Chung (2012) show evidence that 
individual who viewed a dramatic television program with implicit messages to discourage 
drinking and driving did not express reactance to these messages. Furthermore, the authors note 
reactance remained diminished even after the explicit appeal made in a PSA following the 
program. It is this potential for reducing reactance, thereby potentially reducing directional 
motivated reasoning, that makes dramatic narratives a key conduit to consider when studying 
media effects on political attitudes. 
2.4 Narrative Persuasion 
Dramatic narratives in films and shows can play a pivotal role in influencing political 
attitude change through the weight factor of the attitude formula. Chong and Druckman (2007a) 
make the case that framing effects change the weight of this formula by placing a specific frame 
around the communication, thereby making certain associated thoughts more important in that 
given moment. Dramatic narratives, like news media, frames the messages it contains (Bahk 
2009; Bartsch, et al. 2014; Mulligan and Habel 2011). Through frames and the use of narrative 
techniques that decrease reactance, dramatic narratives can affect attitudes through narrative 
persuasion. 
One of the primary reasons for examining dramatic narratives for their persuasive effects 
is that explicit persuasive messages—like those discussed by Moyer-Gusé and Nabi (2011) in 
educational videos—can elicit reactance and promote motivated reasoning in viewers. The 
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advantage of dramatic narratives regarding persuasion is the difference in how individuals 
engage with the media and process the messages therein. Hamby, Brinberg, and Jaccard’s (2018) 
thorough examination of narrative persuasion explains the framework through which attitude 
change is possible. They use the psychology and communication literatures to build a model of 
the narrative persuasion process. Within this process, two deictic shifts occur: One of the viewer 
placing himself into the story via absorption (strongly related to the concepts of transportation, 
narrative engagement/parasocial interaction, and identification) and one of the viewer removing 
himself from the story to reflect upon it within his own life (which is enhanced by the perceived 
realism of the narrative). Much like news viewers need to be able to relate a campaign speech to 
issues they care about in order to be moved by the speech (Iyengar and Kinder 2010), it is the act 
of reflection that allows narrative persuasion to induce attitude change (Hamby, et al. 2018). 
A deictic shift occurs when “readers shift their deictic center from themselves to a locus 
in the narrative in order to comprehend and be absorbed by the story” (Hamby, et al. 2018); a 
deictic center is a reference point for understanding context, “typically the present time, location, 
participant role, and so forth of the speaker” (SIL International 2005). An individual’s primary 
deictic center, or deixis, is herself at the exact location and moment in time she is currently 
experiencing. Shifting her deictic center into a narrative involves imagining herself as being a 
particular character (identification) or being in the time and place where the story is set 
(transportation). In American colloquial terms, this is sometimes called “putting yourself in 
someone else’s shoes.” 
Hamby, Brinberg, and Jaccard (2018) suggest that the deictic shift into the story 
(absorption) and then back into one’s own life while relating the two deictic centers (reflection) 
is the key process for inciting persuasive outcomes. In their model absorption, or losing oneself 
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in the narrative, is necessary for comprehension of the story and requires a “willing suspension 
of disbelief” (3). This “uncritical approach,” they note, decreases the desire and ability to 
“scrutinize messages in the narrative and to generate counterarguments” (Hamby, et al. 2018, 3). 
In other words, people turn to entertainment as a means of escape or with the motivation of 
feeling deeply (Oliver and Bartsch 2010; Oliver and Raney 2011), not with the desire to mentally 
argue against explicit, or implicit, messages embedded in the narrative. Hamby, Brinberg, and 
Jaccard (2018) aver that the first step, absorption, occurs via three potential mechanisms: 
Transportation, identification, and narrative engagement. Although these terms are sometimes 
used interchangeably and are represented by different terms in different fields and subfields, I 
will maintain use of the word absorption to refer to the deictic shift of an individual into a 
narrative. 
For additional terms, I refer to Moyer-Gusé’s (2008b) definitions, as they relate 
specifically to audio-visual narratives (movies, shows, etc.). She maintains Green and Brock’s 
definition that transportation, or narrative involvement, refers to the “notion of being swept up 
into the storyline” when an individual’s mental capacity is fully focused on the events within the 
story (Moyer-Gusé 2008b, 409). Identification, on the other hand, is one form of involvement 
with characters in the narrative. In a later study, Moyer-Gusé and Nabi (2010) break down the 
broader category of involvement with characters into identification (with a chosen character, 
often the protagonist), wishful identification (with a preferred character), perceived similarity 
(between himself and a certain character), and parasocial interaction (PSI, in which a viewer 
feels as personally connected to a character as she might feel connected to a friend). In each 
version of identification, the viewer’s deictic shift allows him to cognitively and emotionally 
associate himself as a specific character in the narrative. He will perceive the storyline through 
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what he imagines as the lens of that character (Bahk 2009; Hamby, et al. 2018; Lather and 
Moyer-Guse 2011; Moyer-Gusé 2008a; 2008b; Moyer-Gusé, et al. 2011; Moyer-Gusé and Nabi 
2011). 
The second deictic shift, back into one’s own life in the real world, ignites reflective 
processes in the viewer’s mind. Hamby, Brinberg, and Jaccard (2018) are firm that absorption is 
the starting point of the persuasion process; absorption alone—even long-term memory of a 
story—does not inherently result in persuasion. Narrative reflection, the authors posit, is the 
potential result of narrative processing, “drawing inferences from actors engaged in goals, and 
then extrapolating to one’s life,” and finding meaning from those inferences in one’s own life 
(Hamby, et al. 2018, 7). It is this intentional reflection, relating the messages of the narrative to 
one’s own life, that creates space for persuasion (Bartsch, et al. 2014; Hamby, et al. 2017; 
Hamby, et al. 2018; Oliver and Bartsch 2010). 
This explanation of deictic shifts into the narrative (absorption) and back into reality 
(reflection) is directly comparable to much of the work on narrative persuasion. For example, 
Bartsch, Kalch, and Oliver (2014; see also Oliver and Bartsch 2010) note that the two processes 
of absorption into a dramatic narrative and of reflection afterward are imperative to spark the 
cognitive elaboration process and potentially elicit attitude change. Moyer-Gusé and Nabi (2010; 
2011; see also Moyer-Gusé 2008a) use similar concepts within their updated Elaboration 
Likelihood Model to show an extensive breakdown of how absorption into a narrative and 
reflection after viewing can affect attitudes toward risky sexual behaviors in teens. Furthermore, 
engaging in this process of absorption and reflection has been noted for its potential to affect 
politically-relevant attitudes (Bahk 2010; Slater, et al. 2006) and may reduce stigma toward 
marginalized groups (Igartua, et al. 2014; Moyer-Gusé, et al. 2019). 
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2.5 Mediated Intergroup Contact 
Mediated intergroup contact is discussed in two primary ways: As vicarious intergroup 
contact in which the viewer observes an onscreen member of their ingroup interacting with an 
outgroup member, or as mediated intergroup contact in which the viewer identifies with an 
onscreen member of the outgroup through parasocial interaction/parasocial contact. This can be 
an interaction based in reality or part of a fictional narrative. The interaction may be positive, 
negative, or mixed. It also matters whether the onscreen outgroup member interacts with a 
member of their own group, a majority group member, a member of the viewer’s ingroup, or a 
member of a different outgroup. Sometimes the viewer is only able to reduce their prejudice 
toward the outgroup character, considering them an exception, but other times the viewer is able 
to expand that decreased prejudice to the entire real-world outgroup. 
2.5.1 Building on Contact Theory 
Social cognitive theory (SCT) claims that humans learn not only through personal 
experience, but also through observation (Ortiz and Harwood 2007). This observation is not 
confined to the immediate world of the observer, but extends to the world as portrayed through 
media (Bandura 2001). In terms of diminishing intergroup bias or conflict, SCT would assert that 
continued exposure to seeing ingroup and outgroup members engaging in positive contact and 
relationships will shift their view toward accepting these interactions as the societal norm. It 
would also posit that viewing these positive interactions will decrease prejudice toward the 
outgroup member and allow the viewer to generalize their positive perception of the outgroup 
member to the entire outgroup. 
Intergroup contact theory, based on Allport’s contact hypothesis, instead suggests that 
engaging with an outgroup member will be far more effective in diminishing prejudice than 
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simply observing intergroup interactions. Early intergroup contact research indicates that 
intergroup contact may reduce or exacerbate prejudice; however, Pettigrew et al (2011) instead 
attribute the mixed results of early research to “[1] Their incomplete samples of relevant papers, 
[2] their absence of strict inclusion rules, and [3] their non-quantitative assessments of contact 
effects,” further noting that several studies used intergroup proximity, and not intergroup contact, 
as their independent variable (274). More recent examinations of intergroup contact theory show 
promising evidence that intergroup contact more regularly diminishes anxiety and prejudice 
toward outgroup members than was previously believed, sometimes allowing positive beliefs 
toward an outgroup member to be generalized to the entire outgroup (Pettigrew, et al. 2011). 
Indirect intergroup contact—when you have an ingroup friend who has an outgroup 
friend—can also serve to make this intergroup interaction more “normatively acceptable” (as 
suggested by SCT), but does not show as strong effects as direct intergroup contact (Pettigrew et 
al 2011). The authors suggest indirect intergroup contact may be an important step toward direct 
intergroup contact. As such, indirect ntergroup contact mediated through dramatic narratives in 
television and film could offer another such helpful stepping stone. Whereas direct intergroup 
contact has been criticized in places of extreme intergroup contact as difficult and dangerous 
(Pettigrew et al 2011), mediated intergroup contact is relatively safe and easy, especially given 
the wide array of options and the entertainment industry’s growing desire to present more 
inclusive material. 
2.5.2 Facilitating Mediated Intergroup Contact 
Two primary purposes of examining dramatic narrative as a means of influencing 
sociopolitical attitudes are 1) understanding its ability to reduce resistance to embedded 
messages and promote narrative persuasion and 2) understanding its ability to reduce anxiety and 
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increase empathy toward an outgroup through mediated intergroup contact. In both cases, 
identification plays a key role in fostering attitudinal change in the viewer. In the case of 
narrative persuasion, parasocial interaction reduces reactance in the viewer, especially for 
implicit messages, and cognitive-emotional identification reduces active counterarguing (Moyer-
Gusé and Nabi 2010). In the case of mediated intergroup contact, identification with an outgroup 
character—especially through empathy and perspective taking—increases empathy and 
decreases anxiety toward the outgroup in the real-world. 
Mediated intergroup contact refers to exposure to indirect intergroup contact through 
media, often entertainment media and dramatic narratives. This mediated contact can occur 
either as vicarious contact, in which the viewer identifies with an ingroup character who has an 
onscreen interaction with an outgroup character, or as parasocial contact, in which the viewer 
identifies with an onscreen member of the outgroup. Parasocial interaction can affect the viewer 
both when based in reality—through a documentary or unscripted program—or as part of a 
fictional narrative (Moyer-Gusé, et al. 2019). Either way, identification seems to serve as the 
primary mechanism in mediated intergroup contact for reducing anxiety and increasing empathy 
toward the outgroup character—and toward the real-world outgroup (Moyer-Gusé, et al. 2019; 
Ortiz and Harwood 2007). 
Similar to Allport’s contact conditions, Ortiz and Harwood (2007) suggest that mediated 
contact requires identification with a character in order to “vicariously participate” in the 
interaction. However, the particular definition the authors provide for identification, “when 
viewers perceive themselves as similar to a character and vicariously participate in the 
character’s experiences,” may be more specifically termed perceived similarity and parasocial 
interaction (Ortiz and Harwood 2007, 618). Although both are forms of identification, perceived 
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similarity refers to the recognition of traits in a character that the viewer perceives as being 
similar to themselves, and parasocial interaction (PSI) refers to the feeling of being a part of the 
experience, as though the onscreen characters could be your friends (see Moyer-Gusé 2008). 
This idea of “vicariously participat[ing] in the character’s experiences” could also be described 
more simply as transportation, the feeling of being absorbed and mentally transported into the 
scene. The authors further describe identification as occurring “when individuals view 
themselves as the character within the program; adopt the character’s perspective; experience 
and understand the character’s emotions; and understand how and why the character acts the way 
he or she does” (Ortiz and Harwood 2007). Again, these can be labeled more specifically as 
cognitive-emotional identification—viewing oneself as the character or experiencing and 
understanding the character’s emotions—or empathy and perspective taking—adopting the 
character’s perspective or understanding the character’s actions (see Chory-Assad and Cicchirillo 
2005).  
Ortiz and Harwood (2007) assert that mediated intergroup contact may serve as a step 
toward real-world intergroup contact (see also Pettigrew et al 2011). Because it is not so severe 
as to expect viewers to fully embrace the outgroup character’s views and emotions, as with 
cognitive-emotional identification, or to see them as a friend, as with group identification or 
parasocial interaction, empathy is likely easier to achieve with an outgroup character, especially 
toward the beginning of viewing. As Chory-Assad and Cicchirillo (2005) point out, however, 
empathy with an onscreen character may serve as a precursor to cognitive-emotional 
identification. Relatedly, identification with the ingroup character who is experiencing intergroup 
contact onscreen may be more important, especially at the beginning, for producing eventual 
parasocial interaction (Moyer-Gusé, et al. 2019). Moyer-Gusé, Dale, and Ortiz (2019) also find 
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that identification through parasocial interaction and simply liking the outgroup character—in 
their study, non-Muslim viewers liking an onscreen Muslim character—can evoke feelings of 
guilt, which “can motivate an individual to develop more favorable attitudes and behaviors 
toward the outgroup” (9). 
2.5.2.1 Negative vs. Positive Mediated Intergroup Contact 
In addition to identification, Ortiz and Harwood (2007) state the onscreen intergroup 
interaction must be positive to serve as mediated contact, and the character must represent group 
typicality, which they describe as meaning “the more the outgroup character is perceived as 
representative of his or her group, the more likely exposure to positive intergroup contact will 
translate into positive intergroup attitudes” (618). However, an extensive review of intergroup 
contact studies suggests that both positive and negative intergroup contact may invoke positive 
results (Pettigrew et al 2011).  Furthermore, there are other factors that influence the impact of 
negative intergroup contact. Voluntary intergroup contact that skews negative is not likely to 
increase prejudice, and may even decrease prejudice; however, involuntary positive intergroup 
contact, on the other hand, may not decrease prejudice (Pettigrew et al 2011).  
As many other aspects of in-person intergroup contact seem highly relevant to mediated 
intergroup contact, the nuances of contact type (positive or negative) and conditions (voluntary, 
history, etc.) may impact mediated intergroup contact similarly. Given that entertainment media 
consumption is largely voluntary, for example, even depictions of negative intergroup contact 
may induce positive results such as decreasing anxiety of the outgroup (Ortiz and Harwood 
2007). However, positive depictions of intergroup contact, and especially teamwork, serve most 
strongly to reduce anxiety toward the outgroup (Dale and Moyer-Gusé 2020). The results 
discussed in Chapter 5 indicate that shows depicting the Muslim terrorist stereotype may not 
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simply offer either a negative mediated intergroup experience or a positive one, but many shows 
instead portray nuanced characters and intergroup relationships. 
2.5.2.2 Decreasing Resistance to Narrative Persuasion 
Several factors of narrative persuasion increase the likelihood of an embedded message in 
entertainment media influencing audience members beyond the initial narrative exposure. 
Although identification plays an essential role, absorption and reflection must still be 
experienced by the viewer to produce real-world results (Hamby, et al. 2017; Hamby, et al. 
2018). Absorption refers to an individual shifting their own deictic center—or point of 
view/perspective—to that of the story, meaning they begin to experience the narrative from 
within it. Reflection refers to the individual experiencing elaborative processing by relating 
elements of the narrative to their own life once they have shifted their perspective—deictic 
center—back into their own reality. 
Identification occurs in tandem with absorption when an individual shifts their deictic 
center into a story and also takes on the perspective of a specific character or understands a 
character or characters in relation to themselves within the story. As described above, there are 
multiple forms of identification, each of which increase the potential for narrative persuasion via 
various mechanisms. Moyer-Gusé and Nabi (2010) find evidence that cognitive-emotional 
identification with or perceived similarity to an onscreen character can decrease feelings of 
perceived vulnerability, which can diminish reflection in audience members. Cognitive-
emotional identification, when the viewer takes on the emotions and perspective of the character, 
showed an immediate decrease in viewers’ perceived vulnerability, while perceived similarity 
showed a lagged effect (Moyer-Gusé and Nabi 2010). They also found evidence that parasocial 
interaction, or feeling that one has a face-to-face relationship with a character, may decrease 
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reactance to embedded messages, especially when the message is implicit rather than explicit 
(Moyer-Gusé and Nabi 2010). 
2.6 Benefits to Political Science Research 
Perhaps one of the most significant factors that dramatic narratives in films and shows 
lend to the study of political behavior is their potential to lessen or even bypass directional 
motivated reasoning. Druckman and McGrath (2019) posit that information input versus prior 
held beliefs is not a sufficient description of the preference formation process. The authors argue 
credibility plays a key role in motivating individuals toward acceptance or rejection. It is not 
simply that an individual weighs new and prior information objectively, but that the “strength of 
an individual’s confidence in the new information relative to her strength of confidence in the 
prior best guess determines both the extent to which belief moves in response to the new 
information, and the strength of the confidence in that new belief” (Druckman and McGrath 
2019, 112). Given three potential outcomes—no effect, persuasion, or backlash—confidence in 
the validity of new information may be what makes new information more or less likely to shift 
one’s prior beliefs. 
Identification with a fictional character in a dramatic narrative—in the form of perceived 
similarity to that character, of liking the character strongly, of wishful identification or wishing 
to be like them, or of parasocial interaction (PSI), which allows audience members to relate to a 
character similar to a real-life friend—has been shown to reduce reactance (Hamby, et al. 2018; 
Moyer-Gusé, et al. 2011; Moyer-Gusé and Nabi 2011). Similarly, Andersen et al. (2017) find 
that exposure to a news story with exemplars similar to the respondents “triggered an empathic 
concern and increased political participation intentions,” while stories with dissimilar exemplars 
“decreased empathic concern, which in turn decreased political participation intentions” (490). 
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Communication scholars may label this type of identification as “perceived similarity,” and find 
it to be a significant condition for decreasing resistance to narrative persuasion (Moyer-Gusé and 
Nabi 2010; 2011). 
Indeed, each of the directional motivated reasoning mechanisms discussed in political 
science can be seen in patterns of resistance to explicit messages in dramatic narratives explained 
by communication scholars in the entertainment-education literature. The confirmation bias, 
defined by Druckman and McGrath (2019) as the “tendency to seek out information that 
confirms one’s own beliefs” is also referred to by both political science and communication as 
selective exposure (113). The prior attitude affect, which places the strength of new information 
as being relative to one’s prior belief, may account for weak absorption and identification in a 
dramatic narrative. When one’s prior attitudes are too far from those portrayed onscreen, it may 
shatter the illusion created and diminish one’s ability to “connect” with the material. When 
messages in a dramatic narrative are explicit, this can also elicit counterarguing (Moyer-Gusé 
and Nabi 2011), or a disconfirmation bias, which Druckman and McGrath (2019) describe as 
“greater scrutiny and counter-argumentation of information contrary to one’s prior beliefs” 
(113). 
Examinations of entertainment-oriented, soft news demonstrate the strong ability of non-
traditional sources to influence political knowledge and voting patterns, especially in non-
politically oriented viewers (Baum 2004; Baum and Jamison 2006; Baumgartner and Morris 
2006). Soft news can be described as non-traditional, information-oriented media characterized 
by specific characteristics, namely “the absence of a public policy component, sensationalized 
presentation, human-interest themes, and emphasis on dramatic subject matter, such as crime and 
disaster” (Baum 2004, 92). Unsurprisingly, these characteristics are what tie them closely with 
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entertainment media, the dramatic presentations and endearing hosts being far more appealing 
than traditional news broadcasts. Yet, these shows do provide compelling information that 
reaches audiences. Viewers of The Daily Show, for example, are more likely to feel confident in 
their political knowledge (Baumgartner and Morris 2006). When exposed to Tina Fey’s 
impersonation of then-vice presidential candidate Sarah Palin, individuals self-reporting as 
Republican and Independent were afterward less approving of Palin as an appropriate running 
mate for Republican presidential candidate John McCain (Baumgartner, et al. 2012). 
Baumgartner and Morris (2008) even found evidence that Stephen Colbert’s spoof character of 
himself as a staunch conservative ideologue on his popular late-night show The Colbert Report 
increased affinity of Republicans in viewers. 
Given the role that communication scholars see of identification in decreasing resistance 
to narrative persuasion, it is likely no small wonder that these characters can influence attitude 
shifts in their audience members. However, soft news media still does not have nearly the 
viewership numbers of shows watched purely for entertainment. Further, shows like those 
Baumgartner and Morris have examined for political influence—The Daily Show with Jon 
Stewart (2012), The Colbert Report (2008), and Saturday Night Live (2012)—suffer from 
selective exposure in that they are more likely to be watched by individuals who are younger and 
more liberal (Baumgartner and Morris 2006). 
However, entertainment-education studies note that dramatic narratives are more likely to 
induce attitude shifts (Moyer-Gusé and Nabi 2010) and reduce resistance (Moyer-Gusé and Nabi 
2011) than their information-oriented counterparts. Watching crime shows like CSI or Law & 
Order can prime audiences to believe crime is a much larger problem in America than it actually 
is (Holbrook and Hill 2005; Pettey and Bracken 2008). Mulligan and Habel (2011) show that 
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both the implicit frame (morality) and explicit frame (abortion is a choice) can affect attitude 
shifts in viewers of dramatic feature film The Cider House Rules. Viewing scenes from The West 
Wing, which depicts a strong, fair economist-turned-politician in the democrat President Josiah 
Bartlet, can influence not only how individuals view the many roles of the president (Holbert, et 
al. 2005), but also their approval of real-world presidents and their success (Holbert 2003). 
Kearns and Young (2019) note greater expressed interest in political action after exposure to a 
torture scene from popular TV show 24, and note that individuals watching the scene depicting 
torture as unsuccessful in coercing the character to give up information were more likely to sign 
a petition against using torture for interrogation than individuals watching the scene where 
torture is shown as successful. This evidence altogether suggests that political and sociopolitical 
messages in dramatic narratives are effective in decreasing resistance to narrative persuasion—in 




3 UNDERSTANDING THE IMPACT OF CONTEMPORARY ENTERTAINMENT 
MEDIA CONSUMPTION PATTERS ON SOCIAL AND POLITICAL ATTITUDES 
Entertainment media, through narrative persuasion, can have significant, lasting effects 
on the social and political attitudes of viewers. While we understand the components of narrative 
persuasion and its effects relatively well, its role in mediated intergroup contact has only recently 
come to the fore. Mediated intergroup contact occurs as a form of vicarious contact between 
members of two social groups, typically a majority ingroup and minority outgroup, without the 
added anxiety of a real world interaction (Ortiz and Harwood 2007). As such, this mediated 
contact could work to not only greatly diminish cultural intergroup conflict, but also interparty 
conflict. Further, in conjunction with narrative persuasion, it could diminish the prejudice and 
biases that impact certain policy attitudes in the American public. However, contemporary 
consumption methods, such as binge watching, may hinder these potentially very positive 
effects. In this chapter, I begin to explore how mediated intergroup contact theory might be 
extended to influence interparty prejudice and policy attitudes. Then, I explore two theories: 1. 
Accumulative effects of negative mediated intergroup contact may increase prejudice and 
approval of public policies that negatively affect an outgroup, and 2. Binge effects may decrease 
the impact of narrative persuasion and mediated intergroup contact. In each section of the 
chapter, I link the concepts in question to the three empirical chapters of this manuscript and the 
studies therein, culminating in an extended explanation of binge effects theory. 
3.1 Mediated Interparty Contact 
In the past, contact theory has largely been used to examine how certain conditions of 
social contact between members of differing social groups can diminish prejudice. Typically, this 
has referred to social groups differentiated by their race, ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation, or 
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religion. However, recent evidence from a study by Iyengar and Westwood (2015) notes that 
political party, rather than race, may serve as the most divisive social identity in America. How, 
then, may social contact—and my more particular interested, mediated intergroup contact—serve 
to diminish interparty prejudice? 
In Chapter 4, I explore the impact of narrative persuasion on policy attitudes as well as 
social attitudes. Much of my findings reflect current understanding in the literature regarding the 
importance of identification and absorption. However, I find that very little narrative persuasion 
can be evidenced by participant discussions. Instead, I discover the potential for a new path of 
examining mediated intergroup contact beyond the typical exploration of racial, ethnic, 
gendered, or sexual orientation identities. The main finding of this chapter suggests that 
behaviors and opinions of the political “other,” rather than policy attitudes, are more likely 
affected by onscreen political disputes. As such, this chapter begins to ask whether mediated 
intergroup contact can be extended to a very different type of social group: Political identity. 
3.2 Accumulative Effects on Narrative Persuasion and Mediated Intergroup Contact 
Does mediated intergroup contact increase in efficacy with accumulation of exposure? 
Mediated intergroup contact may lessen anxiety and increase empathy toward outgroup members 
in the real world. However, political science studies up to this point have focused on single-
episode exposure or observational correlations between shows watched and beliefs. One political 
science study, conducted in Rwanda by Paluck and Green (2009), examines the effects of 
consistent exposure to certain behaviors in a dramatic, fictional radio program using a 
longitudinal, year-long experiment in sites across the country. They find that this consistent 
exposure does impact audience perceptions of social norms, as well as intended behaviors. This 
may indicate that narrative persuasion shifts behaviors with extended exposure, but do the effects 
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of mediated intergroup contact increase or strengthen with extended exposure, as well? In other 
words, are there accumulative effects with mediated exposure to indirect intergroup contact? 
3.2.1 Cultivation Theory 
Gerbner (1998) describes mass media cultivation of social reality a “gravitational 
process” rather than a “unidirectional” one, explaining that mass media will alter the social 
reality perceived by various groups in society based on their relationship to mainstream 
television (180). “The angle and direction of the ‘pull’ depends on where groups of viewers and 
their styles of life are with reference to the line of gravity, or the ‘mainstream’ of the world of 
television” (Gerbner 1998, 180). Mainstream television creates this “line of gravity” by 
establishing certain norms within their programming. The more individuals consume mainstream 
television, the more they will assume these norms within their concept of social reality.  
Gerbner’s cultivation theory, also referred to as “drip, drip effects,” has both served as 
foundation for media research and been thoroughly critiqued (see Potter 2014). However, 
scholars today are more likely to focus on viewership of specific media genres rather than total 
television viewing, which Potter (2014) notes may not examine cultivation effects, but selective 
exposure. I also find that very few political scientists endeavor to examine the accumulative 
effects of dramatic media, though dramatic media effects on political attitudes have been studied 
at length for their immediate influence. Priming in dramatic media, for example, can influence 
views toward the real-world president (Holbert et al 2005) and perceptions of crime rates in 
America (Holbrook and Hill 2005). Mulligan and Habel (2011) examine how frames in the 
dramatic film The Cider House Rules affect attitudes toward abortion laws (79). Each of these 
studies look at immediate effects of dramatic media, rather than lasting effects. 
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Several impressive studies that do examine accumulated dramatic media effects, 
however, do not discuss the underlying mechanisms of these effects using the vocabulary 
outlined in this manuscript. Gierzynski and Eddy (2016) use extensive survey data to examine 
the lasting influence of the Harry Potter franchise on Millennials’ political and social values. 
Hether et al (2009), who opt for a quasi-natural experiment, collect survey data at multiple times 
over a television season to find evidence that similar breast cancer storylines in two primetime 
shows may affect policy beliefs. Paluck and Green’s (2009) study in post-genocide Rwanda 
includes a year-long experiment to examine whether listening to a dramatic, fictional radio 
program could alter perceptions of sociopolitical behaviors and listeners’ willingness to alter 
their own behaviors. 
However, streaming services and the surge of new material they bring in terms of 
amount, story and character diversity, and availability may change the strength of that gravity. 
Harmon et al (2019) find that streaming service users do not show the same “affluenza 
symptoms” of materialism and life dissatisfaction associated with watching too much television. 
The authors posit that audience program selectivity translates to audience message selectivity, 
thereby eliminating the connection cultivation theory makes between increased television 
viewing and greater expression of specific social norms. Similarly, binge watching may lessen 
the gravitational effects Gerbner describes by lessening the persuasive impact of message 
outliers. 
3.2.2 Accumulative Impact 
I posit that increased exposure to certain norms through entertainment media will 
accumulate to impact perceptions of real-world social norms. When these depictions include 
members of an outgroup, they will impact not only social perceptions of the outgroup and its 
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members, but also viewers’ attitudes toward policies that impact the marginalized outgroup. 
Portrayals of positive intergroup contact could decrease prejudice toward outgroup members and 
decrease approval of policies that negatively affect the outgroup. However, the opposite is also 
true: Portrayals of negative intergroup contact could increase prejudice toward outgroup 
members and increase approval of policies that negatively affect them. As exposure to the new 
social norm accumulates, so does its impact on sociopolitical attitudes. 
However, streaming services and the surge of new material they bring in terms of 
amount, story and character diversity, and availability may change the strength of that gravity. 
Harmon et al (2019) find that streaming service users do not show the same “affluenza 
symptoms” of materialism and life dissatisfaction associated with watching too much television. 
The authors posit that audience program selectivity translates to audience message selectivity, 
thereby eliminating the connection cultivation theory makes between increased television 
viewing and greater expression of specific social norms. Similarly, binge watching may lessen 
the gravitational effects Gerbner describes by lessening the persuasive impact of message 
outliers. 
In Chapter 5, I explore the potential for accumulative entertainment media effects. In 
particular, I examine the impact of increased, accumulated exposure to the Muslim terrorist 
stereotype present in many popular television shows. I observe whether increased exposure has a 
greater impact as it accumulates across programs, and whether some character depictions are 
more influential than others. I study these effects on social attitudes toward Muslims and on 
policy attitudes toward counterterrorism policies and policies affecting people from Muslim-
majority countries. 
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3.3 Media Consumption Method Effects 
The contemporary media environment includes many platforms, mediums, and screens. 
The Nielsen Company (2018) reports that the average American spends nearly 11 hours per day 
looking at screens—nearly half the entire day! Television viewing comprises nearly 4.5 (40 
percent) of those hours, and 20 percent of overall American television viewing is done via a 
streaming platform rather than a television set. In 2014, only 75 percent of Americans owned a 
smartphone, up from 60 percent in 2013, and only 40 percent subscribed to some type of video-
on-demand service, up from 21 percent in 2013 (Nielsen 2014). Just six years later, in the first 
quarter of 2020, Nielsen (2020) reports that on average Americans spend nearly four hours per 
day accessing the Internet or an app via their smartphone, and more than 2.5 hours on a tablet, 
computer, or Internet-connected device. Another four hours is spent viewing live or time-shifted 
television (Nielsen 2020), with nearly 19 percent of all television viewing occurring through a 
streaming platform (Spangler 2020). Needless to say, the way Americans consume media has 
drastically changed since 2000, when the hottest new trend was upgrading physical DVDs to HD 
and Blu-Ray (Nielsen 2014).4 
Nielsen (2020) does admit, however, that “some amount of simultaneous usage may 
occur across devices,” indicating that some of their measurements may overlap (for example, the 
Smart TV app would also be considered an Internet connected device), but also alluding to the 
fact that many Americans interact with more than one screen at a time. While only 28 percent of 
Americans say they “sometimes” use their phone or tablet while watching television, a whopping 
45 percent say they “very often” or “always” use a second screen (Perez 2018). Daniel 
                                                 
4 DVD, or digital versatile disc, is form of digital optical disc storage developed in 1995 and widely used for 
viewing films and show series. Video storage upgrades to this medium include HD, which stands for high definition, 
and Blu-Ray, which can store larger quantities of HD video than a DVD. 
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Kahneman (2011) describes four different conditions that make “thinking slow,” or using more 
elaborative thinking processes, even harder. One of these conditions is switching between tasks, 
not unlike diverting attention from watching a show to responding to a text message, or even 
looking up something the show bring up. This increased cognitive load during viewing can 
diminish absorption, reflection, and attitude effects (Hamby, et al. 2017). Additionally, the 
elevated number of input signals increases the likelihood of audience members to process 
incoming information according to their confirmation bias, focusing on the information that 
aligns with strong prior beliefs and dismissing the rest (Leung 2020). This selective information 
processing already poses an obstacle to diminishing partisan and directional motivated reasoning 
prior to the introduction of multiple stimuli, predisposing individuals to agree more strongly with 
partisan messaging with which they already agree while observing bias in messaging that aligns 
with the opposing party’s viewpoint (Feldman 2010) 
In Iyengar and Kinder’s (1987) seminal work on media effects, they address the issue of 
experimental research being in contrast with mundane realism, asserting that while experiments 
are important to the field of political science and especially to political communication, 
observational research is still necessary. The real world problem of the inattentive audience is 
one that does not often translate to laboratory experiment conditions, yet it remains a key factor 
diminishing the connection “between the supply of information, on the one hand, and its 
consumption, on the other” (Iyengar and Kinder 2010, 143). In the case of entertainment media 
effects research, the attentive experimental audience may exhibit increased absorption, which 
may overinflate results of narrative persuasion. Some efforts have been made in media effects 
experimental research to increase the perception of mundane realism through experimental 
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settings that resemble living rooms or through online studies that mimic natural online behavior 
(see McDermott 2002). 
3.3.1 The Drench Hypothesis 
The question of whether high impact or frequent viewing more deeply impacts television 
audiences has long been discussed but seldom studied in a political science context. There are, 
indeed, two prevailing explanations in the communications literature that describe the most 
impactful factors of dramatic narrative: Quantity or quality. Again, cultivation theory asserts that 
continued exposure to similar messages and themes in media—entertainment or otherwise—will 
shift audience perceptions of social norms toward those depicted in the media. The more 
prevalent the depiction of society, the more likely it is to be seen as typical by the majority—an 
effect of quantity (Gerbner 1998). Continued exposure to a stereotype, for example, will increase 
viewers’ beliefs that the stereotype is typical of the group the character represents. Ortiz and 
Harwood (2007) find that mediated intergroup contact, in which a majority member views a 
program with an outgroup member and in some way empathizes with that character, can reduce 
anxiety toward the outgroup as a whole. While this particular theory has not yet been observed 
over time, Reep and Dambrot (1989) observed that the more frequently an individual watched a 
show, the more likely they would be to list recurring characters as stereotypical. 
The drench hypothesis, on the other hand, expects that a single instance of high-impact 
exposure will have greater lasting effects on viewers—an effect of quality (Bahk 2009; Reep and 
Dambrot 1987). Reep and Dambrot (1989) look to Greenberg’s “drench” hypothesis, which 
states that “viewers may not be influenced by continual repetition of images, but rather some 
particular characters or programs may have an intense and significant impact on viewers and, 
thus, are far more influential than the accumulated images of numerous other characters and 
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programs” (543). Frequency, they claim, is therefore less significant than a high-impact 
characters and images. Bahk (2001a) takes a similar stance, arguing that high-impact films like 
Outbreak about a brutal global pandemic greatly influence sociopolitical beliefs about health and 
safety. Returning to the stereotype example, if an episodic show depicts a non-stereotype 
character that viewers strongly identify with, viewers will instead begin to reject the original 
stereotype in favor of the new character type (Reep and Dambrot 1987). This result is also 
reflected in mediated intergroup contact research, in which researchers find that a single instance 
of exposure to an outgroup character with which viewers empathize positively affects their views 
of the outgroup as a whole (Ortiz and Harwood 2007). As Reep and Dambrot (1987) point out, 
however, these theories are not mutually exclusive—especially, I would argue, outside the 
laboratory where a single episode depicts many characters with varying degrees of what may be 
deemed stereotypical traits and behavior.  
3.3.2 Binge Watching 
Does binge watching decrease the efficacy of narrative persuasion and mediated 
intergroup contact in entertainment media? Where we once had to wait an entire week—or 
more—in between episodes of our favorite primetime series, many people now opt to watch 
them all at once. Binge watching, and even binge racing, has become a popular pastime for 
adults across the globe. The popular streaming service Netflix defines binge-watching as 
“watching between 2-6 episodes of the same TV show in one sitting” (Netflix 2013). This means 
binge watching can entail as little as spending one to six hours viewing episodes of a show one 
right after another in a single sitting. Or, in the case of binge racing, it can entail watching every 
single episode in a season back-to-back with few to no breaks, even when the season is more 
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than ten hours in length. How does the consumption shift from watching a show once weekly to 
watching multiple episodes at once alter dramatic media effects?  
I believe the heart of this question begins in the drip, drip vs. drench controversy and can 
be answered within the context of deictic shift theory. Each of these theories originates outside 
the field of political science, yet are vital to explaining the underlying mechanisms at work in 
binge effects. Binge effects modulate dramatic media effects by decreasing the opportunity for 
narrative persuasion in at least three key ways. Deictic shift theory states that the necessary 
components for narrative persuasion are absorption and reflection, both of which may be 
diminished by this new consumption pattern. First, more time spent watching the same show 
may mean deeper absorption or, more likely, it may lead to dips in attention as the hours drag on. 
Decreased absorption not only diminishes the opportunity for narrative persuasion, but also 
diminishes viewer identification with characters and perceived realism, both of which decrease 
resistance to messaging in dramatic media. 
Second, waiting each week for a new episode may increase reflection time, as individuals 
often turn after each viewing to peers, online forums, and blogs to keep talking and thinking 
about the show while they wait for new content. This accumulation of input over time ties 
closely with cultivation theory, which describes how mass media helps cultivate the social reality 
of our society. In this sense, binge effects may lessen the impact of ground-breaking shows or 
non-mainstream messaging in shows because the reflection time between exposures is shortened 
or erased. 
Third, binge effects may mimic drench effects, regardless of the level of impact provided 
by imagery and storyline. In contrast to cultivation theory, the drench hypothesis asserts that 
high-impact imagery and storylines can have stronger effects on individuals than more mundane 
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audiovisual programs consumed over time—essentially, a high-impact movie will leave a more 
lasting impression than a lower emotional impact show viewed over several weeks or months. 
Viewing all episodes at once, when absorption levels remain high, may create similar effects in 
viewers immediately after binge watching and show increased rates of narrative persuasion. 
Based on the literature—drawing from studies examining deictic shift theory, reactance, 
cultivation theory, and the drench hypothesis—I theorize that binge watching will decrease the 
overall potential for narrative persuasion of dramatic media content as well as decrease the 
potential for mediated intergroup contact to diminish prejudice, specifically for episodic shows. I 
assert that while the immediate influence of binge watching a show may be similar to—or even 
stronger than—watching the same number of episodes of the show weekly, these effects will 
diminish faster due to decreased absorption and reflection time. Overall, I predict binge watching 
dampens any lasting persuasive effects in dramatic media. 
3.3.2.1 Binge Effects: Drip, Drip or Drench? 
Binge-watching, at first glance, seems to join the considerations of cultivation theory and 
the drench hypothesis. The sustained viewing of high-impact images—particularly those of 
contemporary shows with large budgets—should, in theory, be most influential. However, the 
sustained viewing in a single day (or even a couple days) cannot be considered equal to that of 
regular viewing over multiple weeks. Simply pitting binge watching against weekly watching the 
exact same show assumes comparative accumulative effects. More than television happens in 
any given week. People are influenced by their personal circumstances, by the other news and 
non-news media they encounter, and by world events (like the current pandemic increasing the 
binge watching phenomenon). In addition to the previously mentioned ways binge watching may 
shape dramatic media’s influence on its audience, the shortened time span removes potential life 
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distractions that could occur in the longer time span of weekly viewing. for example, if a weekly 
viewer breaks up with their significant other eight weeks into a ten-week romantic story arc, they 
may feel not very absorbed and unable to identify when the two protagonists finally get together 
in episode ten. However, if the viewer had binged the entire season before the breakup, they may 
have felt very absorbed and connected to the show, leading to a stronger opportunity for overall 
narrative persuasion. 
Cultivation theory, on the one hand, dictates that the more time spent with a particular 
media, the stronger the impact will be. According to deictic shift theory, narrative persuasion is 
the result of two essential factors: Absorption and reflection. Together, they assert that the more 
time spent absorbed in media with similar messaging and spent reflecting on that messaging 
increases the likelihood of narrative persuasion. Increased time and absorption in dramatic media 
can also allow for greater identification with characters, which further increases the potential for 
narrative persuasion. Identification and perceived realism play key roles in increasing both 
absorption and reflection while simultaneously diminishing reactance and counterarguing (Bahk 
2001b; Moyer-Gusé 2008; Moyer-Gusé and Nabi 2010; 2011). The traditional cable television 
format of spacing show episodes out to one per week, for example, provides an hour of 
engagement plus a full seven days in between each episode for reflection. On the other hand, 
binge-watching the same number episodes only provides the increased time for absorption and 
identification. Binge watching multiple episodes back-to-back results in much less reflection 
time than that provided by weekly watching. Even if absorption remained at optimal levels 
throughout all binged episodes of a show, which is unlikely given varied attention spans, the 
reflection time between episodes is severely shortened from days to mere minutes. If reflection is 
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the time period during which attitude change occurs, then shortening this time will inevitably 
dampen the potential for narrative persuasion. 
In this sense, binge effects cannot be considered the sum of cultivation theory and the 
drench hypothesis. First, watching multiple episodes of a show at once does not equate to high-
impact imagery and visualizations. Some shows, especially those with larger budgets, may 
provide these components, but they are not by definition an essential part of binge watching. 
Sustained high absorption levels in binge watchers may increase the likelihood that effects will 
mimic drench effects; however, high levels of absorption may also indicate the show includes 
high-impact imagery and/or visualization. This means the stronger effects immediately following 
a binge session could indicate actual drench effects rather than binge effects. Second, individuals 
do not engage with dramatic media—or any media—within a vacuum. People come to their 
screens not only with specific motivations for engaging with media but also with personal 
circumstances, current mindsets, and myriad potential distractions. They will leave their media 
experience with certain impressions to reenter their own lives, often moving straight into 
engagement with other narratives and other media formats. 
Unfortunately, I cannot hold time still, nor can I split time into two dimensions where 
individuals binge or watch weekly in their parallel timelines; therefore, I cannot fully separate 
out all the additional interferences weekly watchers may experience. However, I can examine the 
factors associated with narrative persuasion as they interact with these different consumption 
patterns: Absorption, identification, and perceived realism. 
3.3.3 Binge Effects Theory 
In Chapter 6, I use a longitudinal laboratory experiment to examine the effects of 
consumption method on narrative persuasion and mediated intergroup contact. One episode of a 
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show in a saturated media environment will likely impact its viewers very little. Continued 
messaging in one show or across multiple shows increases the likelihood that narrative 
persuasion will occur, as evidenced by education-entertainment research and studies of 
accumulative effects (e.g. Hether et al 2008). However, individuals are increasingly likely to 
watch series on their own time rather than during the original broadcast, and binge watching is 
on the rise (Nielsen 2019). These consumption shifts, particularly the trend toward binge 
watching, will affect the potential for dramatic media to induce narrative persuasion. I expect, 
based on deictic shift theory, that binge-watching will overall result in a diminished capacity for 
narrative persuasion. While the drench-like experience may heighten dramatic media effects on 
viewers’ attitudes immediately after bingeing, decreased reflection will diminish these effects 
over time. My binge effects theory can be condensed to three main ideas: 
1. Binge watchers are more likely than weekly watchers to experience lower levels of 
absorption. 
2. Binge watchers who do not experience lower levels of absorption than weekly watchers 
will likely exhibit drench effects. 
3. All binge watchers are less likely to experience lasting attitude change than weekly 
watchers.  
I postulate the immediate effects after binge-watching will mimic those of drench effects, 
showing a sizeable shift in political attitudes and social perceptions. This effect may only be true, 
however, for individuals who identify in some way with one of the show’s main characters and 
those who maintain high absorption beyond the initial two hours of viewing. Further, because the 
reflection time is greatly reduced for binge-watchers and is not sustained through a weekly return 
to the program, lasting effects are less likely than what is suggested by cultivation theory. In 
sum, binge-watchers who maintain a high level of absorption may exhibit greater attitudinal 
effects immediately following their viewing session, but these effects are less likely to last than 
those shown by weekly watchers. 
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What does this mean for dramatic media effects on political and sociopolitical attitudes? 
It means that binge-watching may decrease the impact of narrative persuasion overall. On one 
hand, this could decrease the influence of non-mainstream media, making it more difficult to 
encourage diversity of ideas via messaging and casting. On the other hand, it could increase the 
effects of selective exposure and solidify as normal the messages of mainstream media by 
dampening the impact of any new messages. To clarify, by “new messages” I mean any non-
mainstream ideas or concepts included in the narrative. For example, Slater, Rouner, and Long 
(2009) indicate minimal effects on viewers’ attitudes toward same-sex relationships after 
watching a short film that depicts a healthy, loving same-sex relationship. At the time this study 
was done, there were few examples of same-sex relationships in television, and many carried a 
negative frame (Slater, Rouner, and Long 2006). Had the program been longer and viewed 
weekly, stronger attachments to these characters may have grown and encouraged greater 
attitudinal effects. Had the program been longer and binged, viewers with high absorption may 
still have built stronger attachments to the characters, but there would be no lasting attitudinal 
effects. 
In particular, binge effects on narrative persuasion may diminish the potential for 
dramatic media to bypass directional motivated reasoning, which can be particularly strong for 
political attitudes (see Bolsen and Palm 2019; Druckman and McGrath 2019). Although this 
manuscript focuses on dramatic media’s attitudinal effects, binge effects may also diminish the 
capacity of any media to educate viewers. Furthermore, because young adults are more likely to 
binge watch, binge effects could have lasting repercussions for Millennials, members of Gen Z, 
and generations to come. 
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3.4 Moving Forward 
In sum, the next three chapters examine how narrative persuasion and mediated 
intergroup contact affect social perceptions of outgroup members and political attitudes toward 
the public policies that affect the outgroup. More specifically, they explore 1. The effects of 
mediated intergroup contact on policy attitudes and interparty prejudice (Chapter 4); 2. The 
effects of accumulated exposure to the Muslim terrorist stereotype on perceptions of Muslims 
and approval of policy attitudes that negatively affect Muslims and individuals from Muslim-
majority countries (Chapter 5); and 3. How binge effects alter the impact of narrative persuasion 
and mediated intergroup contact on sociopolitical attitudes (Chapter 6). Overall, I assert that 
mediated intergroup contact can affect perceptions of an outgroup and policy attitudes. More 
specifically, I observe the conditions at work in narrative persuasion and mediated intergroup 
contact through an onscreen debate on gun ownership. I move on to argue that nuanced 
depictions of Muslims in TV and film will increase identification with the outgroup characters, 
thereby decreasing viewers’ prejudice toward Muslims and decreasing viewers’ approval of 
public policies that affect Muslims negatively. I finally posit, however, that current the 
consumption habit of binge watching may limit entertainment media effects. 
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4 UNDERSTANDING THE CONDITIONS OF NARRATIVE PERSUASION ON 
POLICY ATTITUDES 
“Personally, I have been a proponent of gun ownership for a long time,” remarks a 
young, African American man and self-proclaimed news-lover in my “Pop Culture and 
American Politics” seminar. He explains, “I do however believe that change is needed in our 
policies regarding guns… Americans are losing their lives in senseless mass shootings every 
year.” This sentiment resonates with the small group of students in my senior seminar class in 
spring of 2019. It is still early in the semester, and the jovial seniors spend the minutes leading to 
the start of class discussing current events and their work in other, shared classes. Without 
knowing one midsemester topic for discussion will be gun rights, they chat openly about their 
views while I listen, welcoming them to prolong their discussion into our class time as I note 
their stances. He continues amidst a few nods, while other students quietly direct their focus 
elsewhere: “people should be able to live their lives going to a place of worship, to school, or 
simply publicly enjoying time out with friends without the thought of someone bringing in a gun 
to kill people being in the back of their heads.” 
Nearly two years after Governor Nathan Deal signed Georgia HB 280, commonly known 
as a “campus carry” bill, into law, my students are still talking about the changes happening 
around them. From one perspective, campus carry laws like Georgia’s HB 280 are intended to 
address the potential dangers of school shootings and the more mundane robberies that occur on 
or near college campuses. As Governor Deal stated in 2017, “At the present time, assailants can, 
and do, target these students knowing full well that their victims are not permitted to carry 
protection… we’ve witnessed college students fall victim to violent attacks in or while traveling 
to libraries and academic buildings” (Downey 2017). From another perspective, these laws have 
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been accused of creating a hostile learning environment that may “chill” free speech (Arnold 
2019) in opposition to prior Supreme Court rulings like that of District of Columbia v. Heller, 
which indicates the current interpretation of the second amendment allows for such limitations as 
“laws forbidding the carrying of firearms into sensitive places such as schools and government 
buildings” (Bennett 2020). There has also been some confusion as to when and where firearms 
are allowed, the Atlanta Journal-Constitution noting 15 violations cited in the University System 
of Georgia within the law’s first year on the books (Stirgus and Prabhu 2018). Further evidence 
indicates that while laws allowing individuals to legally “carry firearms onto college campuses 
are unlikely to lead to fewer mass shootings or fewer casualties in those mass shootings,” 
increased “gun availability in campus environments could make far more common acts of 
aggression, recklessness, or self-harm more deadly” (Webster, et al. 2016). 
As political science majors and senior undergraduates, I first believe my students are 
probably poised to speak more eloquently than others their age on this or other controversial 
political topics. However, in a pre-class survey, my students scored an average of 5.13 out of 
nine on a set of political knowledge questions. Their score is comparable to that of the 5.19 
average score of 144 undergraduates enrolled in an introductory political science class who were 
polled in a pre-treatment survey for the experiment discussed in Chapter 6 of this manuscript. It 
is less than the 5.75 average score of 1088 participants in the national survey detailed in Chapter 
5 of this manuscript. Many of these political science seniors share that they have rarely even 
thought about the issue of gun rights, one young African American woman noting, “unless it was 
being brought up on a national level with school shootings.” Shootings like the 2007 event at 
Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University (Virginia Tech) were the impetus for campus 
carry laws that now exist in 11 states—including the Georgia law my students discuss, for 16 
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state laws banning campus carry policies, and for multiple advocacy groups on both sides of the 
issue (Hassett, et al. 2019). Even so, this young woman and other seniors in my class express 
ambivalence or neutrality, such as the sentiment asserted by one student that, “I could understand 
both sides.” What could push ambivalent Americans like these students toward aligning with one 
side or the other, especially those Americans who are not news-lovers? 
Can entertainment media, broadly enjoyed by adults across America, affect policy 
attitudes? More specifically, can narrative persuasion decrease interparty prejudice and 
motivated reasoning? During the fall 2018 and spring 2019 semesters, I conducted two focus 
groups within my political science senior seminar classes on “Pop Culture and American 
Politics.”5 The readings and activities in these classes exposed students to media effects research, 
the concepts and conditions for narrative persuasion, and multiple forms of popular media with 
sociopolitical messages. Understanding the concepts of narrative persuasion was necessary for 
students both to engage in class discussions and also to discuss these concepts and their reactions 
to media screenings as part of the focus group. Engaging with these concepts allowed 
participants to use precise language when describing the impact of the media we screened in 
classes. After each media screening, students were asked to respond to a writing prompt sharing 
their thoughts and discussing connections to the literature. In conducting these focus groups, I 
hope to better understand the key factors that influence whether an embedded message in a 
dramatic narrative will impact audience attitudes. Simply, could watching a show that explicitly 
                                                 
5 These focus groups were approved by Georgia State University’s Institutional Review Board in March 2019. All 
students in Ms. Pauley’s senior seminar classes during the 2018 to 2019 academic year were provided the option to 
allow their discussion comments and written submissions be used as part of these focus groups. Only the 
submissions of those students who signed the informed consent document expressly giving this permission have 
been used by the researcher. 
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debates gun rights and gun control laws move my ambivalent students toward taking a policy 
stance? 
4.1 Narrative Persuasion of Political Attitudes 
Narrative persuasion refers to the internal process through which a dramatic narrative 
may influence audience opinions and attitudes. This process may occur through explicit 
messages in the narrative inducing central information processing in the audience, thereby 
encouraging the audience to reconsider prior attitudes toward the message topic. It may also 
occur through implicit themes and messages depicting social circumstances that are absorbed by 
the audience through peripheral information processing, thereby affecting their overall 
perceptions of social norms. One of the leading theories regarding narrative persuasion is deictic 
shift theory, which asserts that absorption, or deictic transportation into the storyline, is 
necessary for narrative persuasion and that reflection upon the narrative afterward increases the 
likelihood of persuasion (Hamby, et al. 2017). Further research provides evidence that 
identification with at least one character plays a key role in increasing absorption and 
encouraging reflection while simultaneously diminishing reactance and counterarguing in the 
audience (Moyer-Gusé and Nabi 2010). However, individuals do not engage with dramatic 
media—or any media—within a vacuum. People come to their screens not only with specific 
motivations for engaging with media but also with personal circumstances, cognitive load, and 
myriad potential distractions (see Hamby, et al. 2018). 
What is the key component to holding a viewer’s attention and inducing reflection 
enough to evoke narrative persuasion? More importantly, which factor will encourage a lasting 
attitude change? In reviewing the literature, I noticed that many studies use clips from a show or 
film (e.g. Kearns, et al. 2019), though few include full-episode treatments (e.g. Slater, et al. 
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2006). One episode of a show in a saturated media environment will likely impact its viewers 
very little, which is evidenced by the mixed results of survey data collected in these experiments 
(e.g. Holbert 2003; Holbert, et al. 2005; Slater, et al. 2006). Continued messaging in one show or 
across multiple shows increases the likelihood that narrative persuasion will occur, as evidenced 
by education-entertainment research and studies of accumulative effects, or cultivation theory 
(e.g. Hether, et al. 2008; Quick 2009). In each of these instances, however, results are drawn 
from quantitative, not qualitative data. Few studies even discuss lasting change (see Hether et al 
2008; Lane, et al. 2013; Quick, et al. 2013). Moreover, we tend to examine specific, explicit 
attitudes rather than implicit perceptions of social norms, one exception being Paluck and 
Green’s (2009) study of a dramatic radio program’s effects on acceptance of dissident behaviors 
in post-genocide Rwanda. 
To better understand the components of narrative persuasion qualitatively, I conducted 
two focus groups. In these focus groups, I exposed 24 total participants to several forms of 
popular media as part of my senior seminar class on “Pop Culture and American Politics,” 
essentially assigning absorption. I then required participants to respond to a discussion prompt 
regarding the media, thereby assigning reflection. Because absorption and reflection were largely 
required of the participants, as part of their work as students for a class, this allowed me to hold 
these essential components of narrative persuasion constant. Holding these conditions constant 
further permitted me to better understand the remaining variables of the narrative persuasion 
formula: Identification and the explicit or implicit nature of the message. Because these 
participants were also my students in a course to examine media effects in popular culture, they 
understood the basic components of narrative persuasion. This understanding bestowed 
participants with the means to discuss the nuances of narrative impact in great detail using 
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precise language. The discussion prompts provided to participants asked them not only about 
their views on the related sociopolitical issue prior to and after the experience, but also about 
three main components6 of narrative persuasion: Absorption, identification, and how the message 
was presented (explicitly or implicitly). 
4.1.1 Absorption 
Hamby, Brinberg, and Jaccard (2018) describe the process of narrative persuasion first 
through the lens of deictic shift theory: “the reader creates a mental model of the story world first 
by shifting her deictic center into that model, and then continuing to relate the information given 
in each successive sentence in the narrative to an understanding of the narrative as a whole” 
(115). The deictic center can be described as one’s personal vantage point or point of perception 
(Hamby, et al. 2018). When a deictic shift occurs, the individual will shift this vantage point 
from perceiving the world from their own life to perceiving the world from inside the narrative. 
This may also be described as the experience of absorption or transportation into a story. This 
transportation allows individuals engaging with narrative media to experience “intense emotions 
similar to the emotions we have in response to equivalent situations in our daily life” (Hamby, et 
al. 2018, 115). For example, we may feel frustrated when a character refuses to cooperate, or our 
heartrate may increase during a particularly harrowing scene. 
The second piece of the deictic shift, returning to one’s original vantage point in the self, 
cannot by itself induce persuasion. Retrospective reflection, during which the individual 
considers their experience of the narrative within the context of their own life, is necessary 
(Hamby, et al. 2017; Hamby, et al. 2018). Therefore, the two together—absorption and 
                                                 
6 I asked participants about absorption to best gauge their level of interest and absorption in the material. I do not ask 
about reflection because they are clearly engaging in reflection to respond to the prompt. 
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reflection—are required for narrative persuasion. However, they are not always sufficient to 
induce lasting attitude change. Individual and contextual factors like cognitive load, which 
affects attention and absorption, environment, and especially resistance to embedded messaging 
can limit a narrative’s effectiveness (Hamby, et al. 2018). Absorption, as well as identification 
with one or more characters and the way in which a message is delivered—implicitly or 
explicitly—discussed below, can affect the level of resistance in audience members (Dale and 
Moyer-Gusé 2020; Moyer-Gusé and Nabi 2010). 
4.1.2 Identification 
In the context of social cognitive theory, Chory-Assad and Cicchirillo (2005) assert that 
viewer identification with a character increases that character’s influence on the viewer. 
However, multiple forms of character identification and association exist. Some characters may 
serve as evaluative standards, not unlike priming effects (Chory-Assad and Cicchirillo 2005). 
Others may push a viewer to feel that a character is like a close friend or relative, whose actions 
can deeply affect the emotional state of the viewer (DeGroot and Leith 2018; Lather and Moyer-
Guse 2011; Moyer-Gusé, et al. 2012). Still others may simulate indirect intergroup contact, in 
which a viewer observes intergroup contact but does not participate, thereby lessening prejudice 
by providing examples of cross-group friendship and nonstereotypical behavior (Moyer-Gusé, et 
al. 2019). Identification also plays a key role in facilitating mediated intergroup contact, in 
which members of a majority group identify with characters in a narrative that includes positive 
depictions of outgroup or minority group members—meaning the media serves as the form of 
contact. Viewers who experiences this identification through mediated intergroup contact are 
more likely to view outgroup members positively in the real world (Ortiz and Harwood 2007, 
Park 2012, Dale and Moyer-Gusé 2020). 
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Moyer-Gusé (2008a) identifies five forms of involvement with a character: Identification, 
perceived similarity, wishful identification, liking, and parasocial interaction (PSI). She 
establishes identification with a character as “an emotional and cognitive process whereby a 
viewer takes on the role of a character in a narrative.” In this case, absorption occurs as a shift 
into the deictic center of a specific character as opposed to the narrative as a whole (Moyer-Gusé 
2008a, 410). This form of identification is also referred to as cognitive-emotional identification, 
when viewers choose to interpret the media through the lens of a specific character (Chory-Assad 
and Cicchirillo 2005). I will use the term cognitive-emotional identification for the remainder of 
the chapter to better differentiate the specific concept from its umbrella term. Perceived 
similarity occurs when the viewer perceives that a character is similar in some way to 
themselves, such as demographic similarities, physical attributes, personality, or values and is 
often considered a precursor to cognitive-emotional identification (Moyer-Gusé 2008). Wishful 
identification entails the viewer wanting to be like a character or wanting to emulate the 
character in their own life. Moyer-Gusé (2008a) considers liking as simply holding positive 
evaluations of a character, similar to parasocial interaction (PSI). She describes PSI as the 
viewer feeling as though they have a “face-to-face relationship” with a specific character.  
Other forms of identification include group identification, empathy, and affective 
orientation. Similar to PSI and perceived similarity, group identification involves the viewer 
seeing similarities between their friends and family and the onscreen characters, and then the 
viewer identifying with those characters based on those similarities (Chory-Assad and Cicchirillo 
2005). Chory-Assad and Cicchirillo (2005) consider empathy toward an onscreen character as 
another prerequisite for cognitive-emotional identification, stating that viewers must first be able 
to understand the perspective of a character before taking on their viewpoint. The authors 
69 
describe empathy, or perspective-taking, as both an appreciation for a character’s well-being 
(empathic concern) and as experiencing emotions that correspond with the character’s emotions 
(emotional contagion). Affective orientation, though not necessarily a form of identification, 
gauges an individual’s sensitivity toward experiencing emotional contagion. Individuals with 
high levels of affective orientation toward a character are more likely to experience cognitive-
emotional identification (Chory-Assad and Cicchirillo 2005).  
4.1.3 Implicit vs. Explicit Messaging 
Another purpose of this study is to examine whether implicit or explicit messages are 
more effective for narrative persuasion. Individuals come to their screens with specific 
motivations, typically to escape or feel a thrill, or to feel or think deeply (Bartsch, et al. 2014; 
Bartsch and Schneider 2014; Oliver and Bartsch 2010). This motivation is bi-directional, 
meaning the artists and producers of entertainment media create with specific motivations in the 
same way consumers select that media based on their own motivations, often corresponding with 
one another (Oliver and Bartsch 2010). When Quentin Tarantino writes and directs a thrilling 
screenplay, for example, he knows that people will watch his film with the motivation to feel 
thrilled. 
In addition to the primary themes of a film or show—like the genre and plot—dramatic 
narratives impart nuanced messages to their audiences through story details and character 
relationships. Explicit messages are often aimed at addressing specific issues, but implicit 
messages address core beliefs about how the world works. Explicit messages may be expressed 
through dialogue or even an epilogue at the end of an episode or film for specificity (Lane, et al. 
2013; Moyer-Gusé, et al. 2012). Mulligan and Habel (2011), for example, provide evidence that 
explicit, central frames in fictional media shape how we think about politics by influencing 
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politically-relevant opinions such as whether abortion should be a legal procedure in the case of 
incest. Moyer-Gusé, Jain, and Chung (2012) note that individuals exposed to an explicit 
persuasive appeal in addition to a dramatic narrative on driving under the influence of alcohol 
led to the desired effect of negative attitudes toward drinking and driving. However, individuals 
who did not receive the explicit persuasive appeal showed an increase in favorable attitudes 
toward drinking and driving, which the authors believed was evidence of a boomerang effect in 
which a dramatic narrative normalizes behaviors it intends to scorn (Moyer-Gusé, et al. 2012; 
Moyer-Gusé and Nabi 2010). 
Implicit messages, often imparted through characters’ actions and relationships, influence 
viewers’ perceptions of social norms, potentially updating their socially constructed reality (see 
Alitavoli and Kaveh 2018). Slater, Rouner, and Long (2006), for example, find that implicit 
messaging decreases counterarguing in viewers, meaning viewers are less resistant to messages 
counter to their prior beliefs when the message is implicit rather than explicit (see also Moyer-
Gusé and Nabi 2010). However, the authors note that suppression of counterarguing is not 
sufficient to induce attitude change, especially in deeply controversial, politicized issues like 
marriage equality. While exposure to one implicit theme in a fictional drama (support for the 
death penalty) shows evidence of persuasion in its audience, another implicit theme in a second 
fictional drama (support for rights of gay partners) does not (Slater, et al. 2006). Mulligan and 
Habel (2011) also note mixed effects on their implicit frame in the fictional film The Cider 
House Rules about whether it is more important to follow one’s conscience even when 
something is illegal or to remain morally absolute. 
The literature shows mixed results as to whether an implicit or explicit message in 
entertainment media is most effective. Lane et al (2013) find evidence that using an implicit 
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message in a show episode followed by a public service announcement made by one of the main 
characters shows the most promise for inducing the intended narrative persuasion. Moyer-Gusé, 
Jain, and Chung (2012), on the other hand, show that similar results may have additional 
gendered effects (see also Moyer-Gusé and Nabi 2010; 2011). The final purpose of this study is 
to examine the responses of participants who have been educated on implicit and explicit appeals 
when asked to describe the effects of those messages. 
4.2 Mediated Intergroup Contact 
In addition to reducing reactance, identification can facilitate mediated intergroup 
contact. Mediated intergroup contact, as explained by Ortiz and Harwood (2007), argues that 
when individuals are “exposed to TV images of positive intergroup contact, for example, viewers 
may extract a rule that such interaction is open and friendly. They may then extrapolate this rule 
and use it to guide their behaviors and judgments in future situations where this rule might be 
applicable (i.e., other intergroup interactions)” (617). Similar to reducing reactance in viewers, 
mediated intergroup contact may reduce anxiety in viewers toward intergroup interaction in the 
real world and diminish prejudice toward the outgroup as a whole (Dale and Moyer-Gusé 2020; 
Ortiz and Harwood 2007; Park 2012). Mediated intergroup contact is a theory typically used in 
studies regarding race, gender, sexual orientation, religion and other categories often associated 
with social intergroup conflict or prejudice. While the primary focus of this study was originally 
to examine the impact of narrative persuasion on attitudes toward the explicit debate of gun 
control and gun rights, a secondary focus was to understand the impact of narrative persuasion 
regarding the implicit message of healthy, nontraditional relationships. Because the depicted 
nontraditional relationship occurs between two women of color, mediated intergroup contact 
could also play a role in the narrative’s impact. 
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4.3 Methods 
During the 2018 to 2019 academic year, I conducted two focus groups within my senior 
seminar classes on “Pop Culture and American Politics” to more deeply understand the 
components of narrative persuasion and their importance to the attitude change process prior to 
running a survey or experiment. Participants were exposed to the concepts of narrative 
persuasion and its components in a classroom setting. They watched or listened to several 
programs together and separately over the span of an academic semester, and they came together 
each week in class to discuss concepts in the media effects and political science literatures 
pertinent to the media with which they had recently engaged. In addition to discussions, 
participants responded, in writing, to prompts provided after each program. Providing 
participants with a deeper understanding of the concepts of narrative persuasion allowed them to 
more effectively explain their experiences using precise, relevant language. Their discussions 
and written responses offer qualitative insight into narrative persuasion and the role its 
components play in media-influenced attitude change.  
I find evidence of the important roles that identification and implicit messaging play in 
narrative persuasion. While the literature explores various types of identification and their ability 
to reduce counterarguing (see Moyer-Gusé 2015) the focus group participants’ responses 
indicate that empathic identification with any character in a narrative may be sufficient to 
encourage absorption and reflection—the key components of deictic shift theory. However, the 
prompted reflection did not deliver the expected form of persuasion by altering opinions on an 
explicit or implicit message. Instead, Paluck and Green’s (2009) assertion appears more likely: 
People will accept and begin to mimic the relationships they are exposed to in a dramatic 
narrative. 
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4.3.1 Participants and Recruitment 
In total, 24 students agreed to participate in the focus groups. The group of 24 
participants, as well as the classes themselves, were predominately female (18 participants, the 
other six identifying as male) and mostly minorities (22 participants). Of the 24 students who 
agreed to participate, 16 were from one class and eight from the other. Because the focus groups 
were exploratory and took place within real-world classes, the two groups were not set up 
identically. One class (with 16 participants) was more structured and rooted in class discussions, 
while the other (eight participants) relied more heavily on individual effort and written work. 
The classrooms themselves were different, as well: The first being larger, more conducive to 
moving the desks into a circle for discussions, and brighter with windows; and the second being 
darker and without windows, smaller in size, and located in a building with frequent technical 
difficulties. Regardless of these differences, however, participants’ responses and discussions in 
each class often mirrored one another. 
Table 1 Focus Group Race/Ethnicity Demographics 
Participants Female Male Total 
White, non-Hispanic 2 0 2 
White, Hispanic 2 0 2 
African American or Black 10 4 14 
Hispanic 3 2 5 
Asian 1 0 1 
Total 18 6 24 
 
Responses to the writing prompt of a particular show episode screened in both classes 
displayed sentiments strikingly similar to on another. The episode, “Betsy” from Freeform’s The 
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Bold Type, portrays two friends arguing about gun ownership, giving equal time to each 
woman’s perspective. Simultaneously, their other best friend contends with her feelings about 
her new girlfriend’s request to try nonmonogamy. What struck me most about the responses was 
that the individual explanations provided in these essay responses bucked against a key point in 
the literature regarding attitude change and the role of identification while bolstering the 
assertion that implicit messaging is often more effective than explicit messaging. Upon further 
analysis, I also found it intriguing that the implicit message affected was not the one I had 
originally intended to study, but instead involved the gun rights/gun control debate and how it 
was carried out by the characters. 
4.3.2 Writing Prompt 
In the middle of each semester, students were asked to watch an episode from the second 
season of the television show The Bold Type while in class. They knew they would be asked to 
complete a related writing assignment after watching the episode, but were not informed about 
what the writing prompt would specifically entail. In both classes, the students had previously 
completed a similar assignment in response to either a collection of music or a film. I posted the 
writing prompt for “Betsy” online immediately after class, providing students at least five days 
to complete the assignment. 
After the episode, I provided my students with the following writing prompt: 
How did watching the episode "Betsy" from season two of The Bold Type affect your views 
on either (pick ONE) a) gun rights/gun control or b) nontraditional romantic relationships? 
In your response, be sure to include the following: 
• your views prior to watching the episode 
• how the show did or did not affect your views based on: 
o various forms of identification 
o level of absorption 
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o level of implicitness or explicitness of the message(s) 
o reflection 
• at least two different citations from the articles we've read for class 
• any other views you feel may have been affected by this episode 
 
Both classes had previously been assigned to read journal articles about identification, 
absorption, and reflection; however, one class was significantly more likely to have read the 
material, while the other often had trouble during discussions with several students openly 
admitting they had not read the material before class. Regardless, most students in both classes 
clearly articulated their identification with a specific character (or none), their level of absorption 
and interest in the show, and their views toward their chosen topic and the potential impact the 
show had on these views. 
The writing prompt responses were written by students prior to their knowledge of the 
opportunity to participate in the focus group. Throughout each class, students were encouraged 
to speak and write freely. Written assignments were graded on word count, answering all aspects 
of a prompt, and providing citations to support their perspective. After students agreed to 
participate in the focus group, their survey and written responses were downloaded, their names 
were replaced with a study number, and all materials were set aside for at least one semester to 
diminish researcher ability to link a specific student to a particular response. 
4.3.3 Show Analysis 
“Betsy” is the name of episode seven of season two of Freeform’s hit show The Bold 
Type, which stars three young women who are best friends and work at the same women’s 
magazine in New York City. “Betsy” is also the name of a shotgun owned by one of these 
fictional characters, Sutton Brady. During this episode, Sutton and her best friend and roommate 
Jane Sloan argue over Sutton’s right to keep her beloved shotgun in their apartment. Both 
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women are Caucasian and in their early twenties, but with somewhat different backgrounds that 
provide fodder for the frames they give this issue. Sutton grew up in rural Pennsylvania, where 
she joined the high school shooting team to avoid her alcoholic mother’s benders. Jane grew up 
in Colorado not far from where the Columbine High School shooting occurred when Jane was in 
elementary school, which proved a traumatic event for her character. 
In addition to the main plot of this episode, a secondary storyline involves a 
nontraditional relationship between the third protagonist, Kat Edison, and her girlfriend, Adena 
El-Amin. Kat is a biracial woman also in her early twenties who works with Sutton and Jane, and 
the three are clearly very close friends. Adena is a Muslim lesbian woman and is Kat’s first 
lesbian relationship. During this episode, Adena addresses an incident from a previous episode in 
which Kat has kissed another woman. Adena explains that she is upset, but that she also 
understands Kat’s need to explore her sexuality. The two decide to try an “open relationship” 
where they are allowed to date other women on certain days of the week, allowing Kat to explore 
this new same-sex aspect of her sexuality without putting her relationship with Adena in 
jeopardy. While the writers dedicate some dialogue to Kat and Adena’s decision to try 
nonmonogamy, 7 most of the frames surrounding the normalization of homosexual relationships 
are implied, rather than stated explicitly. Kat speaks openly with Jane and Sutton about the 
positive and negative aspects she perceives of nonmonogamy, and the three women frame their 
opinions on open relationships regardless of sexuality. The frame surrounding the lesbian 
relationship itself is one of complete acceptance and normalcy. When Kat flirts with their 
rideshare driver in one scene, for example, they joke that the “lesbian version” of flirtatious 
                                                 
7 I use the term “nonmonogamy” rather than “polyamory” because the two women discuss an open relationship that 
will be short-term and only physical outside their couple. Kat is allowed to explore her physical sexuality, but not to 
become emotionally attached to another woman. 
77 
physical contact equates to the same flirtatious physical contact in a heteronormative situation. 
This explicit normalization of homosexuality represents an ongoing implicit normalization 
throughout the episode. Kat may bring up her sexuality on occasion, but Jane and Sutton have 
clearly fully accepted Kat as homosexual and do not mention it. 
4.3.3.1 Framing “Betsy” 
Frames are the context given to an issue either within our own thoughts or by someone 
communicating information about an issue, like a journalist. Although framing effects are 
primarily discussed in the political science literature in relation to news media (see Scheufele 
2000), framing and other media effects are also present and effective in dramatic media (e.g. 
Holbert, et al. 2005; Holbrook and Hill 2005; Mulligan and Habel 2011). In the first scene of 
“Betsy,” we discover that Sutton keeps her shotgun in a locked case that Jane believes holds a 
clarinet. Sutton goes along with this assumption at first, but then reveals the truth, and two 
frames are immediately introduced surrounding how each woman views the issue of Sutton’s 
shotgun. Jane first introduces a trust frame, expressing anger toward Sutton for lying to her about 
keeping a firearm in their apartment. Later in the episode, this frame is flipped when Sutton 
accuses Jane of not trusting Sutton to be safe with the weapon. Jane also introduces the safety 
frame, stating that all guns are dangerous and that she does not feel safe with the gun in her 
home. Again, Sutton provides the opposite aspect of this frame when she explains and then 
displays her expertise with using and storing the firearm safely. 
As there are no existing, publicly-available copies of the show’s scripts, content analysis 
was completed by the researcher watching the episode on three separate occasions. The first 
viewing allowed me to prepare the writing prompt for my classes and establish clear frames: 
Trust versus safety. The second viewing allowed me to evaluate the distinctions of these frames: 
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Mistrust due to omission, mistrust due to lack of faith, personal safety, and general safety. In the 
third viewing, I assigned these frames to each mention by one of the characters (leads Jane, 
Sutton, or Kat or recurring character Ryan). I additionally noted whether the frame was explicit 
or implied. For example, Sutton assuring Jane that “we are very safe right now” is an explicit 
safety frame, whereas Jane asking Sutton why she would hide the shotgun from Jane implies a 
trust frame. In total, a trust frame was referred to explicitly and implicitly three times for each 
type, while a safety frame was invoked 13 times total, only three of which were implicit. 
Establishing frames for the nontraditional relationship between Kat and Adena is a 
similar process. In the first viewing, I established two overall frames of nonmonogamy: 
Acceptance and efficacy. The efficacy frame can be further broken down into a morality frame 
and a trust frame.  
4.3.3.2 Explicit Message 
The main plot of the episode “Betsy” involves two white women in their early twenties 
who are friends, coworkers, and roommates. The first scene of the episode reveals that one of 
these women, Sutton, owns a shotgun and has kept it in a locked case in their apartment without 
notifying her roommate, Jane. Because Jane is vehemently opposed to all guns, she immediately 
demands that Sutton get rid of the shotgun. The shotgun, which Sutton named Betsy, holds deep 
significance and sentimental value for Sutton in addition to playing a key role in her once-
favorite hobby of skeet shooting. Sutton refuses to get rid of the shotgun Betsy, and the two 
women spend the rest of the episode at odds. Their discussions about the gun become even more 
heightened when Jane decides to write an article for the magazine they work for entitled, “I Love 
Everything About My Best Friend, But Not Her Gun.”  
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Throughout the episode, we watch these women take firm stances on gun rights as well as 
open up about the reasons behind their stances. Through discussions with each other and with 
their fellow coworker and friend Kat, a biracial and newly lesbian woman in her early twenties, 
the two women are finally able to see each other’s point of view by the end of the episode and 
find a resolution. 
4.3.3.3 Implicit Message 
The third leading character, Kat, spends most of the episode exploring her sexuality 
through meeting a new female partner with the permission of her girlfriend, Adena. Adena 
expresses that she wants Kat to explore her new identity as a lesbian while maintaining an open 
relationship together. While Sutton and Jane battle out the explicit messages of the right to gun 
ownership and the need for gun control through pointed dialogue, Kat works through her feelings 
about her own sexuality and her open relationship with Adena through some dialogue but mostly 
actions. Kat is initially unsure about looking for physical intimacy outside her relationship with 
Adena, but eventually tries online dating. She flirts with the rideshare driver taking Kat, Sutton, 
and Jane to the skeet shooting range as part of Sutton’s entreaty to Jane, and Kat and the driver 
do go out together. Kat shows her discomfort turn to excitement about learning more about 
herself. 
4.3.4 Results 
The literature is clear that absorption, reflection, and identification are the key factors 
encouraging narrative persuasion. The literature also debates whether an implicit or explicit 
message is more persuasive. The responses I gathered from focus group participants offer 
qualitative insight into the roles of these factors not present in previous quantitative and 
experimental studies. The preliminary analyses provide evidence that absorption was present for 
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most participants and reflection was present for all included participants. However, absorption 
and reflection were also essentially assigned conditions, as the participants needed to pay close 
attention to the material to write a reflection response for a grade. Because of this, I am most 
interested in participants’ discussions of identification and whether they were persuaded by the 
implicit or explicit messages in the episode. 
4.3.4.1 Analysis Protocol and Measures 
I analyzed the student responses similarly to the way I approached the show analysis. The 
first readthrough of all essays was done for the sake of grading, but it is also when I recognized 
the similarity in responses to this particular prompt. Once informed consent was provided 
following student grade submissions, participant essays were downloaded, student names were 
removed, and responses were set aside for one semester. The first focus group was completed in 
fall 2018, and so I knew already during the spring 2019 semester that I may obtain more of the 
same responses. Although essays responses to other writing prompts differed from those of the 
2018 class, the responses to “Betsy” in my 2019 class were very similar to those from students in 
my 2018 class. Informed consent was collected again, and the second focus group essays were 
set aside. In summer 2019, I began to analyze the first focus group’s responses. By spring 2020, I 
had read all responses a second and third time, noting participants’ viewpoints, their use of 
frames, their explanations of identification, and their acknowledgment of absorption and 
reflection. 
Of the 24 students who opted to participate in the focus groups, only 21 participants 
responded to this writing prompt. Two additional participants did not follow instructions, nor did 
their essays provide any information about the narrative persuasion factors, leaving 19 essays for 
analysis. Two of the remaining participants chose to write about the show’s implicit message on 
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nontraditional relationships, and the other 17 participants wrote about the show’s explicit 
message on gun rights. Therefore, I will focus almost entirely on the analysis of responses 
related the explicit message regarding gun rights. However, I believe the responses provided by 
the two participants who wrote about nontraditional relationshilps are still worth noting with 
regard to message implicitness. I include a brief analysis of these responses in the section on 
explicit vs. implicit messaging. 
Because the participants were senior undergraduates taking a course on the impact of 
popular culture and media on political attitudes, they were familiar with narrative persuasion and 
its components by name. I measure their absorption and identification first by explicitly asking 
them in the prompt to discuss these factors in their essay responses. However, very few essays 
expressed high levels of absorption or strong identification, two key conditions the literature lists 
for narrative persuasion. One likely reason for this is the lack of perceived similarity between the 
primarily non-white participants and the two white female characters at the center of the gun 
rights debate that most participants chose to discuss. Another is that they may have chosen to use 
other terminology to express this experience. After initial notation of participants’ explicit 
statements of absorption and identification, I looked for language that expressed similar 
experiences and concepts. Some participants did not mention the words “absorption” or 
“identification” at all in their essays, for example, yet they did discuss feeling a connection in 
some way to the material (absorption) or a character (identification). 
4.3.4.2 Absorption 
Of the 17 participants who wrote about the gun rights messages, only 11 expressed clear 
absorption into the episode. One of the participants who wrote about nontraditional relationship 
expressed high absorption, while the other expressed none. Levels ranged from two participants 
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who explicitly said they experienced high absorption to those who did not mention absorption 
explicitly but explained some level of investment in the outcomes of the show. One participant 
wrote, “I was invested in the topic and the conflict,” while two others explained they only felt 
absorbed after the gun rights topic was introduced. Five of the 18 participants did not mention 
absorption, reflection, or a similar experience at all, and two expressed “no interest” and “no 
deictic shift” while watching the episode. 
Table 2 Participant Absorption 




None/No Mention 3 
 
Of participants who did not explicitly express high absorption, a few expressed little 
interest in the topic at all, but most described the process of transportation using other terms and 
phrases. “I was invested in the topic and conflict,” wrote one student. Another explained that 
they only felt absorbed after one character shared a story from her childhood about living close 
to Columbine High School when the school shooting happened there. A third student simply 
admitted they “wanted to know more about the relationship each of the three leading characters 
had with one another.” These essays do not use the words “absorbed” or “transported,” but they 
express thoughts that indicate the participants felt some deictic shift into the narrative. 
4.3.4.3 Identification 
The three participants who opted out of this assignment reported their demographics as a 
white female and two Black males, leaving only one remaining white female in the focus group 
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and three males, two Hispanic and one Black. These demographics decreased the likelihood of 
participants identifying with the show’s characters based on perceived similarity, as the primary 
characters are two young white women and one young biracial woman, and the secondary 
characters are a white middle-aged woman, a young white man, and a young Black man. 
In my initial analysis of participants’ identification, I looked for and tallied the keywords 
for identification type. Eleven participants wrote that they felt some form of identification with 
Jane, the “anti-gun” character, while seven identified in some way with Sutton and only two 
participants identified in some way with Kat. Unsurprisingly, only one participant indicated a 
feeling of perceived similarity to one of the white female characters. This participant was also 
one of the only four participants to identify as white and female. More surprisingly, only one 
participant expressed perceived similarity with Kat, who is biracial with a Black father and white 
mother. This participant identifies as an African American or Black female and stated she “felt a 
sense of similarity to [Kat] due to the fact that her beliefs felt similar to mine and some of her 
physical attributes reminded me of myself as well.” 
In my second analysis of identification in these essay responses, I noticed more 
participants expressing a similar sense that their beliefs were similar to one character or 
another—perceived similarity based on shared values. After compiling the responses who wrote 
about shared beliefs or values with a character, I updated my count for perceived similarity from 
only two participants explicitly stating they felt this type of identification to nine. Noticing this 
sharp difference—even though the participants had some understanding of the terms and their 
meanings—caused me to shift my analysis from a keyword search to a more detailed substantive 
analysis. Between these analyses, I noticed a similar sharp difference between the many who 
expressly wrote they experienced empathy and those whose language reflected the term’s 
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technical definition. The participants who wrote about feeling empathy toward Sutton and Jane, 
most described this as a connection with the characters’ arguments and emotional states rather 
than with the characters themselves. 
Table 3 Participant Identification with Characters 
Identification Type Experienced Sutton Jane Kat 
Cognitive-Emotional ID 4 2 2 0 
Perceived Similarity 9 2 5 2 
Wishful Identification 0 0 0 0 
Parasocial ID 2 0 0 2 
Empathy* 9 3 5 1 
Group identification 5 n/a n/a n/a 
 Low High w/ Sutton High w/ Jane High w/Kat 
Affective Orientation** 7 6 4 2 
This table reflects the 19 participants’ responses that were analyzed. 
*One participant expressed empathy for both Sutton and Jane, while another expressed empathy for individuals whose lives have 
been affected by gun violence. 
**One participant expressed high affective orientation for both Sutton and Jane, while another expressed none at all. 
 
Similarly, while several participants explicitly wrote that they experienced cognitive-
emotional identification, only four participants’ use of the term matched its technical definition. 
Other participants instead described their identification in a manner more reminiscent of 
perspective-taking, the cognitive dimension of empathy, rather than the emotionally-involved 
experience of cognitive-emotional identification. Still other participants’ explanations of their 
identification pointed to an agreement with a character’s stance on gun rights, which may be 
better categorized as perceived similarity based on shared values, though some also express 
empathy for the character in opposition to the character with which they most identified. In 
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particular, two participants state they only feel empathy for Jane after she explains the trauma 
she experienced as a child living down the street from Columbine High School when the school 
shooting occurred there. This could explain why six of the 19 participants felt empathy for this 
character, though one participant notes that while she agrees with Jane’s point of view on gun 
control, “I would disagree with the way she handled the situation… thus negating the potential 
for me to experience true empathic identification with her.” 
My final understanding of the substantive analysis of these essay responses is presented 
in Table 3. Five participants expressed perceived similarity—either through shared 
demographics or shared values—with Jane. Two participants expressed similarity with Jane, and 
two participants expressed similarity with Kat. Nine participants also expressed feeling empathy: 
Five toward Jane, three toward Sutton, and one toward Kat. Two participants noted that they felt 
as though they could be friends with Kat, voicing their parasocial identification (PSI). Five noted 
feeling as though the main characters reminded them of their friends, family, or other social 
group—group identification—with one participant admitting he identified with the “age group of 
these characters” and the way they talked about gun rights. No participants reported they felt 
wishful identification with one of the characters—either explicitly or implicitly. Four participants 
articulated their cognitive-emotional identification with one of the characters, two identifying 
with Sutton and two with Jane. Finally, 12 participants’ descriptions of their identification 
pointed to high affective orientation with Sutton (6 participants), Jane (7), or Kat (2). 
4.3.4.4 Explicit Messaging 
Admittedly, most of the students who spoke up during the impromptu discussion of 
Georgia’s campus carry law seemed to agree that while they approve of the constitutional right 
to own firearms, the government also has a duty to its citizens to enact some measures of gun 
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control. In particular, students were keen on banning assault rifles and other weapons that may 
be used to inflict a great deal of damage in a short amount of time. This trend did not shift in 
their responses to the writing prompt on gun rights. One student even noted his views were 
strengthened saying, "the media viewed in class has even further advanced my stance for more 
legislation to be passed on gun control." Only two participants who responded to the gun rights 
topic firmly stated they felt a shift in opinion regarding gun rights or gun control. 
Instead, nine participants expressed what one participant termed a “softening” of opinion. 
For several participants, this meant adopting a better understanding of why an individual may 
own a gun and accepting new perspectives they had not previously considered. One participant’s 
opinion shifted from "I held the view that those who were adamant on possessing a gun did so 
with every intention of using it" to “This episode changed my stereotypical opinion on gun 
owners.” Others recognized the need for better communication on divisive topics. One 
participant wrote that her “views on communication for political topics such as gun control 
opened a little in watching this episode,” and another stated the episode “affected how I view 
others [sic] reasoning and opinions on situations that might differ from my own opinions.” This 
participant went on to say she “also realized that you never really know why someone may feel 
as strongly as they do about something, mainly when they're in opposition with you. You want 
them to see your point of view so bad that you reject their feelings and ideas prematurely.” 
These and other responses do not report a shift in policy views, but rather a shift in views 
of the “other” side of the argument—the other side typically being Sutton’s viewpoint that guns 
are not always violent and can be used safely. One explanation may be that while more 
participants identified with Jane in some way—11 participants, as opposed to Sutton’s seven—
several expressed a preference for Sutton’s behavior during the friends’ argument and a dislike 
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of Jane’s behavior. For much of the episode, Jane is dismissive of Sutton’s feelings and 
somewhat rude to her friend, while Sutton appears more cool-headed and open to listening and 
helping Jane. Several participants expressed dislike for Jane, with one explaining that Jane 
reacted to Sutton’s beliefs in a “childish close-minded way.” Another noted that Sutton is framed 
to make “her argument more acceptable and relatable,” and that this framing “made it harder for 
me to completely dismiss or ignore [Sutton’s] opinion and reasoning.” This same participant 
rightly acknowledges how this likability could lessen counterarguing in viewers. 
4.3.4.5 Implicit Messaging 
Conversely, the responses regarding the implicit message supporting nontraditional 
relationships offered two very different experiences. One participant, who identifies as a 
Hispanic woman and a Christian, admitted that her strong religious identity kept her from either 
feeling absorbed in the story or identifying with one of the characters involved in the 
nonmonogamous lesbian relationship between Kat and Adena. She explained that because she 
believes “relationships and marriage should be between one man and one woman… this episode 
did not affect my views on nontraditional relationships.” She also rightly points out that because 
she does “not watch shows with same sex relationships… the chances of my views being 
changed are minimal according to [the] chronic accessibility hypothesis.” This hypothesis states 
that repeated exposure to the same themes in entertainment programs alters the information that 
is chronically accessible to an individual (Holbrook and Hill 2005). According to the literature, 
this participant’s failure to feel moved in any way toward this implicit message results from her 
lack of absorption, identification, or exposure to similar themes. 
The second participant who responded to the implicit message prompt, who identifies as 
a white female, expressed quite the opposite experience as the first. This participant stated that 
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she felt a high level of absorption and experienced some perceived similarity with Kat because 
she “found myself to have a similar personality, as well as a[n] experience with needing to 
branch out and explore my own sexuality.” However, she noted primary identification through 
parasocial interaction with and empathy for Kat, explaining that “although I saw similarities, I 
cannot fully relate to the pursuance of an open relationship.” The participant expressed that while 
she began with more of a neutral stance on nonmonogamy, “this episode has shone a light on 
why one might choose to pursue [an open relationship] and that the reasoning may not be as 
selfish or sexually driven as I may have previously thought.” She goes on to acknowledge that 
the implicit message of the episode exposed “a healthy aspect of open relationships,” noting that 
by the end of the episode, “Kat and her partner were not only able to come to an agreement, but 
they were able to grow closer which helped me to see how an open relationship can be healthy." 
These two anecdotes do not provide new insight on the impact of implicit messages in 
dramatic narratives. They do bolster previous studies regarding selection bias and mediated 
intergroup contact. Given a wide array of media choice, individuals regularly select media and 
information that aligns with their prior beliefs (Stroud 2007). The first participant I discussed 
regarding implicit messaging clearly stated she avoids exposure to homosexual relationships in 
entertainment media. However, the endogeneity presented in this choice does not altogether 
remove persuasion effects in the media itself. Instead, Stroud (2007) suggests that individuals 
choosing such media may strengthen their prior beliefs, leading to an overall attitudinal 
polarization (426). The second participant indicates increased understanding of homosexual and 
nonmonogamous relationships, in line with findings from studies on mediated intergroup 
contact. Viewing a healthy relationship between two outgroup characters (homosexual women), 
in addition to vicarious contact through ingroup characters (heterosexual women), can lead to 
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increased empathy toward the outgroup in real life (Chory-Assad and Cicchirillo 2005; Kim and 
Harwood 2019; Li 5019). 
4.4 Discussion 
When I first read the responses, I keyed in on several statements in which students 
admitted they did not believe their overall opinion on gun laws had changed but that they 
understood better the complexity of the issue. As one participant explained, “I've attempted to 
view both sides of the story by watching various media outlets such as Fox News and CNN, but 
[found] more and more issues with the comments and remarks,” noting that his frustration with 
how news media covers this issue diminishes his willingness to hear out those with viewpoints 
different from his own. However, entertainment media does not influence its audience members 
in exactly the same way as news media, and narratives can decrease this kind of reactance. 
Another participant shared that “after watching the show it gave me greater insight into the 
different perspectives and more of an understanding of individual views.” The change is not 
occurring after one episode, but the seeds are planted for further discussion. 
4.4.1 Implicit Behavior Cues 
Neither the intended explicit message nor the intended implicit message seemed to have 
much effect in influencing participants’ policy attitudes. However, one unintended implicit 
message did have an effect: Behaviors during an argument within friendly relationships. The 
most interesting finding from the responses was not found in the students’ indications of attitude 
change, but in their willingness to hear and consider both sides of the issue. One participant 
recognized that "after watching the show it gave me greater insight into the different perspectives 
and more of an understanding of individual views." Another noted that they “feel more 
sympathetic as to why people with the opposite view have those views,” reflecting a newfound 
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respect for individuals whose views stand in opposition to their own. Only two participants 
stated they felt a potential shift in their views. One participant wrote that the episode “definitely 
affected my view on gun-rights,” and another said “I experienced a shift in opinion when I saw 
guns used in a different manner than violence.” The attitude that the episode “softened my 
overall opinion and perspective on ownership” was much more frequent. The same participant 
explained this softening as “[changing] my stereotypical opinion on gun owners,” though the 
participant’s “attitude towards gun rights and gun control is very much the same.” 
Across the essays, this sentiment rang out: “my view on gun rights was not changed; 
however, I feel more sympathetic as to why people with the opposite view have those views.” 
This same participant went on to write that "rather than the issue itself, the show showed me the 
importance of understanding why one has a particular view on an issue.” Eight participants 
expressed very similar sentiments that while their views of gun rights and laws had not changed, 
their understanding of the other side had deepened. This sentiment supports the findings of 
Paluck and Green (2009) that repeated exposure to new social norms will shift behaviors toward 
those norms. While these participants did not experience attitude change, they did experience a 
shift in how they perceive the situation. 
4.4.2 Combined Factors 
In addition to examining the factors of narrative persuasion by themselves, I also looked 
for patterns in the responses. Which type of identification is most closely associated with high 
absorption? Or, with increased empathy, considering more than half of participants expressed 
this shift? Do identification and absorption combined have stronger effects? How about 
identification combined with affective orientation, as suggested by the literature? Table 4 
displays how each type of identification correlates with absorption and expression of increased 
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empathy or understanding of the opposing viewpoint. For each participant who expressed one 
type of empathy, I took note of whether they also expressed these conditions and found that 
empathy or affective orientation, when combined with high absorption, showed the greatest 
potential to increase real-world empathy for members of the opposition. 
Table 4 Impact of Identification on Absorption and Empathy 
Identification Type Participants Absorption Increased Empathy 
Cognitive-Emotional ID 4 4 2 
Perceived Similarity 9 7 5 
Parasocial ID 2 2 1 
Group Identification 5 6 3 
Empathy 9 7 7 
Affective Orientation 11 10 7 
 
Of the ten participants who expressed increased empathy toward the opposing viewpoint 
or increased understanding of both sides, 9 expressed moderate to high levels of absorption. The 
one participant who expressed low absorption also had little to say in their essay overall. Three 
of these participants expressed pro-gun rights views, four expressed strong pro-gun control 
views, and two expressed views somewhere in between. The remaining participant expressed 
ambivalent views toward nontraditional relationships. Eight of the ten participants also expressed 
some form of identification, though there seemed to be no defined pattern in type of 
identification, while the other two participants simply did not discuss identification in their 
essays. The most common form of identification, though, was empathy (seven participants), 
which seems also to be associated with higher levels of affective orientation and moderate to 
high levels of absorption. 
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Of the nine participants who expressed empathic identification with one of the main 
characters, seven indicated moderate to high levels of affective orientation; of these seven, six 
also expressed moderate to high absorption. All six of these participants also expressed increased 
empathy toward the opposing viewpoint or increased understanding of one or both sides. As 
previously mentioned, two of the essays that expressed increased empathy or understanding did 
not provide information on how they may have identified with the characters. One of the 
remaining two essays that expressed increased empathy or understanding and moderate to high 
absorption, but not empathy toward a specific character, indicated strong cognitive-emotional 
identification with Sutton. Empathy can be considered a precursor to this form of identification 
(Chory-Assad and Cicchirillo 2005). The final essay indicated both group identification with the 
three protagonist friends and perceived similarity to Jane based on similar viewpoints regarding 
gun control. 
Most interesting of these patterns, however, is that five of the six respondents who fit this 
pattern of empathy, absorption, and increased understanding expressed empathy identification 
with the character who expressed the viewpoint they came to better understand. For example, the 
participant who professed ambivalent attitudes toward nontraditional relationships and 
empathized with Kat, the character entering her first lesbian and open relationship, expressed 
that she now feels more understanding about why individuals would choose a nontraditional 
relationship. The participant who expressed cognitive-emotional identification with Sutton was 
also originally very pro-gun control. Two other participants, who were initially strongly pro-gun 
control and then expressed deeper understanding of the pro-gun rights side of the debate, chose 
the pro-gun rights character, Sutton, as the character with which they most empathized. The two 
participants who expressed increased understanding and identified as pro-gun rights actually 
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empathized most strongly with Jane, the anti-gun character. Finally, the participant who 
expressed increased understanding and identified as moderate on gun rights expressed empathy 
with both Jane and Sutton. 
This pattern does not strongly align with our current understanding of narrative 
persuasion. Neither the implicit nor explicit messages appear to affect policy attitudes. Instead, 
the combined factors of empathic identification, increased affective orientation, and moderate to 
high absorption increased empathy toward people holding opposing policy beliefs in the real 
world. This pattern seems to align more closely with mediated intergroup contact, traditionally 
observed as increased empathy toward a societal outgroup. However, the conflicting characters 
are both young, white, heterosexual American women—hardly the typical case study for 
intergroup bias. In this episode, these characters differ solely in this one belief about gun rights 
in America. The evidence provided by these focus groups suggests the impact of mediated 
intergroup contact may extend to interparty contact, as well. 8 
4.4.3 Limitations 
In any political communication study where a treatment is provided, researchers must 
account for selection effects, causal direction, and decreased environmental realism (see Iyengar 
2011; Pettigrew, et al. 2011). The primary limitations of this study are that participants self-
reported their experiences and they were aware of the type of questions that may be asked of 
them following the treatment. One participant even noted they “knew immediately what kind of 
question we would be asked” when the treatment episode began. Such conditions decrease 
researcher ability to systematically measure attitudinal effects or accurately determine causality. 
                                                 
8 While both characters express liberal leanings in other episodes, neither character states affiliation with a political 
party or ideology in this episode beyond taking a stance on the issue of gun control and openly accepting Kat as a 
member of the LGBTQ+ community. Jane’s argument for gun control aligns closely with Democratic beliefs, while 
Sutton’s statements for gun rights align with Republican beliefs. 
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However, the open-ended prompt, paired with participants who were adequately able to discuss 
their experiences, allowed for deeper understanding at an individual level of the identification 
types present and their presentation in the participants. 
The study also used too few subjects with too many ideal conditions, such as assigned 
absorption and using participants familiar with the persuasive effects at work. Many media 
effects studies with treatments often suffer from heightened absorption rates due to the nature of 
subjects knowing they will be asked about the material later (Iyengar 2011), and using student 
responses to a class assignment likely heightened this phenomenon. However, participants 
expressly indicated their level absorption and interest. Because this level was explained in more 
detail as part of a prompt, as opposed to a numerical measurement, I was better able to 
understand whether they were absorbed for the sake of the assignment or genuinely interested in 
the episode and its characters. This explanation also allowed me to compare absorption levels 
with affective orientation and the various types of identification to gain a clearer picture of how 
these conditions work together in narrative persuasion. 
4.5 Implications for Future Research 
This exploratory study into the components of narrative persuasion in fictional, 
entertainment shows highlights much of what the extant literature already recognizes. Absorption 
is imperative, and identification is key to reducing directional motivated reasoning (reactance). 
Explicit messaging is clearer to identify, but less likely than implicit messaging to affect viewers. 
Mediated intergroup contact can increase empathy in the real world. A single episode will not 
persuade someone in a major way, but it can open an individual to entertaining ideas that differ 
from their prior beliefs.  
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Although the study was not groundbreaking, it did reveal that political scientists still have 
much to uncover in how dramatic, fictional media can affect political attitudes. The explicit 
message of the episode regarded gun rights, but a key implicit behavior made a statement about 
how we discuss deeply divisive political issues with one another. The study suggests that 
interparty and interbelief prejudice could also be reduced through dramatic, fictional narrative 
exposure. Further research should dive deeper into this aspect of political attitudes and the ability 
of dramatic, fictional narratives to encourage depolarization in the electorate. Additional focus 
groups could be conducted to gain deeper qualitative insight on this. To better understand the 
impact of mediated interparty contact, empirical evidence must be gathered and analyzed further. 
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5 ASSESSING THE ACCUMULATIVE EFFECTS OF MEDIATED INTERGROUP 
CONTACT ON POLITICAL ATTITUDES AND SOCIAL PERCEPTIONS 
Since 2014, the number of terrorist attacks has been decreasing both globally and in the 
United States (Miller 2020). Yet, terrorism still accounts for a significant portion of news 
coverage. Of the attacks reported in the U.S., those with Muslim perpetrators make up a 
disproportionate amount of that coverage (Kearns, et al. 2019), although more recent years have 
shown increases in terrorist acts by individuals with far-right and white supremacist ideologies 
(Miller 2020). As mediators of information, the news media plays a significant role in helping 
shape social norms as perceived by its audience (Alitavoli and Kaveh 2018; Igartua, et al. 2014; 
Bennett and Iyengar 2008). News media influences the public’s opinion not only on crimes like 
terrorism, but also our perceptions of the marginalized peoples associated with these crimes 
(Khan and Bruschke 2016; Mastro, et al. 2014; Shaheen 2009; Zúñiga, et al. 2012). However, 
news media makes up a small portion of the television and internet-streamed content consumed 
in America (Nielsen 2019). Does this media influence extend to entertainment media like 
dramatic, fictional television shows? 
Television viewing comprises the bulk (40 percent) of media consumption (Nielsen 
2018). News audiences have long been declining (Djerf-Pierre and Shehata 2017), and evidence 
indicates that dramatic shows are particularly adept at persuasion (see Hamby, et al. 2018). Much 
like news media effects, entertainment media effects present in the dramatic narratives within 
films and shows impact viewers by exposing them to specific topics in a specific context, thereby 
making the information accessible and then providing a way to apply that information in a real-
world context. Whereas the news media does this through compelling fact-based stories, 
dramatic films and shows provide fictional narratives that viewers may relate to situations in 
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their own lives. Over time, repeated themes and messages in entertainment media can shift 
viewers’ perceptions of the world (Alitavoli and Kaveh 2008), and stereotypes can become 
perceived as the norm (Reep and Dambrot 1987). 
I employ data from an original survey using a national sample of (how many) people9 to 
examine correlations between dramatic, fictional media exposure and perceptions of 
marginalized peoples, in this instance, Muslims, Arabs, and Muslim Americans. In particular, I 
explore individuals’ viewing habits of popular fictional shows, their beliefs about 
counterterrorism policies and beliefs about who is likely to commit a terrorist act. The results 
indicate that even with a vast array of media options, there is still a connection between the 
fiction shows we watch and our beliefs about the crimes they depict and the people portrayed as 
their perpetrators. 
5.1 Dramatic Media’s Influence on the Social Construction of Reality 
Although discussed using different terms by different fields, social scientists tend to 
agree that individuals construct their reality through both personal experiences and what they 
observe of the world around them. Political scientist John Zaller (1992) states that opinions are 
“a marriage of information and predisposition” (6). Each attitude or opinion presented by an 
individual is the result of combining the incoming information that the individual has been given 
with their predisposition toward the topic at hand, often in favor of prior opinions (Krosnick 
1988, McGuire 1966, Zaller 1992). Zaller’s work maintains that opinions are given based on 
information available at the “top of the head” at the time of producing the opinion. Attitudes, 
then, are not stable tenets that individuals carry with them from conversation to conversation but 
                                                 
9 This survey was approved by Georgia State University’s Institutional Review Board in 2019. The survey was 
conducted through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk platform and is therefore a national sample, but is not nationally 
representative. 
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are instead nuances of stable values and are subject to change based on the current conversation. 
Zaller (1992) explains that when individuals receive new information through experience or 
observation they compare this information with their previously held beliefs before deciding 
whether to accept or reject the new information. 
The social construction process identified in communication works similarly, but with the 
added understanding that during the competition between previous and new information about 
reality, the media acts as a filter to position one version as more likely than another (Alitavoli 
and Kaveh 2008). Individuals construct their reality, then, through personal experiences; through 
information relayed via significant others, social groups, and organizations; and through 
interaction with media (Alitavoli and Kaveh 2008). Alitavoli and Kaveh (2008) distinguish 
between experienced reality, which is gained through “everyday interaction with the world 
around us,” and symbolic reality, “which is gained from three other sources namely peers, 
institutions and the media” (3). Media plays an especially large role in building symbolic reality 
today as people increasingly spend their time looking at a screen. In 2018, the average American 
adult spent more than eleven hours per day engaging with some form of media; nearly six of 
those hours are spent accessing video content through TV, computer videos, and video focused 
apps or web content on a smartphone or tablet (Nielsen 2018). 
5.1.1 Accumulative Effects 
Cultivation theory states that continued exposure to similar messaging and mediated 
versions of reality can induce viewers to reshape their ideas of reality to be more in-line with 
what they are absorbing from media (Reep and Dambrot 1987). For example, the more 
frequently an individual watches a crime drama, the more likely they are to list crime as 
America’s most important problem (Holbrook and Hill 2005). Similarly, health messages in 
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dramatic shows may also influence whether individuals are more likely to become organ donors 
(Quick 2013) or look into preventative options for breast cancer, even when the message comes 
from more than one show (Hether et al 2008). Gierzynski and Eddy’s (2015) groundbreaking 
work on the effects of sustained engagement with a dramatic narrative with a particular message, 
Harry Potter and the Millennials, examines the accumulative influence of anti-authoritarian 
messaging on political values. The more chronically accessible an issue is in entertainment 
media, and the more consistent the message is, the more likely it is to shape an individual’s view 
of society (Holbrook and Hill 2005). 
Stereotypes in dramatic television shows—and the occasional character who breaks 
them—offer prime examples of this sustained media influence on symbolic reality (Reep and 
Dambrot 1987). News media is more likely to report terrorist attacks when the perpetrator is 
Muslim (Kearns, Betus, and Lemieux 2019), and these stereotypes are mirrored in popular 
dramatic media (see Shaheen 2009). Historically, Muslims and people of Arab descent have been 
depicted in Western media as one of a handful of negative stereotypes: The terrorist, the oil 
sheikh, the belly dancer, or the oppressed wife (Khan and Brushke 2016). As cultivation theory 
suggests, this routine exposure to stereotypes keeps them salient and foundational to our social 
constructive reality (Reep and Dambrot 1987). In essence, information saturation dictates 
information acquisition (Elenbaas, et al. 2012). 
Conversely, when a show presents a character from a marginalized group who does not 
fit into the typical stereotypes, audience members are more likely to take notice in a positive way 
(Gillig, et al. 2017). Gillig et al (2018) find evidence that increased visibility of transgender 
individuals, especially through dramatic narrative, positively influences attitudes toward 
transgender people and related policy issues. The authors credit this shift largely to identification 
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with characters in the dramatic narrative and the elicitation of emotions, which Moyer-Gusé, 
Dale, and Ortiz (2018) describe as form of mediated contact. 
5.2 Entertainment Media Exposure as Mediated Intergroup Contact 
Social contact theory asserts that intergroup, or intercultural, contact can diminish 
prejudice, or ethnocentrism, between members of different social and ethnic groups. Americans 
who exhibit high levels of ethnocentrism are more likely to experience increased perceptions of 
threat after reading a news article about a Muslim terrorist, while those with previous intergroup 
contact with a member from a cultural minority mediates the effects of perceived threat (Khan 
and Bruschke 2016). Gillig et al (2018) and Moyer-Gusé, Dale, and Ortiz (2018) suggest 
entertainment media as a conductor for this intergroup contact, largely due to its ability to foster 
identification between the viewer and one or more onscreen individuals. When identifying with 
an onscreen individual who is also an outgroup member, or with an ingroup member who has 
contact with an outgroup member, viewers can indirectly experience social contact through 
parasocial interaction (Moyer-Gusé, Dale, and Ortiz 2018). 
However, what happens when depictions of out-group members are largely negative? 
This study argues that increased exposure to Muslims/Arabs as terrorists/villain stereotypes in 
dramatic media has significant, detrimental influence over viewers’ perceptions of Muslims and 
Arabian people, as well as their attitudes toward related public policies. Although some shows 
depict Muslims in protagonist roles, several scholars note it is more likely they will be cast in 
antagonist roles, specifically as terrorist characters (e.g. Saleem 2017; Shaheen 2009). Based on 
this literature, I expect the negative stereotype to negatively affect perceptions of Muslims, 
increase the likelihood that individuals will associate terrorism with Islam, and influence 
individuals’ attitudes toward related public policies. Furthermore, increased exposure through 
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watching multiple shows with a Muslim terrorist antagonist and watching multiple episodes of 
those shows will deepen this impact. To explore this theory, I hypothesize: 
H1: Increased exposure to shows that depict Muslim/Arab characters as terrorists will 
increase viewers’ prejudice toward Muslims/Arab people. 
 
H0: Increased exposure to shows that depict Muslim/Arab characters as terrorists 
will have no effect on viewers’ prejudice toward Muslim/Arab people. 
 
H2: Individuals with increased exposure to shows that depict Muslim/Arab characters as 
terrorists will be more likely to support public policies that negatively affect 
people from majority-Muslim countries. 
 
H0: Individuals with increased exposure to shows that depict Muslim/Arab 
characters as terrorists will be no more likely to support public policies that 
negatively affect people from majority-Muslim countries than individuals with 
less exposure to these shows. 
 
H3: Increased exposure to shows with a Muslim/Arab character as the primary antagonist 
will heighten viewers’s support of these policies. 
 
H0: Increased exposure to shows with a Muslim/Arab character as the primary 
antagonist will have no greater effect than exposure to shows where the 
Muslim/Arab character is not the primary antagonist. 
 
H4: Increased exposure to shows with a Muslim/Arab character as a protagonist will 
lessen viewers’ support on these policies. 
 
H0: Increased exposure to shows with a Muslim/Arab character as a protagonist 
will have no effect on viewers’ support of these policies. 
 
To appropriately examine these hypotheses, I conduct a two-part study that first examines 
the available popular shows through substantive content analysis, and then second evaluates their 
accumulative impact on viewers using an online survey.  
5.3 Study Part 1: Show Selection and Analysis 
When deciding which shows to include in my study, I began by selecting recent shows 
that had aired in the last five years. I wanted to find shows that reached a large audience and met 
102 
the following criteria, based on results from key studies examining narrative persuasion (namely 
Hamby, et al. 2017; Hamby, et al. 2018; Moyer-Gusé 2008b; Moyer-Gusé and Nabi 2010; 2011): 
1. Has a runtime of at least 40 minutes per episode, 
2. Contains at least 8 episodes per season, 
3. Falls within the drama genre, 
4. Avoids a serialized format in favor of a season-length story arc (i.e. no crime or medical 
dramas), 
5. Involves crime, politics, and/or terrorism.  
I leaned toward choosing shows that aired on one of the top networks (ABC, CBS, FOX, 
and NBC) and platforms (Amazon, Hulu, and Netflix) and either ran more than one season 
(denoting high viewership) or was considered a “most watched” or “top rated” show. I used 
multiple popular, high-traffic entertainment sites to verify these criteria, including 
TVGuide.com, TVLine.com, and Deadline.com. Once the initial shows were selected from these 
lists, I used the synopses provided by Google as well as details listed on the International Movie 
Database (IMDb) and Wikipedia for each show to determine whether they fit the required 
criteria. 
5.3.1 Show Synopses Analysis 
This list was further shortened to include only shows whose Google and/or IMDb show 
synopsis included at least one of the following keywords: Politics, political, government, trust, 
crime, criminal, criminal justice, terror, and terrorism. I eliminated procedural crime dramas (e.g. 
NCIS) and medical dramas (e.g. Grey’s Anatomy), as these appear in previous studies and have 
already been shown to produce priming and framing effects (see Holbrook and Hill 2005; Quick 
2009), as well as period shows, science fiction shows, and shows centered on the supernatural or 
extra-human abilities because they may be less relatable, thereby diminishing perceived realism 
(Bahk 2011). After all of these considerations I acquired a list of 35 shows that aired and/or 
streamed from 2013 to 2018. I chose a five-year window to provide a large enough sample of 
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shows for participants to choose from, and I ended the show selection in 2018 because I wanted 
to ensure the entire current season of each show had aired prior to running the survey in fall of 
2019, as the typical season of most network dramas runs from fall of one year to spring of the 
next year. 
Table 5 Dramatic Shows Chosen for Terrorism and/or Crime Content Analysis 
24: Legacy (FOX) Jack Ryan (Amazon Prime) Shots Fired (FOX) 
Allegiance (NBC) Jane the Virgin (CW) State of Affairs (NBC) 
American Crime (ABC) Madame Secretary (CBS) Taken (NBC) 
Bodyguard (Netflix) Mr. Robot (USA) The Americans (FX) 
Containment (CW) Odyssey (NBC) The Blacklist (NBC) 
Crisis (NBC) Orange is the New Black (Netflix) The Blacklist: Redemption (NBC) 
Designated Survivor (ABC) Ozark (Netflix) The Crossing (ABC) 
FBI (CBS) Power (Starz) The Informer (Amazon Prime) 
Gang Related (FOX) Quantico (ABC) The Night Of (HBO) 
Homeland (HBO) Scandal (ABC) The Passage (Fox) 
House of Cards (Netflix) Seven Seconds (Netflix) Valor (CW) 
Hostages (CBS) Shades of Blue (NBC)  
 
From this list of 35 shows related to crime, politics, and/or terrorism (Table 5), I studied 
each show’s Wikipedia and IMDb pages for season and episode synopses. I read these to find 
whether the show includes any mention of terrorism, terrorists, or terrorist-like attacks. For 
example, some episodes of The Blacklist feature discussion about terrorism surrounding an event 
but later label the attack otherwise. I also read the synopses with close attention paid to the 
characters, their descriptions, and their relationships. I specifically looked at the antagonist 
characters for signs of racial and religious profiling, as well as whether or not they were painted 
as the primary antagonist in opposition to the show’s main protagonist. 
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5.3.1 Character Analysis 
To examine the prevalence of Arab, Arab-looking, and/or Muslim men as terrorist 
antagonists in these 19 shows, I line read the same episode synopses to determine whether the 
terrorist character served as an antagonist, sometimes called the villain, to the main characters. 
Somewhat unsurprisingly, I discovered all terrorist characters served as antagonists.10 To 
continue my examination of terrorist characters, I learned whether each was described as being 
Muslim or of Arab descent, at times needing to look up the actor’s biography to verify Middle 
Eastern or South Asian descent when the character’s background is implied but not explicit. 
Finally, I determined whether each show used their Muslim/Arab terrorist character(s) as a 
primary antagonist, meaning the character was featured opposite the protagonist(s) in the show’ 
story arc for at least one season. Table 6 displays my findings, which are again not entirely 
surprising. 
Only five out of 19 shows featured terrorist activity not directly associated with a Muslim 
and/or Arab character as the perpetrator, meaning two-thirds of the shows with some terrorism 
storyline depict a Muslim/Arab perpetrator. While all Muslim/Arab terrorist characters are 
portrayed as an antagonist, nine of the 12 shows use a Muslim/Arab terrorist character as their 
primary antagonist. That is half of all shows portraying terrorism and three-fourths of those 
shows with a Muslim/Arab perpetrator. Conversely, only five of the 19 shows depict a 
Muslim/Arab protagonist. Of these shows, all depict some iteration of a Muslim/Arab terrorist 
character, and only one, Quantico, does not have a Muslim terrorist as its primary antagonist. 
                                                 
10 I intentionally make the distinction here between “villain” and “antagonist.” Although often used interchangeably 
in the vernacular, the term “villain” further connotes evilness, whereas “antagonist” simply refers to a character’s 
position in relation to the main character, or protagonist. I prefer to maintain this neutral term as several 
antagonists—even as terrorists—exhibit a complex backstory that does not always portray them as an evil villain. 
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Table 6 Show Analysis of Muslim/Arab Characters 











24: Legacy Yes Yes No 
Bodyguard Yes Yes Yes 
Containment Yes Yes No 
Designated Survivor Yes Yes Yes 
FBI Yes No No 
Homeland Yes Yes Yes 
House of Cards Yes No No 
Jack Ryan Yes Yes No 
Madame Secretary Yes No No 
Mr. Robot No No No 
Odyssey Yes Yes No 
Quantico Yes No Yes 
Scandal No No No 
State of Affairs Yes Yes No 
Taken No No No 
The Americans No No No 
The Blacklist Yes No No 
Blacklist: Redemption No No No 
The Informer Yes Yes Yes 
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However, the plots and characters are often more complex than these dichotomous 
variables suggest. As I explained that not all antagonists are evil villains, neither are all 
Muslim/Arab terrorist characters all portrayed in the same way. In two instances, a season spent 
framing the antagonist as likely to be Muslim and/or Arab would not be categorized as having a 
Muslim/Arab terrorist antagonist, but could impact viewers differently depending on whether 
individuals watched enough of the show to discover the true antagonist. For example, 
Designated Survivor and Quantico both include story arcs where Muslim/Arab characters are 
framed as terrorists at several points throughout the first season, although the actual terrorists are 
revealed at the end of the season as being white characters. An individual who watched the full 
first season of either show may be affected differently than an individual who watched only 
several episodes, perhaps continuing to believe the Muslim/Arab character to be the primary 
suspect.  
Similarly, Homeland’s first season portrays a white man with mental health problems as 
the primary antagonist, while its later seasons feature Muslim and Arab terrorist and non-terrorist 
characters. News media effects studies note the discrepancies in coverage between terrorist acts 
committed by Muslims and those committed by whites (Kearns, et al. 2019; Saleem 2017). Even 
State of Affairs, which depicts both a Muslim Arab terrorist as its primary antagonist and South 
American terrorists in a multi-episode story arc, discusses the Arab as a terrorist but refers often 
to the South American antagonists as war lords or rebels. 
5.4 Study Part 2: Survey 
5.4.1 Survey Questions 
Based on my analysis of show synopses and characters, I compiled and devised survey 
questions to examine potentially key dependent and independent variables in my continued 
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research on narrative persuasion of political attitudes. Responses to these questions hopefully 
reveal information about how an individual perceives and interacts with a specific entertainment 
media, how they interpret certain societal norms, and how they observe themselves. I looked to 
the literature and studies examining similar attitudes for insight into question choice and 
creation. When choosing and creating unique survey questions to use in the MTurk 
questionnaire, I focused on three primary purposes: Identification, media use, and sociopolitical 
attitudes related to terrorism and perceptions of Muslims. I did not need to create entirely new 
questions for many aspects I wanted to examine; however, there were areas where I needed to 
either tweak an existing question or create a new one. Below, I explain my choice of questions 
for each purpose. 
5.4.1.1 Demographics and Identification 
In keeping with other political science studies, I employed demographics questions 
regularly used on the American National Election Studies (ANES) survey to illuminate the 
personal identities of my participants (see ANES 2016). These questions include political 
identification, religion, education, marital status, employment, and income. For race, ethnicity, 
and gender, however, I looked to newer versions of these questions to better capture the 
contemporary, diverse identity landscape portrayed in today’s entertainment media. The gender 
question includes male, female, and a third choice of “non-binary/other.” The race and ethnicity 
question, taken from Hughes et al (2016), allows respondents to check multiple boxes and 
provides more choices than previous questionnaires: American Indian or Alaska Native; Asian; 
Black or African American; Hispanic, Latinx, or Spanish origin; Middle Eastern or North 
African; Native Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander; White; or Other. This form of the race and 
ethnicity question was particularly important for its inclusion of the “Middle Eastern or North 
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African” option, as distinguished from the “Asian” option, because it allows better differentiation 
for participants’ potential identification with a character presented as being Middle Eastern 
and/or Arab. I also included a question on travel, asking whether respondents had traveled 
outside of the country in the past five years, which can indicate a greater openness to new 
cultures (Saleem 2017). 
These demographics questions are not only important for understanding why respondents 
may hold certain sociopolitical attitudes, but also for exploring their similarities to the characters 
portrayed in the popular dramas I’m studying. Perceived similarity, as a way of identifying with 
a fictional character, remains the strongest influence on decreasing counterarguing, a form of 
resistance to embedded messages in dramatic fictional media similar to directional motivated 
reasoning (Moyer-Gusé and Nabi 2011). It also remains the only form of identification that can 
be externally verified, to a degree, by comparing the demographics of the character to the viewer. 
Therefore, certain demographics questions may serve as control variables or even covariates for 
the dependent variables of this study. 
5.4.1.2 Media Use 
I asked participants about their media use to determine either an explanatory/independent 
variable or a lurking or blocking variable. For example, the more politically aware someone is, 
the less likely they are to be swayed by new information (Lupton, et al. 2015). Querying 
respondents about how often they watch and how much attention they pay to the news each 
week, as well as asking several political knowledge questions, provides insight into how 
persuasive a narrative may be for that individual. These questions were also gleaned from the 
regular ANES survey. Similarly, the literature provides evidence that watching crime serials like 
Law & Order or CSI increase the likelihood that an individual will perceive crime as a major 
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problem in America (Holbrook and Hill 2005). Thus, I created a question similar to those the 
ANES asks about how many days each week an individual is exposed to news content, non-news 
content, or social media. 
As the consumption method and amount remain the key explanatory variables I am 
observing, I created two new questions for my research. First, I directly ask respondents whether 
they prefer to watch shows as they air on television, typically once per week, or if they prefer to 
binge-watch shows after they have finished airing, watching many episodes in one sitting.  Next, 
I returned to the list of shows that fit my criteria for narrative persuasion of views toward 
counterterrorism policies and perceptions of Muslims. For each show, I decided to ask 
participants how much they had watched: Never watched, watched one to three episodes, 
watched more than three episodes but not one season, or watched at least one full season. These 
questions could help me to better understand the accumulative effects of these shows. 
5.4.1.3 Key Attitude Variables 
My key dependent variables include policy views and social attitudes. The policies I was 
most interested in were those on sending troops to the levant to fight Islamic militants, allowing 
Syrian refugees to immigrate to the U.S., and approving the use of drone strikes to target 
terrorists abroad. For each of these policies, I chose questions with a range of answers to indicate 
favorability on a seven-point likert scale. I selected the questions regarding sending U.S. troops 
and accepting Syrian refugees from a survey that examines how news media affects these 
attitudes (Saleem 2017), and I created a drone strike approval question to fit the same format. 
Lastly, I included a dichotomous question about the relationship between sacrificing freedoms 
and safety from terrorist attacks. 
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For social attitudes, I wanted to examine perceptions about Islam and Muslims in 
association to violence and terrorism. I chose questions about whether respondents are worried a 
terrorist attack will happen in the near future in the U.S. and whether they are worried a terrorist 
attack will happen in their area (Saleem 2017). Pulling again from Saleem et al (2017), I chose to 
include a grid question on how likely members of certain social groups are to engage in an act of 
terrorism. I created a similar grid question on how likely members of certain social groups are to 
experience discrimination in the U.S. for comparison. Finally, I chose a dichotomous question 
asking respondents whether they believe Islam is more or less likely than other religions to 
promote violence. 
To examine overall social prejudice against Muslims, I created a new bias variable from 
the responses to two grid questions regarding Muslims. First, I created new measurements from 
the spectrum of responses to the two grid questions asking for an evaluation of various social or 
political groups. The first grid question asked respondents how likely they felt that a member 
from each group would be to commit a terrorist attack on the United States in the near future 
(Blacks, Whites, Muslims, Christians, Left-wing Radicals, Right-wing Radicals, Russians, and 
Chinese). Because I am more interested in prejudice against Muslims than whether the individual 
is overly concerned about terrorism in general, I compared each individual’s response to whether 
a Muslim would commit an attack to the individual’s average response across all eight groups. I 
subtracted the averaged response from the response specific to Muslims, and then I converted 
these measurements to a spectrum from zero to one. I repeated this process for a second grid 
question regarding discrimination. The question asked respondents to evaluate how much 
discrimination members of each group (Black, Whites, Women, Men, LBTQ Persons, 
Transgender Persons, Muslims, and Christians) face in the U.S. from none to a great deal. 
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Because prejudiced individuals are less likely to perceive discrimination against the group about 
which they are prejudiced, I took the final measurements and subtracted them from one to 
achieve a percentage that reflects a higher number for individuals less likely to perceive 
prejudice against Muslims than against members of other groups. To create the bias dependent 
variable, I added together the final percentage measurements created from the two grid 
questions, and then I divided by two to obtain a single set of measurements reflecting overall 
bias against Muslims. 
For political policy attitudes, I chose to examine two different, salient policies that affect 
Muslim-majority countries. First, I asked respondents whether they favor or oppose “sending 
ground troops to fight Islamic militants, like ISIS, in Iraq and Syria,” providing a seven-point 
response scale. My assumption is that individuals with greater bias against Muslims will be more 
likely to favor sending troops. Second, I asked respondents whether they favor or oppose 
accepting refugees from Syria, again providing a seven-point response scale. My assumption is 
that individuals with greater bias toward Muslims will be less likely to favor accepting Syrian 
refugees. 
5.4.1.4 Key Independent Variables 
Using the list of 35 shows that include the themes or keywords crime, politics, and/or 
terrorism (Table 5), I presented each show one-by-one in a survey question that asked whether 
respondents had seen the show: never (0), 1-3 episodes (1), more than 3 episodes and up to one 
season (2), or at least one season (3). From these questions, paying particular attention to the 
shows listed in Table 6, I created three new variables that measure exposure to terrorism 
storylines with Muslim perpetrators and storylines with a Muslim terrorist as the primary 
antagonist. These variables—Muslim terrorist (MT) exposure, Muslim terrorist antagonist 
112 
(MTA) exposure, and Muslim protagonist (MP) exposure—are an aggregation of participants’ 
responses to how much they watched of a specific set of shows. The MT exposure variable 
aggregates participants’ responses to the exposure question for the 14 shows that depict a 
Muslim/Arab terrorist, and the MTA exposure variable aggregates responses for the nine shows 
with a Muslim/Arab terrorist character as the primary antagonist. The MP exposure variable 
aggregates responses for the five shows with a Muslim protagonist. 
The variation in exposure of these three conditions (MT, MTA, and MP exposure) is 
provided as an aggregation of the responses to the initial show exposure questions, which place 
responses on a scale from 0 to 3. The gross exposure variables express a percentage (0 to 1) of 
the initial aggregation of these responses to the shows of each category. For example, if a 
participant watched two episodes of Jack Ryan (measured as 1 in the original show exposure 
variable), ten episodes of Madame Secretary (measured as 2), more than one season of both 
Quantico and Taken (measured as 3), and no episodes of any of the other shows that depict a 
Muslim terrorist stereotype, their initial MT exposure measurement would be 9. However, 
because only Jack Ryan depicts a Muslim/Arab terrorist character as a primary antagonist, their 
MTA exposure would measure as 1. These aggregations are then converted into a percentage of 
possible responses. Because there are 14 shows depicting a Muslim terrorist stereotype, 
continuing with this example, the individual’s MT exposure percentage measurement would be 
0.214 or 21.4 percent of the total exposure measurement possible. 
By aggregating the responses to these show exposure questions, I am better able to 
understand the potential impact of watching shows that use terrorists, and especially Muslim 
terrorist stereotypes, as an antagonist. For example, a show that uses a white, left-wing radical 
terrorist in one episode and a Muslim jihadist in another episode, like FBI, will probably have 
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less impact on a viewer’s belief that Muslims are more likely than other groups to commit a 
terrorist act than a show where an entire season is based on a storyline that uses a Muslim 
terrorist character as its primary antagonist, such as State of Affairs. By converting the 
aggregated responses to percentages, I am better able to compare these responses across varying 
measurements. 
5.4.2 Methods 
In October 2019, I conducted a survey experiment using Amazon’s Mechanical Turk 
platform. The survey included 118 questions covering demographics, views on public policy, 
political knowledge, beliefs about various social groups, trust in governmental institutions, and 
news and dramatic media consumption patterns (Appendix B). A total of 1088 participants 
responded and were provided $2.00 as compensation for their time, which was approximately 30 
to 45 minutes. Data was collected in less than 24 hours using this method, and participants were 
compensated within two business days. 
5.4.2.1 Participants 
Of the 1088 participants, 652 (60.04%) identified as male, 431 (39.69%) identified as 
female, and 3 (0.28%) identified as non-binary or other. Approximately 70% of participants self-
identified as age 35 or younger, with the youngest participant at 18, the mean age at 34, and the 
oldest participant at 74 years of age. More than half of participants (54%, 587 participants) 
identified as White, while 23% (250) identified as Asian, and 11.32% (123) identified as Black 
or African American. Only 4.23% (46 participants) identified as Hispanic, Latinx, or Spanish 
origin as their sole identification, though 72 participants in total listed this as one of their 
identities. A total of 61 participants (5.61%) listed more than one identity, with 16 participants 
listing American Indian or Alaskan Native, 21 listing Asian, 18 listing Black or African 
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American, 26 listing Hispanic, Latinx, or Spanish origin, seven listing Middle Eastern or North 
African, 10 listing Native Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander, and 46 listing White as one of 
multiple identities. There were also 15 participants who identified solely as American Indian or 
Alaskan Native, and five participants (0.46%) identified as Middle Eastern or North African. 
Considering the marginalized identity being observed concerns a globally popular 
religion, I included nine choices for the religion question and also a question about the level of 
importance of participants’ religion (Appendix B). The majority of respondents identified as 
Catholic (343, 31.53%), Hindu (162, 14.89%), and Protestant (160, 14.71%) with 292 
participants (26.84%) claiming no preference. The remaining 5.98% of participants associated as 
Pagan (3 participants), Jewish (11), Muslim (32), and another religion (66) with 19 participants 
preferring not to say. Participants’ responses as to how important their religion is to them was 
somewhat bipolar with 30.91% (336 participants) claiming their religion is not at all important 
while 23.46% (255) claim it to be very important and 22.17% (241) claim it to be extremely 
important. This places nearly 46% of participants as feeling their religion (likely Catholicism, 
Hinduism, or Protestantism) is very or extremely important to them. Only 8% (87) reported their 
religion was slightly important and 13.52% (147) claimed it to be moderately important. The 
remaining 21 participants (1.93%) reported they were undecided. Unsurprisingly, those who 
reported their religion was of little importance were more likely to claim no religious preference 
(250 participants). Those who claimed their religion to be very important were predominately 
Catholic (110, or 32% of those who reported to be Catholic), Protestant (50), and Hindu (70). 
Those who claimed their religion was extremely important to them were also predominately 
Catholic (129), Protestant (42), and Hindu (39). Those who identified as Muslim were more 
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likely to report their religion as very important (34.38% of Muslim respondents) or extremely 
important (31.25%). 
Interestingly, 40.63% of respondents reported to align with the Democratic Party, while 
31.25 aligned with Republicans. Yet, 44.12% reported they disapprove of how President Donald 
Trump is doing his job, while 47.95% said they approve. Many respondents also agreed with the 
statement that they generally trust the federal government to run the United States, with 57.72% 
saying they agree in some capacity and only 32.72% saying they disagree. 
5.4.2.2 Shows 
A surprising 141 participants (12.96%) reported having never seen an episode of any of 
the 19 shows depicting a terrorism storyline, and 198 (18.2%) had never seen an episode of one 
of the 14 shows depicting one of the terrorist characters as Muslim. Nearly one-third of 
participants (30.15%) had never seen an episode of one of the nine shows depicting a 
Muslim/Arab terrorist character as the primary antagonist. A similar 33.09% had never seen one 
of the shows with a terrorism storyline depicting a Muslim protagonist—not surprising 
considering four out of the five shows with a Muslim protagonist also include a Muslim 
antagonist. 
5.4.3 Results 
My first hypothesis states that increased exposure to the Muslim terrorist (MT) stereotype 
will negatively influence viewer perceptions of Muslims. To examine this hypothesis, I ran a 
linear regression comparing the correlation between aggregated exposure to shows depicting a 
Muslim/Arab terrorist character and the bias dependent variable (Table 7). Unsurprisingly, 
individuals with higher education and those who have traveled outside the US in the past five 
years appear less likely to express bias against Muslims. Surprisingly, higher political knowledge 
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significantly correlates with greater bias. Against my expectations, greater aggregated exposure 
to the MT stereotype negatively correlates with bias against Muslims, indicating that increased 
exposure lessens bias.11 This may indicate that any increased mediated exposure—positive or 
negative—to an outgroup member (mediated intergroup contact) can facilitate empathy and/or 
decrease anxiety toward the outgroup, as suggested by the focus group responses in Chapter 4 of 
this manuscript. 
Table 7 OLS Regression on Bias Against Muslims 
 Bias Against Muslims 
 Coefficient Standard Error z-score p-value 
MT Stereotype -0.101*** 0.018 -5.61 0.000 
White 0.025*** 0.008 3.25 0.001 
Female 0.006 0.007 0.83 0.410 
Education -0.007** 0.002 -2.79 0.005 
Pol ID/Republican -0.001 0.004 -0.30 0.761 
Pol Knowledge 0.007*** 0.001 5.28 0.000 
Travel Outside US -0.020** 0.007 -2.91 0.004 
Constant 0.582 0.019 31.08 0.000 
N=1080, *p-value < 0.05, **p-value < 0.01, ***p-value < 0.001 
My second hypothesis claims that increased exposure to the MT stereotype influences 
views toward favoring public policies that may negatively affect Muslims and people from 
Muslim-majority countries. To test this hypothesis, I looked at responses to two salient public 
                                                 
11 See Appendix C for additional models that measure the relationship between aggregated exposure and the raw 
responses from the questions I used to create this bias variable. While these models provide greater evidence for my 
hypothesis, I believe this is a more adequate measurement of bias against Muslims through association with 
terrorism, whereas the raw answers only provide evidence for bias against Muslims or fear of terrorism in general. 
117 
policy questions in the survey. The first question asked respondents whether they favor or 
oppose sending U.S. ground troops to fight Islamic militants, such as ISIS, in Iraq and Syria. The 
second asks whether they favor or oppose accepting Syrian refugees to the United States. Both 
questions offer a 7-point response scale from “favor a great deal” to “oppose a great deal.” Table 
8 shows the results of these linear regression analyses, providing the coefficient for each 
correlation with the standard error in parenthesis. 
Table 8 OLS Regressions on U.S. Public Policy Beliefs Related to Muslim-Majority Countries 
 Public Policy Beliefs 
 Send Troops to MidEast Accept Syrian Refugees 
MT Stereotype 2.434 (0.265)*** 1.545 (0.263)*** 
White -0.115 (0.113) -0.441 (0.113)*** 
Female 0.129 (0.103) 0.214 (0.103)* 
Education -0.032 (0.036) 0.135 (0.036)*** 
Pol ID/Republican 0.152 (0.062)* -0.503 (0.062)*** 
Pol Knowledge -0.028 (0.021) 0.011 (0.021) 
Travel Outside US 0.268 (0.104)** 0.209 (0.103)* 
Constant -0.257 (0.278) 0.577 (0.275)* 
N=1080, *p-value < 0.05, **p-value < 0.01, ***p-value < 0.001 
Standard errors in parenthesis. 
 
There is a strong correlation between accumulated exposure to the MT stereotype and 
approval of both policies, which supports the assumption that increased exposure would increase 
support of sending troops but refutes the assumption it would decrease favor of accepting Syrian 
refugees. However, the latter result of a positive correlation between accumulated exposure to 
the MT stereotype and favor toward accepting Syrian refugees to the U.S. may indicate increased 
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empathy toward Syrian refugees and increased bias against Muslim terrorists in particular, as 
opposed to Muslims in general. The question regarding sending ground troops to fight Islamic 
militants specifies “in Iraq and Syria,” which could lead many respondents to instead interpret 
the question regarding accepting Syrian refugees to the U.S. to mean accepting individuals to the 
U.S. who are escaping from Islamic militants. 
Both models also show correlations between political identification and the policy 
attitudes; however, the data reports that Republicans are more likely support sending troops but 
less likely to accept Syrian refugees. Having traveled outside the U.S. within the previous five 
years also appears to favor toward both policies. Approval of accepting Syrian refugees to the 
U.S. also correlates with being female and more highly educated, while individuals who identify 
as white are less likely to approve this policy. The mixed results signify there is likely a deeper 
explanation for these specific beliefs rather than a blanket correlation between stereotype 
exposure and policy attitudes. An additional factor that may affect these policy attitudes in 
particular, but also all the models depicted, is that a significant percentage of respondents 
identify as Hindu and Asian. This shows there may be a large portion of the sample that is 
Indian, rather than American. As these policy attitudes are specific to the United States, non-
Americans are likely to answer very differently than Americans. 
My third and fourth hypotheses consider the impact of having a Muslim as the primary 
antagonist or as a protagonist in a show with a terrorism storyline. I predict that having a Muslim 
terrorist character as the primary antagonist will further increase the negative influence of this 
stereotype on viewers’ political attitudes and social perceptions, while having a Muslim 
protagonist will diminish these effects. To evaluate these hypotheses, I examine again the bias 
and policy dependent variables using my aggregated exposure variables for shows that include a 
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Muslim terrorist character as the primary antagonist and shows that include a Muslim 
protagonist. Table 9 displays OLS regressions on the bias and policy attitudes including the 
aggregated variable for exposure to MT antagonists. 
Table 9 OLS Regressions on Bias and Policy Attitudes Regarding Muslims 
 Bias Against Muslims Policy Attitudes 
  Send Troops Accept Refugees 
MT Antagonist -0.106 (0.017)*** 2.298 (0.257)*** 1.472 (0.255)*** 
White 0.023 (0.008)** -0.099 (0.114) -0.429 (0.113)*** 
Female 0.005 (0.007) 0.131 (0.103) 0.216 (0.103)** 
Education -0.007 (0.002)** -0.032 (0.036) 0.135 (0.036)*** 
Pol ID/Republican -0.001 (0.004) 0.150 (0.062)** -0.504 (0.062)*** 
Pol Knowledge 0.007 (0.001)*** -0.023 (0.021) 0.014 (0.021) 
Travel Outside US -0.019 (0.007)** 0.268 (0.104)** 0.208 (0.103)** 
Constant 0.582 (0.019)*** -0.214 (0.277) 0.601 (0.275)** 
N=1080, *p-value < 0.05, **p-value < 0.01, ***p-value < 0.001 
Standard errors in parenthesis. 
In all three models, the correlation between the substantive independent variable and the 
dependent variable is statistically significant (Table 9). The results indicate that increased 
exposure to shows with a Muslim terrorist character as the primary antagonist will decrease an 
individual’s bias against Muslims. The full model regarding bias against Muslims is the same for 
aggregated exposure to Muslim terrorist antagonists as to the Muslim terrorist stereotype. Also 
similar, aggregated exposure to Muslim terrorist antagonist characters is positively and 
significantly correlated with both policy stances. Travel and political party identification are 
again statistically significant, with Republicans being more likely to favor sending troops but less 
likely to favor accepting Syrian refugees, and those having traveled being less likely to express 
120 
bias but more likely to favor both policies. In the regression on favor toward accepting Syrian 
refugees, again the only non-significant factor is political knowledge. 
Table 10 OLS Regressions on Beliefs that a Muslim will Corry out a Terrorist Attack in the U.S. 
in the Near Future 
 Bias of Muslims  Bias of Muslims 
Muslim Protagonist -0.069 (0.016)*** No Muslim Protagonist -0.104 (0.018)*** 
White 0.027 (0.008)*** White 0.025 (0.008)*** 
Female 0.008 (0.007) Female 0.005 (0.007) 
Education -0.008 (0.002)** Education -0.007 (0.002)** 
Pol ID/Republican -0.002 (0.004) Pol ID/Republican -0.001 (0.004) 
Pol Knowledge 0.008 (0.001)*** Pol Knowledge 0.007 (0.001)*** 
Travel Outside US -0.023 (0.007)*** Travel Outside US -0.020 (0.007)** 
Constant 0.577 (0.019)*** Constant 0.583 (0.019)*** 
N=1080, *p-value < 0.05, **p-value < 0.01, ***p-value < 0.001 
Standard errors in parenthesis. 
I ran the same three models using exposure to shows with a Muslim protagonist as the 
substantive independent variable. Interestingly, the results of these regressions were extremely 
similar, likely because four of the five shows with a Muslim protagonist also include a Muslim 
antagonist. To better understand the difference between having a Muslim antagonist and 
protagonist and having only a Muslim protagonist, I created a fifth aggregated exposure variable 
using responses for the shows that depict a Muslim terrorist character but with no Muslim 
protagonist. I compare the two results in Table 10 on the bias dependent variable. Even 
separating the shows, I still find the same correlations. Increased exposure to shows with a 
Muslim protagonist negatively correlates bias against Muslims, as does exposure to shows with a 
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Muslim terrorist character but no Muslim protagonist. In both models, education level and 
political identification also show correlations with statistical significance. 
5.5 Discussion 
All four exposure variables exhibit similar results regarding beliefs about Muslims and 
public policies regarding Muslims and Muslim-majority countries. Increased exposure to the MT 
stereotype in any capacity may influence viewers’ ideas about Muslims—both in America and 
abroad. However, evidence does not support my initial projection that negative stereotypes 
would correlate with bias. Instead, aggregated exposure to onscreen Muslims correlates with 
decreased bias against Muslims. In one interpretation, the correlations are arbitrary. In another, 
there is perhaps an endogenous, underlying factor that indicates individuals less likely to express 
prejudice toward Muslims are also more likely to watch shows that include Muslim characters. 
In a third view, the correlation supports previous studies, like that of Ortiz and Harwood (2007; 
see also Moyer-Gusé, et al. 2019), who find that any voluntary, mediated intergroup contact 
increases empathy toward the outgroup. 
With regard to policy attitudes, increased exposure significantly correlates with favor 
toward sending ground troops to fight Islamic militants in Iraq and Syria, but also correlates with 
favor toward accepting refugees from Syria, a Muslim-majority country. While this refutes my 
initial assumptions that increased exposure to the Muslim terrorist stereotype will increase favor 
of policies that negatively affect Muslims and Muslim-majority countries, it may instead indicate 
the exact opposite. Increased empathy toward Muslims, as is evidenced in the social bias models, 
would understandably correlate with favor of accepting refugees from a Muslim-majority 
country. In another interpretation of the question regarding sending ground troops to Iraq and 
Syria, respondents empathic to the plight of victims in these countries may see U.S. intervention 
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against Islamic militants as positive for the majority-Muslim countries impacted by militant 
violence. These relationships may actually provide deeper evidence that mediated intergroup 
contact—even those of negative portrayals—increase empathy toward the outgroup (see Dale 
and Moyer-Gusé 2020; Moyer-Gusé, et al. 2019; Ortiz and Harwood 2007). 
5.5.1 Limitations 
It is important to note several key limitations of this study. Namely, using the Mechanical 
Turk platform allows for a large sample, but not one that is nationally representative. 
Considering the large ratio of individuals identifying as Asian and Hindu, this sample likely 
includes a significant number of Indians. This may partially account for the overall favor toward 
policies that would send American troops to fight Islamic militants and would accept Syrian 
refugees to American, as non-Americans may be more willing to risk American lives and 
resources. However, it may provide greater evidence for mediated intergroup contact decreasing 
prejudice, considering the long history of religious animosity in India which pits Hindus against 
Muslims. The deep divide between these groups led to the 1948 partition of India and the 
creation of a new, Muslim state, Pakistan. Should the sample include a large number of Hindu 
Indians, the negative correlation between accumulated exposure to the Muslim terrorist 
stereotype and prejudice against Muslims is even more striking. 
Further, the proxies provided to account for stereotype exposure accumulation cannot 
account for varied frames within a show. It is one thing to understand that many shows will delve 
deeper into character histories later in a season and, therefore, to expect audience stereotype 
acceptance to increase in the introductory episodes and decrease thereafter. However, it is quite 
another to comb through every single show available for this tipping point. That level of detail is 
neither a good use of time nor a necessarily desirable collection of data. Regardless of where the 
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show makes this tipping point, there are many other factors in play, such as primacy and recency 
effects (McGuire 1992), personal attention and circumstance (Bennett and Iyengar 2008), 




6 EXAMINING THE IMPACT OF BINGE EFFECTS ON NARRATIVE 
PERSUASION AND MEDIATED INTERGROUP CONTACT 
Do contemporary media consumption habits like binge watching alter the impact of 
entertainment media effects on social and political attitudes? When Gerbner and colleagues 
developed cultivation theory, which asserts that extended exposure to similar messaging across 
mass media influence social norms, they had no way of knowing the vast changes the Internet 
and the information revolution would bring. Harmon et al (2019) present evidence that the 
contemporary media environment diminishes the accumulative effects described by cultivation 
theory, positing that selection bias pushes individuals to seek out media—both news and 
entertainment—that matches their current perceptions of social norms. While this certainly 
comprises part of the explanation for the results they find that messaging in media has null 
effects in the contemporary media environment, it is not the full story. 
In addition to selection bias, the very methods of media consumption have changed quite 
drastically since the 1960s conditions in which Gerbner made his first assertions. Where 
television shows and films were once strictly monitored and even scarce, today the media market 
is saturated at all times with easily-accessible audio-visual material that Americans consume in 
rather large quantities. In the 1960s, television, film, and advertising were not new, but they did 
command a far lesser percentage of Americans’ daily attention. Today, Americans have access to 
video content across a wide array of devices and platforms at any time of the day in nearly any 
location. American adults spend, on average, 11 hours per day looking at a screen, using more 
than four of those hours to watch live or streamed television (Nielsen 2019). In addition to cable 
and network television, subscription-based platforms offer full of hundreds of thousands of hours 
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of entertainment content. Unlike the 20st century in which cultivation theory was developed, 
today we have Netflix. 
Video streaming platforms like Netflix have transformed the entertainment media market, 
not only raising the sheer amount of easily-accessible content, but also transforming the methods 
through which we consume it. In the 1960s television news and a few shows were available at 
certain times of the day, limiting the possibilities of consumption. Now, American adults report 
not only watching more television, but bingeing on it. Binge watching refers to the practice of 
consuming at least two to six episodes of the same show in one sitting (Netflix 2013). Netflix 
(2016), which makes up 31 percent of television streaming, reports approximately 73 percent of 
its users engage in binge watching on a weekly basis. With the ever-growing supply and ever-
changing demands of the entertainment media market, does cultivation theory still have merit? 
6.1 Evaluating Media Consumption Method Effects 
In this chapter, I evaluate the effects of binge watching on narrative persuasion and 
mediated intergroup contact through a longitudinal laboratory experiment. To do this, I build 
upon the survey results in Chapter 5, which suggest a relationship between watching shows that 
include Muslim characters—even as antagonists—and shifting attitudes toward Muslims and 
policies related to Muslim-majority countries. In addition to examining the accumulative effects 
of exposure to nuanced mediated intergroup contact and persuasive messages embedded in the 
narrative, I use this experiment to study how binge watching further alters these effects on 
viewers’ social perceptions and political attitudes. The laboratory experiment also allows me to 
control for selection effects and evaluate causal direction. 
126 
Over seven weeks, 14412 undergraduate students from a large, diverse, university 
screened the first three episodes from one of two popular, fictional dramas. Within each of these 
groups, approximately half of the participants  binged all three episodes in one sitting, screening 
them back-to-back with only short breaks in between each episode. The other half  of each group 
came in once per week for three weeks to watch each episode, mimicking the conventional 
weekly television broadcasting format. Thus, the two by two treatment design produced four 
groups: Show 1 binge watchers, show 1 weekly watchers, show 2 binge watchers, and show 2 
weekly watchers. All participants completed pre- and post-treatment surveys to determine 
attitude shifts, and 112 participants (77.8 percent) completed an additional follow-up survey two 
weeks after the final episode was screened for weekly watchers to track any lasting effects. I 
used two treatment shows to compare effects between material as well as between consumption 
methods. The first three episodes of Amazon Prime’s Jack Ryan served as the counterterrorism 
treatment show, intended to influence audience attitudes toward American counterterrorism 
policies and perceptions of Muslims and crime. I used ABC’s This Is Us as a comparison show 
with a tolerance treatment, as it neither discusses terrorism nor depicts a Muslim character but 
does portray explicit and implicit messages of acceptance regarding marginalized groups. 
This chapter describes the experiment in full. First, I revisit my theory of binge effects in 
the context of mediated intergroup contact and my expectations for its effects on social 
perceptions and political attitudes. Next, I expound upon the details of designing and carrying 
out the study. Finally, I share the results of the experiment and discuss the evidence these results 
provide. This innovative design builds upon exceptional previous studies, and I hope it will 
prove the first of many in this vein. 
                                                 
12 In total, 159 participants began the first treatment, but only 145 completed all three treatment sessions and filled 
out the pre- and post-treatment surveys. 
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6.2 Binge Effects Theory 
The entertainment media effects literature does not currently consider the impact of what 
is popularly referred to as “binge watching.” The term “bingeing” is vernacularly related to the 
act of gorging oneself on food and/or drink. This is where we get the term “binge drinking,” 
which alludes to the act of drinking alcoholic beverages to excess in a short period of time. In 
contemporary parlance, one may binge on books, movies, video games, and television shows in 
the same manner. Binge watching typically describes the act of watching multiple episodes of 
the same show in one sitting (Conlin, Billings, and Averset 2016; Netflix 2013). An entire season 
of a show may even be binged in a day or two, depending on the number and length of episodes. 
I coin the term binge effects to describe changes to the impact of narrative persuasion on 
individual attitudes that may occur as a result of the consecutive consumption of lengthy media 
over a relatively short period of time. This can refer to a film and its sequels or to many episodes 
or a full season of an episodic show. As Conlin, Billings, and Averset (2016) point out, “the 
content of the narrative does not shift, yet the amount of narrative one watches can be rapidly 
accelerated when compared to past media release models” (152, emphasis removed). However, 
the act of bingeing on a specific media—in which each consumed item of media is part of a 
series or is highly related in some thematic way, such as by genre or topic—is different from the 
acts of consuming a single media item such as a film or show episode or of consuming multiple 
media items over a longer time period such as a week, month, or season. As such, it deserves 
different terminology from cultivation theory.  
Because the media is consumed all at once, I expect it to have greater initial persuasive 
effects, not unlike the drench hypothesis suggests. In other words, after watching multiple 
episodes in one sitting, persuasive effects will be greater than the same effects measured at the 
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end of watching the same episodes week-by-week. I formed this expectation based on my 
understanding of narrative persuasion, and the probability that binge watching may keep viewers 
in a state of absorption longer.13 Sitting for multiple episodes of a show implies there will be 
fewer interruptions to viewers’ narrative engagement, indicating that any deictic shift of 
absorption (transportation and/or identification) will last longer. I aver that the longer a viewer is 
absorbed in the narrative, the more likely they are to experience full transportation and 
identification, which increases the likelihood of reduced reactance and of message acceptance. 
However, I also expect binge-watching to have fewer lasting persuasive effects than 
those associated with cultivation theory because there is less likelihood that viewers will have a 
continued engagement with the exact theme, or message, of the binged show. Without regular 
engagement, the effects are likely to wear off faster than if the media was continuously watched 
over a longer time period, as with cultivation theory. Furthermore, without the regular and 
continued sessions of reflection—bypassed by beginning the next episode immediately and 
staying absorbed—an individual who has binge-watched a show rather than watching it at 
regular intervals is less likely to receive the full effects of reflection. The reflection process of 
considering the narrative concepts as they relate to one’s own life in the real world is imperative 
to inducing attitude change; fewer opportunities to reflect mean fewer opportunities for the 
individual to consider how the narrative relates to his own beliefs. 
Therefore, I posit that binge-watching a show with politically-relevant themes and/or 
characters will have a strong initial effect on viewers’ attitudes. However, watching the same 
show regularly over a longer period of time will have more lasting effects on viewers’ attitudes. 
                                                 
13 An opposing assumption may be that continuous watching could lead to decreased absorption through distractions 
or multitasking. I try to limit this potentiality in my design, described later thin this chapter, by limiting the binge 
session to three hour-long episodes. 
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In this study, I look specifically at the impact of exposure to three episodes of two different 
shows. The counterterrorism show includes a terrorism storyline as its main plot with a Muslim 
terrorist character as the show’s primary antagonist. In line with mediated intergroup contact 
theory, I expect the negative portrayal of an outgroup member—the Muslim terrorist character—
to negatively affect perceptions of Muslims. In accordance with cultivation theory, I expect the 
narrative to influence attitudes toward favoring counterterrorism policies that target terrorists, 
Muslims, and Muslim-majority countries. The tolerance show details the struggles of several 
marginalized social groups and includes a storyline of familial bond and acceptance of outgroup 
members. In line with mediated intergroup contact theory, I expect the positive intergroup 
contact consistently portrayed in these episodes will increase tolerance of outgroup members in 
viewers. As per my binge effects theory, I expect that viewers who binge the episodes will 
exhibit these effects strongly immediately following the screening, and I also expect that these 
effects will diminish more quickly for binge watchers than for weekly watchers. 
6.3 A Longitudinal Experiment of Binge Effects 
Several entertainment media effects studies provide evidence that contemporary fictional 
television shows influence our political attitudes (e.g. Holbert 2003; Holbrook and Hill 2005; 
Kearns and Young 2017; Gillig, et al. 2017; Pettey and Bracken 2008) and social perceptions 
(e.g. Dale and Moyer-Gusé 2020; Gillig, et al. 2017; Moyer-Gusé, et al. 2019; Ortiz and 
Harwood 2007; Wojcieszak and Kim 2016). However, very few examine these effects over time 
(see Hether, et al. 2008; Lane, et al. 2013; Paluck and Green 2009; Slater, et al. 2006). So far, 
none examine how binge watching these shows affects their ability to influence us. 
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6.3.1 Experiment Design 
To study how binge watching alters entertainment media effects, I created a six-part 
longitudinal experiment with a pre/posttest and two-factor design. The experiment begins with a 
pre-treatment survey, to be completed online by all participants. Participants who complete the 
questionnaire must then complete three sessions of exposure to one of two treatment media. Half 
of participants complete the sessions in the same day to simulate bingeing, whereas the other half 
complete one session each week for three weeks to simulate traditional weekly watching. 
Immediately following their third session, participants fill out a post-treatment survey. For binge 
watchers, this occurs on the same day they watch episodes one, two, and three. For weekly 
watchers, this occurs on the day they watch only episode three. The final, sixth part of the 
experiment consists of a follow-up survey sent to all participants at a later date. Figure 1 depicts 
the six components of this process. 
 
Figure 1 Experiment Components and Process 
 
The two-factor design examines a specific media, episodes from a television show, as one 
treatment and mode of consumption, binge versus weekly watching, as the second treatment. 
This results in four participant groups: Binge counterterrorism, weekly counterterrorism, binge 
tolerance, and weekly tolerance (Table 11). I choose to use television shows for the media 














the preferred media. To ensure internal validity, all subjects are randomly assigned to one of the 
four participant groups upon signing up for the experiment.  
Potential participants are informed they will be randomly assigned to either come in for 
approximately four hours on a single day or for approximately three and a half hours on three 
separate days. To minimize attrition, the days are specified in the call for participants, and 
participants are notified of their particular expectations prior to the first media session. The 
signup period lasts two weeks, during which participants sign an informed consent document and 
take the pre-treatment questionnaire online, and then day and time assignments are sent to 
participants at least 24 hours prior to the first media session for scheduling purposes. Participants 
are not told which show they will be watching until they arrive at the first media session. 
Table 11 Experiment Groups 
 Counterterrorism Show Tolerance Show 
Binge Sessions Counterterrorism Binge Tolerance Binge 
Weekly Sessions Counterterrorism Weekly Tolerance Weekly 
 
The three media sessions account for three episodes of either the counterterrorism show 
or the tolerance show, each of which are approximately 50 to 60 minutes long. Therefore, one 
session is equal to one episode, and three sessions allow participants to watch all three episodes 
of their assigned show. Participants assigned to the Binge Groups complete all three sessions in 
the same day, allowing for breaks in between each session. Following the third session, which is 
the third episode, binge participants take a post-treatment questionnaire online using their smart 
device or on a hard copy. This means the binge participants complete Sessions 1 through 3 all 
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during Week 2 of the experiment. They also take the post-treatment questionnaire during Week 2 
of the experiment. 
Participants assigned to the Weekly Groups complete only one session per week. This 
means that in Week 2 of the experiment, they complete Session 1, during Week 3 they complete 
Session 2, and in Week 4 they complete Session 3. Like the binge participants, weekly 
participants are asked to take the post-treatment questionnaire on their smart device or on a hard 
copy immedialy following their third session. However, unlike the binge participants, this means 
weekly participants take the post-treatment questionnaire during Week 4 of the experiment. 
To examine lasting attitudinal effects, the follow-up questionnaire is sent out two weeks 
following the final media session for all participants. All participants may take the follow-up 
questionnaire during Weeks 6 and 7 of the media sessions, which is approximately four weeks 
following exposure for the binge participants and two weeks following final exposure for the 
weekly participants. 
 
I expect the statistical means of questionnaire responses to specific dependent variable 
questions will change in relation to the treatments. Prior to any treatment, means between groups 





















Figure 2 Model of Binge Effects Longitudinal Experiment Process 
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experiment for binge participants and in Week 4 for weekly participants, I expect these means 
will differ between participants assigned to the counterterrorism show and those assigned to the 
tolerance show, as well as between the binge and weekly groups within those groups. At the 
follow-up point, I expect only the weekly groups’ means to differ from those of the binge groups, 
indicating the diminished effects of bingeing. 
Two key issues with any observational study of entertainment media effects are selection 
effects and causal direction (Pettigrew et al 2011). Considering mediated intergroup contact, for 
example, individuals less likely to express prejudice are also more likely to interact with 
intergroup members and watch shows portraying intergroup relationships (Ortiz and Harwood 
2007). Conversely, individuals more likely to experience prejudice are less likely to engage in 
intergroup contact or view shows with mediated intergroup contact. Random assignment controls 
for selection effects, allowing me to better examine causal direction. 
Another issue with experimental studies, however, lies in the decreased realism of a 
laboratory setting. To increase the mundane realism of this study, I incorporated both a familiar 
setting and online tools. All surveys were taken by participants online using a computer, tablet, 
or smartphone—participants chose their preferred device. As part of the treatment procedures, 
participants were told to try and view the show as they would normally view a show. Participants 
were allowed to bring in food, breaks were taken in between sessions for the Binge Groups to 
allow for movement and using the restroom, and the only discouraged activity was talking loudly 
so as not to disturb other participants. 
6.3.2 Show Selection and Hypotheses 
The linchpin of the experiment lies in selecting appropriate treatment shows for 
evaluating the effects of narrative persuasion and mediated intergroup contact on participants in 
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each group. In Chapter 5 of this manuscript I establish 18 popular television and streamed shows 
that aired between 2013 and 2018 that depict terrorism, 12 of which depict a Muslim terrorist 
character and nine that contain a Muslim terrorist character as the show’s primary antagonist. To 
select the counterterrorism treatment show for my binge effects experiment, I more deeply 
examined these nine shows (Appendix A). To select the tolerance show, I reviewed the most 
popular shows that did not make my original list and, therefore, did not cover topics relating to 
terrorism, crime, and politics. 
6.3.2.1 Counterterrorism Treatment: Jack Ryan 
I chose Jack Ryan as the counterterrorism treatment show primarily because it depicts a 
Muslim terrorist character as the show’s only antagonist in the first three episodes and depicts no 
non-Muslim antagonists.14 It is also ideal because this antagonist arrives in the first episode and 
because there is a Muslim protagonist. The humanization of the antagonist offers an additional 
layer to the study pertaining to mediated intergroup contact theory. The inclusion of a Muslim 
protagonist and the humanization of the Muslim antagonist may offer insight into the role 
identification plays in facilitating narrative persuasion and mediated intergroup contact. For 
instance, participants who identify in some way with one or more Muslim characters, like Hanin 
Ali, may present very different attitudes than those who identify in some way with 
counterterrorism agents, like Sandrine Araud or Victor Polizzi (see Appendix A for analysis). 
First, I expect the counterterrorism treatment show, Jack Ryan, will influence audience 
members’ social perceptions of Muslims as a result of mediated intergroup contact. More 
specifically, I hypothesize: 
                                                 
14 In episode one, the terrorist group who arrives at Suleiman’s compound does include a white man who seems to 
be European. However, he receives very little screen time and acts solely in a subordinate role. His brief interaction 
with Hanin explicitly brings attention to him being different from the others. Neither myself nor my colleague listed 
this character as an antagonist vital to the storyline in our content analysis of the first three episodes. 
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1. Bias against Muslims will shift following exposure to the counterterrorism treatment 
show. 
a. Bias will increase for viewers who identify with characters portrayed as fighting 
Muslim antagonists, like Jack Ryan, Sandrine Arnaud, or Victor Polizzi. 
b. Bias will decrease for viewers who identify with Muslim protagonists, like Hanin 
Ali or Jim Greer. 
Further, I expect exposure to the treatment show will affect audience members’ policy 
attitudes through narrative persuasion. I hypothesize: 
2. Favor toward sending ground troops to fight Islamic militants in Iraq and Syria will 
increase. 
a. Favor will increase for viewers who identify with military characters portrayed as 
fighting Muslim antagonists, like UAV operator Victor Polizzi. 
3. Favor toward accepting Syrian refugees into the U.S. will decrease. 
a. Favor will increase for viewers who identify with Syrian Muslim protagonist 
Hanin Ali. 
b. Favor will decrease for viewers who identify with characters portrayed as fighting 
Muslim antagonists, like Jack Ryan or French intelligence agent Sandrine Arnaud. 
4. Favor toward using drone strikes to target Islamic militants will increase. 
a. Favor will increase for viewers who identify with UAV operator Victor Polizzi. 
b. Favor will increase for viewers who dislike Muslim terrorist characters, like 
Mousa bin Suleiman or Yazid. 
6.3.2.2 Tolerance Show: This is Us 
I chose This is Us as the tolerance treatment show and as a comparison to the 
counterterrorism treatment show. It does not contain any characters or storylines likely to 
influence counterterrorism policy attitudes. It contains no overtly Muslim characters, nor does it 
discuss terrorism or foreign policies. After selecting this show, I also found that it depicts a great 
deal of intergroup contact. The main characters comprise three siblings—a white man, a white 
overweight woman, and a Black man, who was adopted. The Black man, Randall, meets his 
biological father, who spent many years abusing drugs, and they begin to build a relationship in 
the first three episodes. These episodes also follow the obese woman, Kate, as she navigates her 
emotions and struggles with her health. Their mother, Rebecca, has remarried a Latino man, 
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Miguel. This show provided a clear mediated intergroup contact treatment, but one very different 
from the counterterrorism treatment. 
As such, I expect that exposure to the tolerance treatment show, This Is Us, will influence 
audience members’ overall outgroup tolerance as a result of mediated intergroup contact. I 
hypothesize: 
5. Bias toward outgroup members will decrease following exposure to the tolerance show. 
6.3.2.3 Binge Effects Hypothesis 
However, for those exposed to a treatment show in a binge watching group, I expect 
these attitude shifts to appear immediately following exposure and then to diminish or disappear 
over time. Specifically, I hypothesize: 
6. Attitude shifts that appear after exposure to any treatment will fade more quickly in 
audience members of the binge groups than those of the weekly groups. 
Overall, I assert that exposure to the counterterrorism show or the tolerance show will 
provide mediated intergroup contact, and that exposure to mediated intergroup contact in the 
counterterrorism show in particular may increase bias against Muslims. Further, participants 
exposed to the counterterrorism show will be more likely to favor counterterrorism policies that 
target Muslims or Muslim-majority countries than participants exposed to the tolerance show. 
However, these attitude shifts will diminish or disappear for participants in the binge group after 
several weeks. One condition that may alter these effects is identification, which may cause some 
participants in the treatment group to exhibit less bias toward Muslims than participants in the 
control groups. This is because identification may increase the effects of mediated intergroup 
contact, regardless of the harmful stereotypes of Islamic militants included in the 
counterterrorism treatment. 
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6.4 Data and Methods 
In February and March of 2020,15 144 undergraduate students16 at a diverse university 
with over 54,000 students took part in a seven-week laboratory experiment consisting of six 
components—three surveys and three treatment sessions. I chose undergraduate students for this 
case study because young adults report the highest levels of binge watching (Sabin 2018) and, 
therefore, may be most likely to exhibit binge effects as the new “normal” for entertainment 
consumption patterns. As detailed earlier in this chapter, participants completed an online pre-
treatment survey during the week prior to the first treatment session. All participants proceeded 
to attend three treatment sessions, during which they watched one episode of their assigned show 
per sessions. Participants assigned to either binge group (71 participants) completed all three 
treatment sessions in one day during Week 2 of the study. Participants assigned to one of the 
weekly groups (73) completed their first treatment session during Week 2, their second session 
during Week 3, and their third during Week 4. As such, binge group participants took the post-
treatment survey after their third session in Week 2, whereas weekly group participants took the 
post-treatment survey after their third session in Week 4. Participants received a follow-up email 
in Week 7 to complete the follow-up survey. For their time, participants were provided three 
points of extra credit to an introductory political science class grade, a $5 Amazon gift card for 
completing the post-treatment survey, and an additional $5 Amazon gift card for completing the 
follow-up survey.17 
                                                 
15 All treatment sessions were completed prior to the university lockdown and the shelter-in-place orders carried out 
due to the 2020 coronavirus pandemic. Participants completed the follow-up survey online. 
16 Originally 226 students agreed to participate and took the pre-treatment survey, but only 159 participants showed 
up for the first session. Session two received 155 participants, and during session three attendance dropped to 147 
participants. Of these 147 participants, two did not complete the post-treatment survey, and one had not completed 
the pre-treatment survey, leaving 144 participants who completed all but the follow-up survey. 
17 The gift cards were funded by an internal research grant awarded by the Georgia State University Political Science 
Department. 
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6.4.1 Recruitment and Participants 
Recruitment was conducted using a political science research pool, which provides 
undergraduates students enrolled in introductory political science classes to participate in 
political science research studies for extra credit in those classes. The call for participants was 
posted online on the Sona System platform during week one of the study. After attrition, 144 
students participated in the full study up to the follow-up survey, and 112 participants also 
completed the follow-up survey (Table 12). The sample was predominately female (102 
participants, approximately 71%), with 41 participants identifying as male and one participant 
identifying as non-binary or other. However, this was evenly distributed across the four groups 
with males as 9, 10, or 11 participants in each group (Appendix C). Approximately 92% of 
participants (132) are aged 18 to 21, with 10 participants aged 22 to 27, one participant aged 39, 
and one participant aged 45. Unsurprisingly, 124 participants indicated that they often prefer to 
binge watch shows rather than watch them weekly, with only 20 participants saying they prefer 
to watch weekly. The weekly watchers were slightly more likely to be assigned to a binge group, 
with seven of these participants randomly assigned to each binge group and three randomly 
assigned to each weekly group. 




(This Is Us) 
Binge Group 35 36 
Weekly Group 41 32 
 
Of the eight religion options, approximately 60% responded they either had no preference 
(43 participants) or selected “other” (45). Four preferred not to say, another four identified as 
Hindu, and 14 identified as Muslim. Of these 14 Muslims, the weekly group watching the control 
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show contained 2 participants, while the three other groups contained 4 Muslim participants 
each. No participants identified as Jewish or pagan. Christians made up approximately 24% (34) 
of participants, with 18 identifying as Catholic and 16 as Protestant. The sample was largely non-
white, with the largest group identifying as Black or African American (54 participants, 38%). 
Only 24 participants identified as white (17%), with 31 identifying as Asian (22%), 15 
identifying as Hispanic, Latinx, or Spanish origin (10%), three identifying as Middle Eastern or 
North African, and two identifying as Native Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander. Fifteen 
participants (10%) indicated some combination of these identities or selected “other.” These 
factors—age, religion, and race/ethnicity—demonstrate that the sample is not nationally 
representative. However, this study is not looking to represent American beliefs, but is instead 
intended to examine the effects of entertainment media exposure and the contemporary 
consumption method of binge watching on narrative persuasion. As such, the results provided by 
this sample are still useful for understanding these effects. 
Overwhelming, 78% of participants indicated they are likely to vote in the 2020 
elections, with 73 participants saying they are extremely likely to vote. Only seven participants 
said they are extremely or moderately unlikely to vote, with five participants indicating 
neutrality. The majority of the sample identifies as democrat (82 participants, 57%), with 38 
undecided participants (26%), 6 republicans, 12 independents, 4 libertarians, and 2 claiming 
“other.” Participants also listed their parents as largely democrat (69 participants, 48%), with 43 
claiming they “don’t know” their parents’ political affiliation (30%), 19 listing their parents as 
republican (13%), three as independent, two as libertarian, three as “other,” and five claiming 
their parents identify with different parties. I include parental indicators as an additional 
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understanding of my young sample. While university students may lean liberal, more specific 
policy attitudes can sometimes align more closely with familial beliefs. 
Most participants claimed they engage with social media every day (110 participants, 
76%), but their responses were less patterned for news media. The majority of participants (83 
participants, 58%) indicated they engage with news media one to three days per week, with only 
14 participants indicating they never engage with news media and 15 indicating they engage with 
news media every day. More participants, however, reported that they only pay attention to the 
news a little (67 participants) or a moderate amount (45). As with social media, participants were 
more likely to say they engage with non-news media every day (67 participants). They also 
indicated they much prefer to binge watch an episodic show than to watch one episode per week, 
with 124 participants (86%) preferring to binge. However, these participants are spread across 
the four groups, with seven participants in each of the binge groups and three participants in each 
of the weekly groups who prefer to watch weekly. 
6.4.2 Surveys 
In addition to demographics questions in the pre-treatment survey, I include social and 
political attitudes questions on all three surveys, and I include show-specific questions on the 
post-treatment survey. The social and political attitude questions are intended to measure the 
effects of narrative persuasion and mediated intergroup contact by examining views toward 
Muslims and approval of counterterrorism strategies that target Muslim-majority countries. I 
used the same questions from the survey study discussed in Chapter 5, which ask about whether 
Islam is more likely to promote violence than other religions, whether they are concerned about a 
terrorism attack on the U.S. in the near future, whether they believe a member from several 
groups is likely to carry out a terrorist attack on the U.S. in the near future—one of the eight 
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groups being Muslims. I asked the same two policy questions from the survey in Chapter 5, how 
much participants favor allowing Syrian refugees to come to American and how much they favor 
sending U.S. troops to fight Islamic militants in Iraq and Syria. Because the Jack Ryan episodes 
include the side story of a UAV operator, I also included a question that asks participants how 
much they favor using drone strikes to target terrorists in other countries. 
For the show-specific questions, I aim to measure two key aspects of narrative 
persuasion: Absorption and identification. I directly ask participants to report how absorbed or 
“sucked in” they felt to the storyline. However, most Americans have little to no knowledge 
about the differences between the types of identification—namely cognitive-emotional 
identification, perceived similarity, wishful identification, and parasocial interaction. To gain 
better responses to an identification question about the main characters of a show, I decided to 
first briefly explain identification and then to use general language to describe the meaning 
behind each type rather than provide their technical terms. For example, rather than asking 
whether participants experienced wishful identification toward a character, I asked whether they 
might “want to be more like this character” (Appendix B). 
6.4.3 Results 
The key relationships I examine are the differences between the four groups over time 
regarding social bias toward Muslims and regarding counterterrorism policy attitudes. 
Differences in the pre-treatment and post-treatment survey responses between the groups that 
viewed the tolerance show, This is Us, and those that viewed the counterterrorism show, Jack 
Ryan, should evidence the effects of narrative persuasion and mediated intergroup contact 
embedded in the treatments. Differences in the post-treatment and follow-up survey responses 
between the binge groups and the weekly groups should indicate whether binge watching altered 
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these effects in some way. In particular, I look at four dependent variables: Association of 
Muslims with terrorism (social bias) and favor toward sending U.S. ground troops to fight 
Islamic militants in Iraq and Syria, accepting Syrian refugees to the U.S., and using drone strikes 
to target and kill terrorists abroad (policy views). Each of the four variables were calculated on a 
7-point scale. 
I begin my evaluation of the experiment’s results by examining whether there were 
indeed differences between participants exposed to the counterterrorism show (Jack Ryan) and 
those exposed to the tolerance show (This Is Us). I used t-test analyses to compare the means 
between the counterterrorism and tolerance treatment groups prior to the treatment, immediately 
following the treatment, and at the follow-up point in Week 7 of the experiment. Table 13 
displays the results of these analyses, and I observe several notable shifts in the differences 
between them. 
 
Table 13 Comparison of Differences of Means Between Tolerance and Counterterrorism Groups  
Survey Results Over Time 
Social Variable  Tolerance CT Show t-value p-value 

















     Continued next page 
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Policy Variables  Tolerance CT Show t-value p-value 



















































T-Test Difference of Means Analysis 
N=76 for pre- and post-treatment and n=57 for follow-up counterterrorism groups. 
N=68 for pre- and post-treatment and n=55 for follow-up tolerance groups for policy variables. 
N=67 for pre- and post-treatment tolerance groups for bias variable. 
* p<0.01, ** p<0.05 
Namely, I observe only five points of statistically significant treatment effects between 
participants exposed to the counterterrorism show and those exposed to the tolerance show. The 
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first statistically significant difference of means occurs between participants in the tolerance 
versus the counterterrorism groups at the pre-treatment point for bias against Muslims. While 
this should have been addressed through random assignment, which occurred at the pre-
treatment point when participants signed up for the study, the small sample could decrease the 
effects of this randomization. I continue to take this into account when moving forward with my 
analysis. The specific survey question used as a proxy for the social bias dependent variables 
measures participants’ association of Muslims with terrorist activity. Here, I find the probability 
value reflects that after exposure to the treatment shows, it becomes less likely that the social 
bias means of the counterterrorism and tolerance groups are statistically different. While the pre-
treatment correlation between these groups could be termed statistically significant within a 90% 
confidence interval, this probability entirely diminishes at the post-treatment and follow-up 
points. Given that participants in the tolerance groups begin with a higher level of bias, meaning 
they were more likely to associate Muslims with terrorist activity than participants in the 
counterterrorism groups, this shift could indicate a several causes. First, it is possible that the 
samples are biased and no treatment effects are actually present. However, it could also indicate 
either that participants in the tolerance groups’ bias lessened during the experiment or that 
participants counterterrorism groups’ bias increased, or both, as was the expectation. 
Regarding the policy variables, the statistically significant differences in means between 
participants exposed to the counterterrorism treatment show and those exposed to the comparison 
show, the tolerance treatment show, occur at all time points for the refugees dependent variable 
and at the post-treatment point for the drone strikes dependent variable. They do not occur at all 
for the troops variable. In my hypotheses, I state that exposure to the counterterrorism show will 
likely increase favor toward the troops and drone strike variables and decrease favor toward the 
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refugee variable. I further hypothesize that character identification may influence these effects. 
In the t-test results, the troops variable shows no statistically significant difference between the 
counterterrorism and tolerance groups at any point in the experiment, while the Syrian refugees 
variable shows statistically significant correlations at all three survey points in the experiment. 
The drone variable shows no significance at the pre-treatment point, statistical significance at the 
post-treatment point, and no significance at the follow-up point. This indicates that the 
counterterrorism show likely had an impact for attitudes toward using drone strikes, but that 
effects on the other policy dependent variables are either null or nuanced.  
6.4.3.1 Social Bias 
My first and fifth hypotheses suggest that exposure to either one treatment show or the 
other will affect social bias. More specifically, I hypothesize: 
𝐻1: Bias against Muslims will shift following exposure to the counterterrorism show. 
𝐻1𝑎: Bias will increase for viewers who identify with characters portrayed as 
fighting Muslim antagonists, like Jack Ryan, Sandrine Arnaud, or Victor Polizzi. 
𝐻1𝑏: Bias will decrease for viewers who identify with Muslim protagonists, like 
Hanin Ali. 
𝐻5: Bias toward outgroups will decrease following exposure to the tolerance show. 
As a proxy for measuring social bias, I created the bias dependent variable from a survey 
question asking participants how likely they think it is that a member from one of eight social 
groups will commit a terrorist attack on the U.S. in the near future. The social groups were 
Blacks, whites, Muslims, Christians, right-wing activists, left-wing activists, Russians, and 
Chinese, and responses were provided on a 7-point scale from “extremely unlikely” to 
“extremely likely.” Because I expect the counterterrorism treatment to influence bias toward 
146 
Muslims, I keyed in on responses solely addressing how likely participants were to associate 
Muslims with an imminent terrorist attack in the U.S. 
To better evaluate my hypotheses regarding bias against Muslims, I ran several OLS 
regression models using post-treatment bias, change in bias between the pre- and post-treatment 
points, and change in bias between the pre-treatment and follow-up points as my dependent 
variable. In each model, I controlled for treatment show, consumption type, party identification, 
race, religion, and having recently traveled outside the U.S. Using post-treatment bias as my 
dependent variable, I found that being white negatively correlated with bias with 90 percent 
confidence. However, including pre-treatment bias in this model erased this correlation. Running 
the same two models separately for participants exposed to each show, I found that identifying as 
Christian correlated with 95 percent confidence for participants exposed to the counterterrorism 
treatment. 
When using change between the pre- and post-treatment points as my dependent variable, 
I found a positive correlation with identifying as Christian with 95 percent confidence for 
participants exposed to the counterterrorism show. When examining change between the pre-
treatment and follow-up points, I found a negative correlation with identifying as Democrat with 
90 percent confidence for participants exposed to the tolerance show and a positive correlation 
with identifying as Christian with 90 percent confidence for participants exposed to the 
counterterrorism show. I also found a positive correlation between exposure to the 
counterterrorism show and increased bias between the pre-treatment and follow-up points. These 
results indicate treatment effects are at work in one or both of the treatment shows, with 
individuals exposed to the counterterrorism show displaying greater bias than those exposed to 
the tolerance show over time. 
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Table 14 Pairwise Comparisons for Two-way Repeated Measures ANOVA for Social Bias 





All Participants    
 Pre- to Post-Treatment 0.066 0.168 1.000 
 Post-Treatment to Follow-up 0.279 0.151 0.201 
 Pre-Treatment to Follow-up 0.345 0.170 0.135 
Tolerance Treatment    
 Pre- to Post-Treatment 0.207 0.237 1.000 
 Post-Treatment to Follow-up 0.418 0.240 0.265 
 Pre-Treatment to Follow-up 0.625* 0.232 0.029 
Counterterrorism Treatment    
 Pre- to Post-Treatment -0.072 0.232 1.000 
 Post-Treatment to Follow-up 0.139 0.186 1.000 
 Pre-Treatment to Follow-up 0.067 0.244 1.000 
*p<0.05 
To better understand these results, I ran three two-way repeated measures ANOVA 
models using binge effects and identifying as Christian as the control variables. The three models 
included 1. all participants, 2. participants exposed to the counterterrorism show, or 3. 
participants exposed to the tolerance show. All three two-way repeated measures ANOVA 
models passed Mauchly’s test of sphericity at p=0.321 (all participants), p=0.075 
(counterterrorism), and p=0.964 (tolerance).  
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Figure 3 Estimated Marginal Means of Bias for Tolerance Groups Derived from Repeated 
Measures Two—Way ANOVA 
 
Figure 4 Estimated Means of Bias for Counterterrorism Groups Derived from Repeated 
Measures Two—Way ANOVA 
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In reviewing the three sets of pairwise comparisons for each time period, I found only 
one statistically significant shift with 95 percent confidence, which occurs for participants 
exposed to the tolerance show between the post-treatment and follow-up points (Table 14). 
However, none showed statistically significant differences between weekly and binge watchers. 
Figures 3 and 4 provide visual depictions of the estimated marginal means from these two-way 
repeated measures ANOVA models. I include these figures because they provide additional 
information about directionality. Although the statistically significant shift occurs only between 
the pre-treatment and post-treatment points for participants exposed to the tolerance show, there 
is additional information to be gleaned from the direction of this shift and the non-statistically 
significant shifts in other groups. For both weekly and binge watchers exposed to the tolerance 
show, there is a steady decline in bias across all three points (Figure 3). What makes the shift 
particularly interesting is where it occurs: From above 4 to around 3.5. Given the response 
options in the survey question used to measure bias against Muslims, the number 4 denotes the 
point of neutrality between “slightly likely” at 5 and “slightly unlikely” at 3.  
This shift from above the point of neutrality to below the point of neutrality over the 
length of the experiment, in conjunction with statistical significance, could support the assertion 
of Hypothesis 5 that exposure over time to the positive intergroup relationships depicted in the 
tolerance show will lead to decreased bias toward outgroups in real life. The results could also 
indicate stronger mediated intergroup contact effects than previously discussed in the literature. 
No Muslim, Middle Eastern or Arab, or terrorist characters exist in the tolerance show episodes, 
nor is there any discussion of Islam or terrorism. Yet, the overt intergroup relationships depicted 
between whites, African Americans, and persons from other marginalized groups seem to evoke 
a mediated effect on overall tolerance toward members from any outgroup. 
150 
Participants exposed to the counterterrorism show, however, exhibit little to no shift in 
their responses between the pre-treatment and post-treatment points—statistically significant or 
otherwise. Both the binge and weekly watchers exposed to the counterterrorism show provided 
averages responses below the point of neutrality at all three time points, indicating they were 
already less likely to associate Muslims with terrorism than their counterparts in the tolerance 
groups. The slight increase exhibited by weekly watchers visible at the post-treatment point 
could instead indicate some form of demand bias, in which respondents became aware of the 
research agenda to some extent and were more likely to respond to this question with neutral 
attitudes rather than an indication of true attitudes. 
As a final test of mediated intergroup contact effects on counterterrorism group 
participants, I used linear regression analyses to examine whether identifying with different 
characters affected the social bias dependent variable (Hypotheses 1a and 1b). Hypothesis 1a 
suggests that viewers who identify in some way with characters portrayed with fighting terrorism 
would be more likely to associate Muslims with terrorism; whereas, Hypothesis 1b asserts that 
viewers who identify in some way with Muslim protagonist characters would by less likely to 
exhibit this bias. The original question regarding identification provides laymen descriptions for 
four different types of character identification: Cognitive-emotional identification, wishful 
identification, parasocial interaction, and an inverse identification type of whether participants 
disliked the character. I dichotomized individual characters into whether participants expressed 
one of the positive forms of identification versus whether they expressed dislike or no 
identification, and I ran an OLS regression on post-treatment bias including all dichotomous 
identification variables and the control variables of pre-treatment bias and identifying with the 
Christian religion (Table 15).  
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Table 15 OLS Regression on Association of Muslims with Terrorism for Counterterrorism Show 
 Posttest Association of Muslims with Terrorism 
 Coefficient Standard Error z-score p-value 
Pretest Bias 0.534** 0.101 5.27 0.000 
Christian 1.202* 0.428 2.80 0.007 
Jack Ryan 0.790 0.962 0.82 0.415 
Victor Polizzi 0.712* 0.354 2.04 0.049 
Sandrine Arnaud 0.496 0.396 1.25 0.215 
Jim Greer 0.113 0.421 0.27 0.789 
Hanin Ali 0.058 0.747 0.08 0.939 
Fathi al-Abbas -0.477 0.486 -0.98 0.330 
Ali bin Suleiman -0.554 0.432 -1.28 0.204 
Mousa bin 
Suleiman 
1.105 0.683 1.62 0.111 
Yazid -2.673* 1.127 -2.37 0.021 
Constant 0.357 0.937 0.38 0.705 
N=74, Prob>F=0.0000, R-squared=0.4681 
*p<0.05, **p<0.001 
In addition to the two control variables, I found identification with two characters, Victor 
and Yazid, to be statistically significant with 95 percent confidence. Yazid is one of the few 
speaking Muslim characters who does not receive a detailed background story and who is 
featured in a solely villain-like role. He is also killed via drone strike by the character Victor, a 
UAV operator portrayed in episodes two and three in a subplot only related to the main story 
through this killing. While the show does not expose Victor’s background in the same way it 
does lead characters, like Jack Ryan, the subplot does explore his clear aversion to the work at 
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hand through self-destructive behaviors. In the third episode, Victor goes against his 
commanding officer to shoot down Yazid as Yazid attempts to rape the Muslim female 
protagonist, Hanin. Interestingly, Victor and Yazid are two characters who are given only one 
valence: Yazid is presented in a negative valence as a typical “bad guy” villain and as the more 
typical Muslim terrorist stereotype character, as described in Chapter 5. Victor is portrayed in a 
positive valence as a “good guy” military type, a hero who protects women, and as a winner—
having won $35,000 in a single night at a casino. Though we are shown his contempt for this 
money and the work he does, the final scenes of episode three show him clearly placed in the 
hero trope taking down Yazid, who has been framed in solely negative terms. 
Identification with the Muslim terrorist character, Yazid, negatively correlated with 
association of Muslims with terrorism, indicating that a lack of identification with Yazid 
increased association of Muslims with terrorism. Identification with Victor, as expected, 
positively correlated with associating Muslims with terrorism. These results could point to the 
mixed frames of the lead characters having a mixed impact on bias toward Muslims in the 
counterterrorism treatment groups. The results confirm my Hypothesis 1a, which asserts that 
identification with a character portrayed as fighting Muslim terrorists, e.g. Victor, will increase 
participants’ association of Muslims with terrorism. While the results do not directly confirm 
Hypothesis 1b, which suggests that identification with a Muslim protagonist character will 
decrease bias, they do support an inverse of this assertion: Failing to identify with a character 
who fits the Muslim terrorist stereotype, e.g. Yazid, correlates with increased association of 
Muslims with terrorism. 
Overall, the results provide evidence to support Hypotheses 1a, 1b, and 5, but fail to 
support Hypotheses 1 and 6. In sum, mediated intergroup contact appears evident in participants 
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exposed to the tolerance show (Hypothesis 5), but may be more nuanced in participants exposed 
to the counterterrorism show (Hypothesis 1). Identification appears to play a key role in 
determining the effects of mediated intergroup contact (Hypotheses 1a and 1b). However, binge 
effects do not appear to greatly affect the influence of mediated intergroup contact within these 
contexts (Hypothesis 6). 
6.4.3.2 Policy Attitudes 
The policy attitudes I use to examine narrative persuasion are favor toward sending U.S. 
ground troops to fight Islamic militants such as ISIS in Iraq and Syria, favor toward accepting 
Syrian refugees into the U.S., and favor toward using drone strikes to target and kill terrorists in 
other countries. In Chapter 5, I observed a statistically significant positive correlation between 
accumulated exposure to the Muslim terrorist stereotype and favor toward sending ground 
troops. I chose to also include a question regarding drone strikes because of the drone operator 
subplot included in episodes two and three of Jack Ryan. Responses to all three questions were 
measured on a 7-point Likert scale from “oppose a great deal” to “favor a great deal.” 
6.4.3.2.1 Sending U.S. Ground Troops 
My second hypothesis suggests that exposure to the counterterrorism show will affect 
favor toward sending ground troops to fight Islamic militants, such as ISIS, in Iraq and Syria. 
More specifically, I hypothesize: 
𝐻2: Favor toward sending ground troops to fight Islamic militants in Iraq and Syria will 
increase following exposure to the counterterrorism show. 
𝐻2𝑎: Favor will increase for viewers who identify with military characters 
portrayed as fighting Muslim antagonists, like UAV operator Victor Polizzi. 
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Although no statistically significant differences were apparent for this variable in my 
initial t-test results, I examined the pre- and post-treatment points further to assess possible binge 
effects. I conducted a two-way repeated measures ANOVA for the binge and weekly 
counterterrorism groups on favor toward sending U.S. ground troops to fight Islamic militants in 
Iraq and Syria at three points in time (pre-treatment, post-treatment, and follow-up). Again, no 
correlations were statistically significant, but the graph produced provided additional evidence of 
potential demand bias in participants at the post-treatment point (Figure 5). 
 
Figure 5 Favor Toward Sending U.S. Ground Troops to Fight Islamic Militants 
 
While the pre-treatment and follow-up attitude means are distinctly different regarding 
the troops policy, the post-treatment attitude means are nearly the same, converging at the point 
of neutrality not unlike the results of the bias variable. Participants in the binge counterterrorism 
group were more likely to express opposition to this policy at the pre-treatment and follow-up 
points, while those in the weekly counterterrorism group were more likely to express opposition 
at these points. The means of both groups, however, converge at the point of neutrality at the 
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post-treatment point, indicating mixed treatment effects or, more likely, some form of demand 
bias. Because participants responded to the post-treatment survey immediately after screening 
episode three, respondents likely gleaned some understanding of the research agenda. As such, 
the lack in opinion shift between the pre-treatment and follow-up points indicates little influence 
of the treatment on attitudes toward sending group troops to fight Islamic militants in Iraq and 
Syria, thereby rejecting Hypothesis 2. Additional regression models reviewing potential 
identification influence showed no statistically significant correlations, thereby also rejecting the 
sub-hypotheses for this dependent variable regarding identification. Furthermore , as there were 
no statistically significant differences between the binge and weekly groups, this dependent 
variable offers no evidence to support Hypothesis 6 regarding binge effects. 
6.4.3.2.2 Accepting Syrian Refugees into the U.S. 
My third hypothesis suggests that exposure to the counterterrorism show will affect favor 
toward accepting Syrian refugees to the U.S. More specifically, I hypothesize: 
𝐻3: Favor toward accepting Syrian refugees into the U.S. will decrease following 
exposure to the counterterrorism show. 
𝐻3𝑎: Favor will increase for viewers who identify with the Syrian Muslim 
protagonist Hanin Ali. 
𝐻3𝑏: Favor will decrease for viewers who identify with characters portrayed as 
fighting Muslim antagonists, like Jack Ryan or Sandrine Arnaud. 
Because the initial t-tests showed statistically significant differences between the 
counterterrorism and tolerance groups at all three time points (Table 13), I ran a series of linear 
regressions to determine which factors were likely influencing this policy attitude. For all 
participants within the experiment, race and party identification showed statistically significant 
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correlations with change in the refugees variables between the time periods, indicating these 
identities may have been influenced by either the counterterrorism or the tolerance show. In 
these models, individuals who identified as white or as Democrat were more likely to exhibit 
decreased favor toward the refugee policy over time (Appendix C). When examining these 
factors in the counterterrorism and tolerance groups separately, I find distinct differences within 
each group and across time points. 
For participants exposed to the tolerance show, being a Democrat negatively correlated 
with increased favor toward the refugee policy between the pre- and post-treatment points with 
statistical significance at 90 percent confidence. Identifying as Democrat, white, or Christian 
showed the same negative statistically significant correlation between the pre-treatment and 
follow-up points with 90 percent confidence. Though my initial hypothesis considered only the 
impact of the counterterrorism treatment on attitudes toward the refugee policy, the tolerance 
show may have influenced attitudes toward this variable through triggering these identities. 
Regarding participants exposed to the counterterrorism show, however, only being Christian 
showed a positive statistically significant correlation with 95 percent confidence on attitude 
change between the pre- and post-treatment points, but not between the pre-treatment and 
follow-up points. In other words, Christians exposed to the counterterrorism show were more 
likely to exhibit increased favor toward accepting Syrian refugees to the U.S. between the pre- 
and post-treatment points. Christians, Democrats, and whites exposed to the tolerance show, 
however, were more likely to exhibit decreased favor toward this policy across the experiment. 
This could indicate that while the means between the two treatments are statistically different 
across the span of the experiment, treatment effects may still be at work in either or both shows. 
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As this hypothesis was initially created to explain treatment and binge effects in 
participants exposed to the counterterrorism show, I continued testing on these participants only. 
I ran another linear regression to examine the impact of identification with key characters, and I 
found evidence supporting my sub-hypothesis 3b, which asserts that identification with 
characters depicted as fighting Muslim antagonists would decrease favor toward the refugee 
policy. In this case, identifying with the French intelligence agent Sandrine Arnaud negatively 
correlated with a positive change in favor between the pre-treatment and follow-up points toward 
accepting Syrian refugees. This means individuals who identified with Sandrine were more 
likely to exhibit decreasing favor toward the refugee policy across the span of the experiment. In 
episode three, Sandrine discusses with Jack Ryan her opinion regarding Paris’s issues with 
Muslim immigrants. She describes her perception that French people generally do not accept 
social identifications other than French nationality. Many Muslim immigrants, she explains, 
cling to their identity as Muslims over their new identities as being French. This discussion could 
factor into why identification with Sandrine seems to influence participants’ opposition to 
accepting Syrian, likely Muslim, immigrants into the U.S. 
To best understand the relationship of these factors with the dependent variable, I ran a 
two-way repeated measures ANOVA model including identification with the Christian religion 
or with the character Sandrine as covariates (Table 16). The model passes Mauchly’s test of 
sphericity with a significance level of p=0.099. While attitudes toward the refugee policy in the 
binge and weekly counterterrorism groups do not show statistically significant differences in 
means over time, F(2,104)=0.42, p=0.658, I do find that the main effects of the model show 
approach significance for the interaction of the dependent variable over time for both covariates 
with 90 percent confidence. Identifying as a Christian significantly correlates with attitudes 
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toward the refugee policy over time, F(2,104)=2.867, p=0.061, and identifying with the character 
Sandrine also correlates significantly with attitudes toward the refugee policy over time, 
F(2,104)=2.785, p=0.066.  
Table 16 Simple Effects for Two-Way Repeated Measures ANOVA for Counterterrorism Show 
  Favor Toward Accepting Syrian Refugees to the U.S. 
CT Participants p-value F-value df 
 Time Period 0.658 0.420 2 
 Time*Christian 0.061 2.867 2 
 Time*Sandrine 0.066 2.785 2 
 Time*Binge 0.709 0.345 2 
 Error   104       cont. next pg. 
CT Weekly Group p-value F-value df 
 Time Period 0.659 0.421 2 
 Time*Christian 0.225 0.528 2 
 Time*Sandrine 0.586 0.538 2 
 Error   64 
CT Binge Group    
 Time Period 0.916 0.088 2 
 Time*Christian 0.198 1.692 2 
 Time*Sandrine 0.095 2.510 2 
 Error   36 
 
In reviewing the simple effects of this model across consumption type, I find that the 
weekly counterterrorism group (n=35) and the binge counterterrorism group (n=21) pass 
159 
Mauchly’s test of sphericity at p=0.216 (weekly) and p=0.086 (binge). The simple effects show 
only a statistically significant correlation for identification with the character Sandrine in the 
binge group with 90 percent confidence (Table 16). This indicates that binge watching the 
episodes could have allowed this character to have a stronger effect on audience members. 
Results of the between-subjects tests suggest the same conclusion. While no difference 
exists in policy attitudes between the binge and weekly groups, F(1,52)=0.388, p=0.536, there 
does appear to be significant difference between the groups in terms of identifying with the 
character Sandrine, F(1,52)=3.444, p=0.069. This suggests that while binge effects may not 
directly alter narrative persuasion, they could interfere with identification, a key factor both in 
diminishing reactance to narrative persuasion and in fostering mediated intergroup contact 
effects. 
In sum, the results provide neither evidence to support Hypothesis 3, which asserts that 
exposure to the counterterrorism show would decrease favor toward the refugee policy, nor 
Hypothesis 3a, which suggests the counterterrorism show may increase favor in participants who 
identified with a Muslim protagonist. Further, it does not provide evidence of binge effects 
(Hypothesis 6). However, it does provide evidence to support Hypothesis 1b, which asserts that 
exposure to the counterterrorism show would decrease favor toward the refugee policy in 
participants who identified with one of the characters portrayed as fighting Muslim terrorists, e.g. 
Sandrine. 
6.4.3.2.3 Using Drone Strikes to Target and Kill Terrorists Outside the U.S. 
My fourth hypothesis suggests that exposure to the counterterrorism show will affect 
favor toward using drone strikes to target and kill terrorists outside the U.S. More specifically, I 
hypothesize: 
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𝐻4: Favor toward using drone strikes to target Islamic militants will increase following 
exposure to the counterterrorism show. 
𝐻4𝑎: Favor will increase for viewers who identify with UAV operator Victor 
Polizzi. 
𝐻4𝑏: Favor will increase for viewers who dislike Muslim terrorist characters, like 
Mousa bin Suleiman or Yazid. 
Initial t-tests of treatment effects on the drone strikes policy variable show statistically 
significant differences between the counterterrorism and tolerance groups only at the post-
treatment point, potentially indicating diminished effects at the follow-up point. To better 
understand these differences, I ran a series of linear regression analyses to determine potential 
demographic influences on change in attitudes toward the drone policy variable. I confirmed the 
statistically significant difference with 95 percent confidence in attitudes at the post-treatment 
point between participants exposed to the counterterrorism show and those exposed to the 
tolerance show, which those exposed to the tolerance show being more likely to favor using 
drone strike to target terrorists. Using change in attitude as the dependent variable, I also found 
that consumption type displayed a statistically significant correlation with 95 percent confidence 
between the pre- and post-treatment points, which binge watchers being less likely to exhibit and 
increase in favor toward the drone policy. 
Given that identification with the two characters most deeply affected by the drone strike 
subplot in episode three, Victor and Yazid, also significantly correlated with the social bias 
dependent variable, I ran a second set of regressions to determine whether the same was true for 
the drone policy variable. In my initial regression, I find that identification with neither of these 
characters correlates with the drone policy variable. When I include consumption type as a 
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control variable in this model, however, I find that identification with Ali Suleiman, brother to 
the primary antagonist Mousa bin Suleiman, negatively correlates with favor toward using drone 
strikes with 90 percent confidence. This result could indicate that increased empathy or 
sympathy toward this character, who is injured in episode two by a raid and whom we learn more 
about in episode three, decreases favor toward the drone policy. Episode three reveals more 
information about Ali’s backstory, his desire to be an artist and his kindness and empathy toward 
an old friend who takes Ali in when he is injured. This humanization could play a role in 
decreasing favor toward using drone strikes to target and kill terrorists. In either case, treatment 
effects and binge effects appear to be present. 
I conducted a two-way repeated measures ANOVA on the influence of consumption 
method of the counterterrorism treatment on favor toward using drone strikes to target and kill 
terrorists abroad at the pre-treatment, post-treatment, and follow-up time points. I ran a two-way 
repeated measures ANOVA model, including covariates for being Christian and for identifying 
with the characters Victor, Yazid, or Ali. This model passed Mauchly’s tests of sphericity with a 
p=0.290 significance level. In reviewing the main effects, there was again statistical significance 
for binge effects over time, F(2, 98)=4.408 and p=0.015. Identification with Yazid also showed 
significance with 90 percent confidence, F(2, 98)=2.557 and p=0.083, though neither the religion 






Table 17 Pairwise Comparisons of Favor Toward Using Drone Strikes for Counterterrorism 
Treatment Groups 
  Mean Diff. Standard Error p-value 
Counterterrorism Participants    
 Pre- to Post-Treatment -0.314 0.234 0.559 
 Post-Treatment to Follow-up 0.191 0.203 1.000 
 Pre-Treatment to Follow-up -0.122 0.196 1.000 
CT Weekly Group    
 Pre- to Post-Treatment -0.886* 0.265 0.006 
 Post-Treatment to Follow-up 0.543* 0.240 0.091 
 Pre-Treatment to Follow-up -0.343 0.221 0.388 
CT Binge Group    
 Pre- to Post-Treatment 0.136 0.391 1.000 
 Post-Treatment to Follow-up -0.045 0.305 1.000 
 Pre-Treatment to Follow-up 0.091 0.335 1.000 
 
I then split the consumption groups to separately analyze the simple effects for binge and 
weekly watchers, both of which pass Mauchly’s text of sphericity at p=0.467 (weekly, n=35) and 
p=0.401 (binge, n=22). However, only the weekly group shows statistically significant effects 
for the drone strike policy variable over time, F(2,68)=6.778, p=0.002. The pairwise 
comparisons across time for each consumption type bear out this finding, indicating that only the 
weekly counterterrorism group experienced the expected counterterrorism show treatment effects 
(Table 17).  
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Figure 6 Drone Policy Attitudes by Consumption Type for Counterterrorism Treatment 
 
Participants in the binge group at all three time points provided a mean response lower 
than the point of neutrality, indicating opposition to the drone strike policy. Interestingly, 
participants in the weekly group exhibit a mean at the pre-treatment and follow-up points below 
the point of neutrality, but exhibit a mean above the point of neutrality at the post-treatment 
point, indicating a shift toward favor of the drone strike policy. This may reveal drench effects 
related to episode three of the counterterrorism show, which portrays a successful drone strike 
made by a likable American, Victor, against a decided foreign villain, Yazid, in its final scenes. 
These drench effects could have been diminished for binge watchers experiencing fatigue after 
having watched two episodes immediately prior to viewing the same episode three that affected 
weekly watchers so significantly. It could also indicate some type of demand bias in either the 
weekly or binge group. Either way, there remains a significant difference in attitudes toward the 
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drone policy across the experiment between the weekly and binge groups, indicating some form 
of consumption method effects. 
Overall, the results provide evidence that supports Hypothesis 4, which asserts that 
exposure to the counterterrorism treatment will affect attitudes toward the drone strike policy. 
Hypothesis 4a suggests that identification with a Muslim protagonist would decrease favor 
toward the drone policy, whereas Hypothesis 4b asserts that identification with a dislike or lack 
of identification with a Muslim antagonist would increase favor toward the drone policy. 
However, the related sub-hypotheses have no direct evidentiary support. While no statistically 
significant shifts occurred in policy views for participants in the binge counterterrorism group, 
participants in the weekly counterterrorism group exhibited the effects expected of the binge 
group in Hypothesis 6, which suggests that treatment effects will increases significantly at the 
post-treatment point, but diminish back toward original levels at the follow-up point (Figure 6). 
As such, Hypothesis 6 regarding binge effects is likewise not fully supported, though the results 
do indicate consumption method effects, as much lesser effects appeared in the binge group as 
opposed to the weekly group.  
6.5 Discussion 
The data and models presented in the results section of this chapter seek to test six main 
hypotheses regarding the impact of the two treatment shows on social bias, of regarding the 
impact of the counterterrorism treatment show on three policy attitudes, and regarding the effects 
of binge watching as a means of media consumption. The tests also consider the influence of 
character identification in enhancing these effects. However, as this experiment did not take 
place within a vacuum—and was designed to increase external validity by using full-length 
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episodes and increased mundane realism—there are several limitations of the experiment and the 
data to consider. 
6.5.1 Limitations 
First, there is little evidence of strong treatment effects between the counterterrorism and 
tolerance groups, with only the social bias and drone policy variables exhibiting statistically 
significant evidence of treatment effects aligned with my first four hypotheses (see Table 13). 
Although great care was taken to select the treatment shows based on their ability to directly 
affect the key dependent variables, this does not mean these shows were without caveat. The 
counterterrorism show, Jack Ryan, depicts multiple Muslim and terrorist characters with myriad 
frames and contexts. This nuanced portrayal could weaken treatment effects of mediated 
intergroup contact on the dependent variables. Alternately, the tolerance show, This Is Us, may 
not depict or discuss terrorism or Muslims, but it does portray positive interracial, interethnic, 
and other relationships that could increase mediated intergroup contact effects to include the 
Muslim outgroup. Together, the two effects likely led to diminished differences between the two 
groups regarding the social bias dependent variable. 
Second, the sample itself may have been biased. The participants were largely individuals 
from minority groups and did not associate themselves strongly with any conservative political 
views. All participants were undergraduate students enrolled in either an Introduction to 
American Government or Global Issues course during the span of the experiment. Although the 
experiment took place during the first half of the semester, regular discussion of political 
topics—especially international political topics, which may have included immigration, global 
security, or the Israel-Palestine conflict—could have influenced participants’ responses to survey 
questions about terrorism and counterterrorism policies. Further, taking the post-treatment survey 
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immediately following screening the third episode, and with no distractor task, likely led some 
participants to exhibit demand bias. This might especially be true for the binge groups, who 
would have been heavily immersed in the subject matter and have only taken the pre-treatment 
survey in the week prior to their lengthy media session. 
Any one of these factors may have influenced participants’ views in a more impactful 
way than three episodes of a show. However, this experiment was set up with the intention of 
inducing mundane realism for participants with the expectation that any potential results would 
have a significant degree of external validity. Considering participants approximately spent only 
three hours in a theater-like classroom watching a fictional, entertainment show, and considering 
other influences that potentially affected participants during the seven-week long study, any 
results are impressive. 
6.5.2 Social Bias and Policy Attitudes 
Overall, bias across all four groups decreased both at the post-treatment and follow-up 
points, with the only statistically significant difference in the means of the counterterrorism and 
tolerance groups occurring at the pre-treatment point. The only statistically significant difference 
in the means of these groups across time occurs within the tolerance groups between the pre-
treatment and follow-up points. Together, this could indicate that the significant shift does not 
occur as an increase in bias in the counterterrorism groups, but as a decrease in bias in the 
tolerance groups. The counterterrorism show offers a nuanced depiction of Muslims and 
terrorists, and it also only depicts terrorist activity as occurring outside the U.S. These factors 
may have diminished any potential treatment effects in the counterterrorism groups regarding 
participants’ association of Muslims with terrorist activity in the U.S. Furthermore, the 
overarching message of intergroup acceptance in the tolerance show for multiple social 
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outgroups (e.g. African Americans, drug abusers, and obese persons) likely increased tolerance 
of the Muslim outgroup through mediated intergroup contact effects. The results also suggest 
that identification plays a key role in treatment impact. 
In reviewing results related to the three policy variables, there is evidence of treatment 
effects from the counterterrorism show. Although no effects were present for the troops variable, 
identification appears to interact with treatment effects on the refugees variable, particularly for 
participants in the binge counterterrorism group. Favor toward the drone strike policy shows the 
most promise not only in terms of exhibiting treatment effects on the drone variable but also 
regarding binge effects. Based on the literature, I had expected the an attitude shift for both 
weekly and binge watchers at the post-treatment point followed by a sharp decrease at the 
follow-up point for binge watchers. However, this attitude shift appears to only have occurred 
within the weekly counterterrorism group, with no statistically significant effects on the binge 
group. This provides evidence of narrative persuasion only for the weekly group. 
Even still, this is enough evidence to support my claim that binge watching may lead to 
decreased entertainment media effects. Most participants, across all four groups, ranked their 
absorption and interest in the material as being moderate to high at the post-treatment point. 
However, the stark difference in treatment effects on the drone policy attitude between the binge 
and weekly counterterrorism watchers indicates there may be more nuanced effects at work. It 
could be that binge watchers were less absorbed in the material by episode three. Watching three 
episodes containing intense action scenes back-to-back may have saturated or inured the binge 
watchers’ sensitivity so that the final storyline, which depicted Victor’s drone attack on Yazid, 
made a far lesser impact. Demand bias may also have played in role in one of these groups. 
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6.5.3 Developing a Binge Effects Theory 
While my initial hypothesis regarding binge effects does not appear to hold up under 
scrutiny, the results of this experiment do provide evidence that consumption method, and 
especially binge watching, does play a role in entertainment media effects. Binge watching may 
have diminished narrative persuasion of attitudes toward the drone strike policy, for example. 
Binge watching may also have intensified the impact of some forms of identification—binge 
counterterrorism watchers who identified with Sandrine were more likely to oppose the refugee 
policy—while diminishing the effects of other forms of identification—dislike of Yazid in 
weekly counterterrorism watchers increased favor toward the drone strike policy. These results 
may not have been expected, but they provide the first step toward better understanding the 
impact of entertainment media, and how we engage with it, on social and political attitudes. 
Future research can build on this study to better understand the effects of binge watching and 





The Information Revolution of the 21st century has brought many changes to the lives of 
Americans and, with those changes, reshaped the very fabric of society through influencing 
social norms and introducing new conversations about the role of government and media within 
those norms. Not only has the media landscape vastly expanded, so too has Americans’ response. 
Hundreds of thousands of hours of entertainment media content exist at our fingertips, leading to 
blogs, forums, fan sites, social media, podcasts, and other forms of entertainment reflection and 
parasocial interaction that would amount to millions of hours of related content. Comparatively, 
very little research has been done to understand how these changes affect the complex 
relationship humans have with entertainment media. 
Markus Prior (2013) was right when he posited that increased entertainment options 
would decrease news consumption. Though social media has begun to fill some of those gaps in 
recent years, most Americans prefer to spend a quarter of their waking hours engaging with 
entertainment, not news media. However, Matthew Baum (2004) was also correct in asserting 
that even passive viewing of politically relevant soft news can influence political attitudes and 
behaviors. So, too, can exposure to entertainment media influence our political attitudes and 
behaviors (e.g. Holbert, et al. 2005; Holbrook and Hill 2005; Kearns and Young 2017; Mulligan 
and Habel 2011; Paluck and Green 2009). Yet, most of the research that has been done to 
understand the influence of entertainment media—or that of hard and soft news media—does not 
account for the vast and drastic changes to Americans’ daily media consumption patterns that 
epitomize the contemporary media environment. 
Contemporary media consumption patterns can be characterized by selection bias, 
inattentive viewing, multitasking and bingeing. Given these habits, do entertainment media 
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effects understood through narrative persuasion, cultivation theory, and mediated intergroup 
contact still exist? With this manuscript, I sought to examine the conditions and effects of 
contemporary entertainment media consumption patterns in the American context. I found that 
identification with characters, especially empathic identification, plays a much larger role in 
entertainment media effects than previously believed. Viewers who experience high affective 
orientation and empathic identification with a character involved in an onscreen intergroup 
relationship may express empathy toward an outgroup in real life. In Chapter 4, focus group 
participants discussed this effect of mediated intergroup contact not regarding social outgroups 
previously studied, but in relation to public policy views. They expressed increased 
understanding of views regarding firearm policies they had previously deemed categorically 
repugnant or unconscionable. Participants in the longitudinal experiment in Chapter 6 evidenced 
the impact of character identification on social and policy attitude shifts following exposure to 
the counterterrorism treatment. Identification with different characters during exposure to the 
counterterrorism treatment showed evidence of influencing participants’ association of Muslims 
with terrorism, favor toward accepting Syrian refugees to the U.S., and favor toward using drone 
strikes to target and kill terrorists outside the U.S. 
The studies all provide evidence that mediated intergroup contact evokes strong, nuanced 
effects, and these effects appear to accrue over time and across narratives. The focus group 
responses indicate that mediated intergroup contact can influence political intergroup bias in 
addition to other social intergroup conflicts. The longitudinal experiment results suggest that 
mediated intergroup contact with any outgroup may influence tolerance in viewers toward all 
outgroups. Responses to the survey evidence that the shift in entertainment media toward 
nuanced depictions of Muslim terrorist characters may decrease bias toward Muslims in real life, 
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regardless of whether the mediated intergroup contact portrayed is overall negative or positive. 
The survey and experiment results also support the assertion that mediated intergroup contact 
effects may accrue, demonstrating that cultivation theory still holds a place in the entertainment 
media effects literature regardless of increased selection effects. 
While this manuscript did not develop a complete theory of binge effects, it does provide 
a much-needed stepping stone toward understanding the impact of this consumption method. The 
experiment data present evidence that binge watching can diminish narrative impact on political 
attitudes. Furthermore, binge watching can change the way viewers identify with characters and 
storylines. This manuscript provides evidence that attention, absorption, identification, and 
reflection must all be included in developing a complete theory of binge effects to determine the 
full impact of this increasingly popular method of consuming entertainment media. 
The studies reveal no small amount about identification, accumulated media exposure, 
and binge watching. Narrative persuasion may be diminished through inattentive binge watching, 
low absorption created by selection bias, or low levels of affective orientation. Though mediated 
intergroup contact shows the highest lingering efficacy in the contemporary entertainment media 
environment, identification and absorption are still required to produce an impact on viewers. 
Cultivation theory, through accumulative effects, still matters in the media effect literature; 
however, its effects remain tempered by selection bias and consumption method effects. The 
evidence supports my assertions that contemporary consumption patterns are altering the impact 
of entertainment media on political attitudes and social perceptions, but there is a long way to go 
before we can uncover the full story.  
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7.1 Future Research 
This manuscript begins a broader discussion of how contemporary consumption patterns 
affect the efficacy of entertainment media’s influence on political attitudes and perceptions of 
social norms. Inattentive binge watching, as this dissertation evidences, appears to decrease the 
impact of narrative, while having little effect on the efficacy of mediated intergroup contact. The 
studies presented in this manuscript highlight the importance of understanding the impact of 
consumption method in addition to the influence of what media we consume. Furthermore, it 
begins a new line of research that will help political scientists better understand the political 
attitude and behavior changes of American adults who spend a quarter of their waking hours 
passively watching entertainment media. 
Future research should build upon this line of inquiry by examining the conditions and 
mechanisms present in contemporary entertainment media consumption patterns with greater 
specificity. Qualitative, experimental, and mixed method approaches will be most helpful in 
targeting personal variance in media selection, exposure effects, and consumption method effects 
in the contemporary media environment. Understanding this individual variance through detail-
oriented studies designed to increase internal validity will allow for better specificity in 
designing large-n, quantitative studies of the specific conditions and mechanisms at work. 
Future research should include better understanding consumption methods such as binge 
watching, multitasking or using multiple screens, the role of attention, and selection bias. It 
should focus more distinctly on understanding the impact of absorption and attention, but also 
differing amounts and methods of engaging in retrospective reflection. Contemporary forms of 
reflection continue to take place in the mind and in person through conversations, but has 
expanded to continue through blogs, forums, podcasts, social media, conventions, and more. 
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Future research regarding entertainment media effects and media consumption method effects 
must take these components of the contemporary media environment into account to fully 
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Appendix A: Content Analyses 
Appendix A.1: Focus Group Essay Analysis 
After establishing which topic each participant selected, I first reviewed the essay 
responses looking for the following keywords: 
• Absorbed/absorption 
• Cognitive-emotional identification 
• Perceived similarity 
• Wishful identification 
• Parasocial identification (PSI) 
• Group identification 
• Liking 
• Empathy 
• Affective orientation 
• Trust 
• Safety 
Also reviewed whether they noted a shift in opinion, as well as what their prior attitudes 
were toward their chosen topic, the gun debate or nontraditional relationships. When they 
mentioned a specific type of identification, I marked down with which character they associated 
some type of identification. I also noted their pre-treatment attitude toward the issue at hand. For 
gun ownership, I ranked them as pro-gun ownership, anti-gun ownership, or somewhere in 
between. For nontraditional relationships, I also ranked them in favor, opposed, or in between. 
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Participant gun topic absorbed anti (1) to pro (3) increased empathy 
1 1 1 1 0 
2 1 1 2 1 
3 1 0 1 0 
4 1 0 0 0 
5 1 0 2 0 
6 1 0 2 1 
7 1 0 2 0 
8 1 1 1 0 
9 1 0 2 0 
10 1 0 1 1 
11 1 1 0 1 
12 1 0 2 0 
13 1 1 3 1 
14 1 0 2 0 
15 1 1 0 1 
16 1 1 2 0 
17 1 1 1 1 
18 1 1 2 0 
19 1 1 1 1 
20 0 0 1 0 




Jane Sutton Kat c-e ID similarity wish ID PSI group 
ID 
empathy AO 
1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 
2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
4 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
5 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
6 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
7 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 
8 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
9 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 
10 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
11 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
12 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
13 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
15 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 
16 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
17 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
19 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
21 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 
 
However, because the identification explanations several participants provided did not 
match up with the identification labels they used, I reviewed the essays again—not looking for 
keywords, but matching their descriptions of how they identified with the storyline and 
characters. From this analysis I created a second, more detailed, table of responses. When 
participants did not mention absorption, for example, I looked for similar terminology that would 
express their level of absorption—transportation, level of interest, sucked in, etc. For 
identification, I paid closer attention to their descriptions of how they connected to each 
character rather than the terminology. For example, a description of feeling similar in values to 
one of the characters would be “perceived similarity,” or saying one of the characters reminded 
them of their friends would be “group identification.” I also paired the character with the type of 
identification more clearly. In particular, I marked for whom each participant expressed empathy 
by writing that in the empathy section. 
 
participant gun topic absorbed anti (1) to pro (3) safety trust 
9 0 high 2 
  
37 0 none 1 
  
5 1 moderate 1 
  
10 1 moderate-high 1 1 
 
11 1 moderate 1 
  
12 1 low 2 
  
13 1 moderate 2 
  
14 1 moderate 2 
  
17 1 high 1 1 
 
18 1 moderate 1 1 
 
19 1 high 2 
  
22 1 high 3 
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23 1 n/a 2 
 
1 
26 1 moderate 1 1 
 
28 1 n/a 3 1 
 
30 1 low 2 1 
 
34 1 low 2 1 
 
36 1 moderate 3 
  
38 1 moderate 3 1 Cont. 
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Appendix A.2: Show Synopsis Analysis 
For each of the 35 shows whose synopses mentioned one or more of the keywords 
terrorism, terrorist, politics, or crime, I content analyzed the Wikipedia and International Movie 
Database (IMDb) season and episode synopses to determine the potential impact for the terrorist 
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character(s) and storyline. In particular, I took notes on the intended ethnicity of the antagonists 
and protagonists, and I reviewed how much time the terrorism story arc took up. 
 
Show Name  Terrorism?  Muslim/Arab  Notes 
Villain?  
24: Legacy   1   1 
Allegiance   0   0  Russian villain 
American Crime  0   0 
Bodyguard   1   1  Most villains white,  
        many Asian good guys 
Containment   1   1 
Crisis    0   0 
Designated Survivor  1   1  Asian terrorist was a 
         patsy, all others white 
FBI    1   1  Arab protagonist 
Gang Related   0   0 
Homeland   1   1  S1 white terrorist 
House of Cards  1   1  S4 & 5 
Hostages   0   0 
Jack Ryan   1   1 
Jane the Virgin  0   0 
Madame Secretary  1   1 
Mr. Robot   1   0 
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Odyssey   1   1 
Orange is the New Black 0   0 
Ozark    0   0 
Power    0   0 
Quantico   1   0  Many Asian good guys 
Scandal   1   0  Small plot in S3 
7 Seconds   0   0 
Shades of Blue  0   0 
Shots Fired   0   0 
State of Affairs  1   1 
Taken    1   0 
The Americans  1   0 
The Blacklist   1   1  Mostly white villains 
Blacklist: Redemption 1   0 
The Crossing   0   0 
The Informer   1   1  Protagonist also Asian desc. 
The Night Of   0   0  Framed Asian male 
The Passage   0   0 
Valor    0   0 
 
Appendix A.3: Experiment Show Analysis 
Two coders evaluated the primary treatment show for its potential to induce certain 
attitude changes in viewers. The researcher and a second graduate student in the Georgia State 
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University Political Science Department, Adrien Halliez, evaluated the substantive content of the 
first three episodes of season one of Jack Ryan. Below are the materials provided to the coders to 
direct their analysis. The researcher created these materials more than a month prior to carrying 
out the analysis to diminish bias. 
Content Analysis 
Character Content Analysis Template 
Show   Title 
Episode  1.1 (i.e. Season One, Episode One) 
Absorption  1-5 
Character  Name 
Gender  Male/Female/Trans 
Race   Asian/Black/White 
Ethnicity  Hispanic/Non-Hispanic 
Nationality  American/French/Lebanese/etc. 
Religion  Christian/Jewish/Muslim/NA 
Age   Young/Adult/Old 
Overall Likeability 1-5 
Is this character described/depicted in this episode as a(n) __________? 
Gov Official  Y/N 
CIA Agent  Y/N 
Military  Y/N 
UAV Operator Y/N 
Terrorist  Y/N 
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 Active—Y/N Are they acting in an active role like leadership? 
 Passive—Y/N Are they acting in a passive role, where they are just helping? 
UAV Target Y/N UAV – unmanned aerial vehicle (drone) 
Sane  Y/N Just whether or not they are clearly in control of their faculties 
Is the character given the following frame in this episode? 
Victim Frame  Y/N Are they portrayed as a victim? 
Perpetrator Frame Y/N Are they portrayed as having committed a crime? 
Adept Frame  Y/N Are they good at their job? 
Corrupt Frame Y/N Are they bad at their job or acting in a corrupt manner? 
Humanizing Frame Y/N  Are they portrayed in a sensitive way as a human with flaws? 
Criminalizing Frame Y/N Are they portrayed as a hardened criminal? 
Episode Content Analysis Template 
Show   Title 
Episode  1.1 
Absorption  1-5 
For each episode, answer the following questions: 
1. Who are the primary protagonists/main characters in this episode? 
2. How would you describe the protagonist character(s)? 
3. Do you feel any sympathy for the protagonist character(s)? Do you know why they have 
chosen this life path? 
4. Who are the primary antagonists/villains in this episode? 
5. How would you describe the antagonist character(s)? 
6. Do you feel any sympathy for the antagonist character(s)? Do you know why they have 
chosen this life path? 
7. How are Muslims treated/discussed in this episode? 
8. How are Christians treated/discussed in this episode? 
9. How are Jews treated/discussed in this episode? 
10. How are Hispanics treated/discussed in this episode? 
11. How are Whites treated/discussed in this episode? 
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12. How are Blacks treated/discussed in this episode? 
13. How are other minorities treated/discussed in this episode? 
14. Do you feel there are any strong explicit messages in this episode? 
15. Do you feel there are any strongly implied messages in this episode? 
16. Are there any scenes that really moved you? Please describe them and explain how you 
felt. 
17. Are there any character that you felt strongly about? How did you feel? Why? 
Jack Ryan Content Analysis: Alexandra Pauley 
Content Analysis, Jack Ryan, Episode 1 
18. Who are the primary protagonists/main characters in this episode? 
a. Jack Ryan 
b. James Greer 
c. Mousa bin Suleiman 
19. How would you describe the protagonist character(s)? 
a. Jack and James are CIA officials. Jack is very smart, described often as a boy 
scout. He does go around his boss, James, when he thinks James is not listening 
and is overlooking the next 9-11. 
b. James is gruff and has been described as potentially incompetent. He has been 
severely demoted, which one rumor attributes to a war crime. 
20. Do you feel any sympathy for the protagonist character(s)? Do you know why they have 
chosen this life path? 
a. Not yet. 
21. Who are the primary antagonists/villains in this episode? 
a. Mousa bin Suleiman 
22. How would you describe the antagonist character(s)? 
a. He is heavily humanized in this first episode. The flashback to his home being 
bombed, presumably by Westerners, establishes motive for his terrorism. He is 
also shown as being caring and emotionally connected to his brother. 
23. Do you feel any sympathy for the antagonist character(s)? Do you know why they have 
chosen this life path? 
a. Yes. He nearly lost his brother in the bombing, and we don’t know what all he did 
lose. 
24. How are Muslims treated/discussed in this episode? 
a. They don’t explicitly address Islam in the episode, though the crime James is 
rumored to have committed was clearly against Muslim terrorists in Karachi, 
Pakistan (another analyst says James ordered pig’s blood poured on all terrorist 
bodies so they could not get into heaven). 
b. In another instance, Hanin speaks up against the visiting terrorist leader. He is 
framed as being shady and up to no good, and she is shown as being a loving 
mother of three children. 
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c. Several of Suleiman’s escape team are shown as killers and fighters, but without a 
uniform like the American soldiers. 
25. How are Christians treated/discussed in this episode? 
a. Christianity is not discussed 
26. How are Jews treated/discussed in this episode? 
a. Judaism is not discussed 
27. How are Hispanics treated/discussed in this episode? 
a. Latin culture is not discussed 
28. How are Whites treated/discussed in this episode? 
a. Race is not discussed 
29. How are Blacks treated/discussed in this episode? 
a. Race is not discussed, though the one Black man in the episode is shown as being 
disagreeable and with a chip on his shoulder, easily angered and quick to lash out 
(as with the first scene where he almost hits Jack with his car, but takes the time 
to fully stop, roll down his window, and call Jack a shithead). 
30. How are other minorities treated/discussed in this episode? 
a. The female characters take a clear backseat in the episode. Jack even manipulates 
a woman who likes him at the office to go against his orders from James. 
31. Do you feel there are any strong explicit messages in this episode? 
a. Yes. Words like shithead, asshole (spoken by a young Mousa), etc. 
32. Do you feel there are any strongly implied messages in this episode? 
a. Listen to your superiors 
b. Westerners are partially to blame for Middle Eastern terrorism 
c. Terrorists will do anything for their leaders, even kill and then maim dead bodies 
33. Are there any scenes that really moved you? Please describe them and explain how you 
felt. 
a. The final scene where it flashes back to after the bombing when Mousa saves his 
litter brother and scars his hands in the process. We see his brother rescue him in 
the present, and they share a moment together in both times where they are 
touching foreheads in clear gratitude for each other. 
34. Are there any character that you felt strongly about? How did you feel? Why? 
a. Joe Mueller is an ass for trying to get state secrets from Jack 
b. Nathan Singer doesn’t seem like he’s going to be a nice guy based on his tone 
when talking with James 
c. I’m really curious about Hanin and how she got where she is – she doesn’t fully 
fit into the docile wifely role media typically depicts of Muslim wives, especially 
wives of terrorists 
Content Analysis, Jack Ryan, Episode 2 
1. Who are the primary protagonists/main characters in this episode? 
a. Jack Ryan 
b. James Greer 
2. How would you describe the protagonist character(s)? 
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a. Jack is getting cockier. 
b. James is shown with a softer side, going through a divorce and questioning his 
faith. 
3. Do you feel any sympathy for the protagonist character(s)? Do you know why they have 
chosen this life path? 
a. I feel sympathy for James because he is having a hard time both with his divorce 
and with having been severely demoted. It’s clear something big happened. 
b. There are moments that point to Jack having PTSD from something major when 
he was a marine in Afghanistan, but we don’t know what. The moments he shares 
with Cathy are cute because he’s just a man who likes a woman, and she makes 
him nervous. 
4. Who are the primary antagonists/villains in this episode? 
a. Mousa 
b. Ali bin Suleiman 
5. How would you describe the antagonist character(s)? 
a. It’s hard to call them antagonists at times because they are shown to be so kind 
and loving to one another, and then also Mousa with his wife and children. Yet, 
they’re still clearly criminals who are okay with people dying for their cause – 
whatever it is. 
6. Do you feel any sympathy for the antagonist character(s)? Do you know why they have 
chosen this life path? 
a. Sympathy is a strong word. I am more sad that they have ended up here, because 
they seem to be good people at their cores, but again they are still involved with 
terrorism, money smuggling, and deaths – albeit up to this point they have only 
killed officers. 
b. We find out Mousa was in jail, but without any deep explanation. 
7. How are Muslims treated/discussed in this episode? 
a. We begin to see how Muslims are treated poorly in France through Sandrine’s 
commentary and the massive SWAT team they bring into the district. 
b. We see two men who do not appear to be Arab talking about Islam in a positive, 
peaceful way. One of these men is James. 
c. There seems to be a demarcation between the Suleiman family and “other 
Muslims,” as expressed by Hanin. She is upset at these men being in her home. 
d. We also see one man coming onto her daughter in a really creepy way. This scene 
and the scene where Mousa takes Hanin to bed show a clear male dominance. 
Hanin is asking her husband why these men are in her home, and she says to him 
that she has never asked anything of him before, as though this would be a 
violation. 
8. How are Christians treated/discussed in this episode? 
a. The opening scene shows two Arab men kill a Catholic priest in an alley for his 
wallet. This frames Arabs as criminals and Christians as victims of their crimes. 
9. How are Jews treated/discussed in this episode? 
a. Judaism is not addressed in this episode 
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10. How are Hispanics treated/discussed in this episode? 
a. Latin culture is not addressed in this episode 
11. How are Whites treated/discussed in this episode? 
a. Being white is not addressed in this episode 
12. How are Blacks treated/discussed in this episode? 
a. Being Black is not addressed in this episode 
13. How are other minorities treated/discussed in this episode? 
a. n/a 
14. Do you feel there are any strong explicit messages in this episode? 
a. Yoga helps build core muscles 
15. Do you feel there are any strongly implied messages in this episode? 
a. Women are inferior in Muslim culture 
b. Muslims are more likely to commit crimes 
c. Non-Arab Muslims are more peaceful 
16. Are there any scenes that really moved you? Please describe them and explain how you 
felt. 
a. The scene with James and his Muslim friend in the diner is very sweet. James is 
vulnerable, and we learn more about his history. His friend implores him to come 
back to prayers and gives him a prayer bead necklace as a reminder that Allah has 
not given up on James even if James has “taken a break” from his faith. It makes 
me feel loving toward the Islamic faith and those who practice it in a peaceful 
way. 
b. The raid scene is disturbing for several reasons. The kid playing dice as the 
group’s lookout was sad and a bit revolting – clever to use a kid, but also awful to 
bring a kid into that mess. The group in the apartment is playing cards and 
smoking (maybe weed?), generally being shown as degenerates. Then, there are 
guns and explosives everywhere. Ali forces one of them to wear a suicide vest, 
and the only woman of the group, who looks very small and terrified, volunteers 
to wear it. They start shooting even before the SWAT team burst through the front 
door. The scene is very disturbing. Neither side looks innocent, though they do 
make the Muslims look dirtier and criminal. 
17. Are there any character that you felt strongly about? How did you feel? Why? 
a. I definitely like James more now that I understand his background more. 
b. I do not like Nathan, who keeps trying to drag James down, even though he said 
he went to bat for him. I don’t trust him. 
c. Yazid is a total creep! He makes young, greasy, Muslim men look like evil 
villains. 
d. I worry for Hanin. She seems so unsure of her place in the world, or her 
children’s. 
Content Analysis, Jack Ryan, Episode 3 
1. Who are the primary protagonists/main characters in this episode? 
a. Jack and James 
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b. Hanin 
2. How would you describe the protagonist character(s)? 
a. Hanin comes to light as a minor protagonist. She is meek, but strong. She loves 
her children and defies her husband first by getting passports to take them away 
from Syria. Then, after Mousa finds and burns the passports, she takes her girls 
and runs anyway. 
b. Victor becomes a protagonist, but in an antihero kind of way. 
3. Do you feel any sympathy for the protagonist character(s)? Do you know why they have 
chosen this life path? 
a. So much sympathy for Hanin! She cares for her husband, but is deeply devoted to 
her children and giving her daughters a better life than she had. She did not 
choose her life path up to this point, but in this episode, she decides to change her 
life path drastically. 
b. I have some sympathy for Victor, but he chose the path he is on. He seems stuck 
and sad, but unwilling to make any real changes. 




5. How would you describe the antagonist character(s)? 
a. Mousa grows darker with each episode. He is becoming a scary character. 
b. Ali is still running, more in a passive role and not so much an antagonist anymore 
as someone being chased by the protagonists. 
c. Yazid is the antagonist to Hanin as she and Sara run away. He is just despicable. 
6. Do you feel any sympathy for the antagonist character(s)? Do you know why they have 
chosen this life path? 
a. We know Mousa is angry about the bombings when he was a kid. We know he 
was in a French jail for several years. We do not know his exact vendetta. My 
sympathy for him wanes with each episode. 
b. I do have some sympathy for Ali, especially when he ignores his brother’s orders 
to kill Omer and his sons. Ali doesn’t seem like he wants to be a terrorist, but just 
wants to do right by his older brother. 
c. Zero sympathy for Yazid. 
7. How are Muslims treated/discussed in this episode? 
a. Largely, Muslim men are vilified in this episode, while Muslim women are shown 
as lesser in their community and in need of protection. 
b. Captain Arnaud points out the difficulties faced by Muslims in France. She 
acknowledges that they are forced into poorer neighborhoods, often refused 
employment, and seen as lesser because they do not fully accept being French and 
only French. 
8. How are Christians treated/discussed in this episode? 
a. Christianity is not discussed in this episode 
9. How are Jews treated/discussed in this episode? 
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a. Judaism is not discussed in this episode 
10. How are Hispanics treated/discussed in this episode? 
a. Ava “Riot Grrl” Garcia is the first presumable Hispanic character we see in the 
series. Her ethnicity is not directly pointed out, nor is it discussed. 
11. How are Whites treated/discussed in this episode? 
a. Being white is not explicitly discussed 
12. How are Blacks treated/discussed in this episode? 
a. Being Black is not explicitly discussed 
13. How are other minorities treated/discussed in this episode? 
a. Garcia makes a transgender slur when she asks Victor if he “accidentally picked 
up another tranny” when he comes in with a black eye 
14. Do you feel there are any strong explicit messages in this episode? 
a. Muslims are not treated fairly in France 
15. Do you feel there are any strongly implied messages in this episode? 
a. Muslim men are misogynist, and Islam is likely misogynist 
b. White men are godlike heroes 
c. Women need to be protected by men 
d. America must protect the world 
e. Drone strikes are good 
16. Are there any scenes that really moved you? Please describe them and explain how you 
felt. 
a. The scene when the Suleimans play Monopoly and Mousa tells his children how 
he married their mother is chilling. I am touched he chose to marry Hanin rather 
than bed her as a gift from her poor father, but that is a very inappropriate story to 
tell small children. When he mentions Hanin was only a little older than Sara, it 
felt like a threat that he might sell/marry off Sara the way Hanin’s father sold her. 
Then, when he burns the passports, I was scared for Hanin and furious with 
Mousa for being so cruel. 
b. When Hanin is leaving with her children and her son Samir refuses to leave, she 
tells her youngest daughter Rama that Samir will be okay because their father 
loves him. It was a sad reminder that Hanin feels unsafe and that her husband 
does not love their daughters the way he loves their son. 
c. I was so scared for Hanin when Yazid was attacking her. I cried when Victor 
killed him. 
d. When Victor kills Yazid, I was so grateful, but the frame is a dangerous one. 
There is an implicit message that white American men will always be the heroes 
and the rest of the world, especially beautiful Muslim women, need their help. 
e. The scene where Victor tries to gamble away the money he “earned” shooting 
targets is depressing. He is clearly miserable. When he wins and keeps winning is 
like a slap in the face, but also an implicit message that being a white American 
male soldier means killing makes him a hero who deserves big rewards. 
17. Are there any character that you felt strongly about? How did you feel? Why? 
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a. I was relieved when Yazid was killed. They completely villainized this character 
to the point where I had no negative feelings about his death. 
b. Victor unsettles me. He seems like a nice enough guy, and I was glad when he 
stood up to his superior officer and killed Yazid anyway, but there is still 
something off about that storyline. He is troubled by the deaths he inflicts, but 
also glorified for them. 
 
Character Analysis: Alexandra Pauley, Part 1 
Show Ep Absor
b 
Character Gend. Race Hisp
. 
Nationality Religion Age 
Jack 
Ryan 
1.1 4 Jack Ryan Male White No American n/a adult, 30s 
Jack 
Ryan 




White No American n/a adult, 30s 
Jack 
Ryan 
1.1 4 James Greer Male Black No American n/a adult, 40s 
Jack 
Ryan 
1.1 4 Mousa bin 
Suleiman 
Male Arab No Lebanese Muslim adult, 40s 
Jack 
Ryan 
1.1 4 Nathan 
Singer 
Male White No American n/a adult, 50s 
Jack 
Ryan 




Arab No Middle 
Eastern 
Muslim adult, 30s 
Jack 
Ryan 
1.1 4 Joe Mueller Male White No American n/a adult, 60s 
Jack 
Ryan 
1.1 4 Teresa Femal
e 
White No American n/a adult, 30s 
Jack 
Ryan 
1.1 4 Patrick Male White No American n/a adult, 30s 
Jack 
Ryan 
1.1 4 Tarek Male South 
Asian 
No American n/a adult, 30s 
Jack 
Ryan 
1.1 4 Uncle Fathi Male Arab No Middle 
Eastern 
Muslim adult, 60s 
Jack 
Ryan 
1.1 4 Matice Male White No American n/a adult, 30s 
Jack 
Ryan 





Male Arab No Middle 
Eastern 
Muslim adult, 50s 
Jack 
Ryan 
1.1 4 Ansore Male White No Scandanavian
? 
n/a adult, 40s 
Jack 
Ryan 








White No American n/a adult, 30s 
Jack 
Ryan 
1.2 5 James Greer Male Black No American Muslim adult, 40s 
Jack 
Ryan 
1.2 5 Mousa bin 
Suleiman 
Male Arab No Lebanese Muslim adult, 40s 
Jack 
Ryan 
1.2 5 Nathan 
Singer 
Male White No American n/a adult, 50s 
Jack 
Ryan 




Arab No Middle 
Eastern 
Muslim adult, 30s 
Jack 
Ryan 




No American n/a adult, 30s 
Jack 
Ryan 
1.2 5 Patrick Male White No American n/a adult, 30s 
Jack 
Ryan 
1.2 5 Tarek Male South 
Asian 
No American n/a adult, 30s 
Jack 
Ryan 
















Muslim adult, 20s 
Jack 
Ryan 
1.2 5 Matice Male White no White n/a adult, 30s 
Jack 
Ryan 
1.3 5 Jack Ryan Male White No American n/a adult, 30s 
Jack 
Ryan 
1.3 5 James Greer Male Black No American Muslim adult, 40s 
Jack 
Ryan 
1.3 5 Mousa bin 
Suleiman 
Male Arab No Lebanese Muslim adult, 40s 
Jack 
Ryan 




Arab No Middle 
Eastern 
Muslim adult, 30s 
Jack 
Ryan 
















Muslim adult, 20s 
Jack 
Ryan 
1.3 5 Victor 
"Tombstone
" 
Male White No American n/a adult, 20s 
Jack 
Ryan 






Yes American n/a adult, 20s 
Jack 
Ryan 
1.3 5 UAV Target Male Arab No Syrian Muslim adult, 30s 
Jack 
Ryan 








1.3 5 Stanley 
Kowalski 
Male White No American n/a adult, 50s 
Jack 
Ryan 
1.3 5 Omer, Ali's 
friend 
Male Arab No French Muslim adult, 40s 
Jack 
Ryan 




Male Arab No Middle 
Eastern 
Muslim adult, 30s 
Jack 
Ryan 





White No French n/a adult, 30s 
Jack 
Ryan 
1.3 5 Uncle Fathi Male Arab no Middle 
Eastern 















1.1 Jack Ryan 4 Y Y Y N N n/a N 
1.1 Cathy 
Mueller 5 N N N N N n/a N 
1.1 James 
Greer 3 Y Y Y N N n/a N 
1.1 Mousa 
bin 
Suleiman 3 N N N N Y Active N 
1.1 Nathan 
Singer 3 Y Y Y N N n/a N 
1.1 Hanin 
Suleiman 5 N N N N N n/a N 
1.1 Joe 
Mueller 1 N N N N N n/a N 
1.1 Teresa 4 Y Y N N N n/a N 
1.1 Patrick 3 Y Y N N N n/a N 
1.1 Tarek 3 Y Y N N N n/a N 
1.1 Uncle 
Fathi 4 N N N N Y Passive N 
1.1 Matice 5 Y Y Y N N n/a N 





d 1 N N N N Y Active N 
1.1 Ansore 2 N N N N Y Active N 
1.2 Jack Ryan 4 Y Y Y N N n/a N 
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1.2 Cathy 
Mueller 5 N N N N N n/a N 
1.2 James 
Greer 4 Y Y Y N N n/a N 
1.2 Mousa 
bin 
Suleiman 2 N N N N Y Active N 
1.2 Nathan 
Singer 2 Y Y Y N N n/a N 
1.2 Hanin 
Suleiman 4 N N N N N n/a N 
1.2 Noreen 5 Y Y N N N n/a N 
1.2 Patrick 4 Y Y N N N n/a N 
1.2 Tarek 4 Y Y N N N n/a N 
1.2 Sara 5 N N N N N n/a N 
1.2 Yazid 0 N N N N Y Active N 
1.2 Matice 5 Y Y Y N N n/a N 
1.3 Jack Ryan 5 Y Y Y N N n/a N 
1.3 James 
Greer 5 Y Y Y N N n/a N 
1.3 Mousa 
bin 
Suleiman 2 N N N N Y Active N 
1.3 Hanin 
Suleiman 5 N N N N N n/a N 
1.3 Sara 5 N N N N N n/a N 
1.3 Yazid 0 N N N N Y Active Y 
1.3 Victor 
"Tombsto
ne" 4 Y N Y Y N n/a N 
1.3 "Riot 
Grrl" 
Garcia 5 Y N Y Y N n/a N 
1.3 UAV 
Target 4 N N N N Y Passive Y 
1.3 Blanche 
DuBois 3 N N N N N n/a N 
1.3 Stanley 
Kowalski 2 N N N N N n/a N 
1.3 Omer, 
Ali's 








Arnaud 4 Y N N N N n/a N 
1.3 Uncle 













1.1 Jack Ryan Y N N Y N Y N 
1.1 Cathy 
Mueller Y N N Y N N N 
1.1 James 
Greer Y N N N N Y N 
1.1 Mousa 
bin 
Suleiman Y Y Y Y N Y Y 
1.1 Nathan 
Singer Y N N Y N N N 
1.1 Hanin 
Suleiman Y N N Y N Y N 
1.1 Joe 
Mueller Y N N Y Y Y Y 
1.1 Teresa Y Y N N N Y N 
1.1 Patrick Y N N N N N N 
1.1 Tarek Y N N N N N N 
1.1 Uncle 
Fathi Y N N Y N Y N 
1.1 Matice Y N N Y N Y N 





d Y N Y Y N N Y 
1.1 Ansore Y N Y Y N N Y 
1.2 Jack Ryan Y N N Y N Y N 
1.2 Cathy 
Mueller Y N N Y N Y N 
1.2 James 
Greer Y N N Y N Y N 
1.2 Mousa 
bin 
Suleiman Y N Y Y N Y Y 
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1.2 Nathan 
Singer Y N N N Y N N 
1.2 Hanin 
Suleiman Y Y N Y N Y N 
1.2 Noreen Y N N N N Y N 
1.2 Patrick Y N N N N Y N 
1.2 Tarek Y N N N N N N 
1.2 Sara Y Y N N N Y N 
1.2 Yazid Y N Y N Y N Y 
1.2 Matice Y N N Y Y Y N 
1.3 Jack Ryan Y N N Y N N N 
1.3 James 
Greer Y N N Y N Y N 
1.3 Mousa 
bin 
Suleiman Y N Y Y N N Y 
1.3 Hanin 
Suleiman Y Y N Y N Y N 
1.3 Sara Y Y N Y N Y N 
1.3 Yazid Y N Y N Y N Y 
1.3 Victor 
"Tombsto
ne" Y N Y Y N Y N 
1.3 "Riot 
Grrl" 
Garcia Y N N Y N Y N 
1.3 UAV 
Target Y Y N N N Y Y 
1.3 Blanche 
DuBois N N Y N N N N 
1.3 Stanley 
Kowalski N N Y N N Y N 
1.3 Omer, 
Ali's 




terrorist Y N Y Y N N Y 
1.3 Capt. 
Sandrine 
Arnaud Y N N Y N N N 
1.3 Uncle 
Fathi Y Y N N Y Y N 
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Jack Ryan Content Analysis: Adrien Halliez 
Content Analysis, Jack Ryan, Episode 1 
For each episode, answer the following questions: 
1. Who are the primary protagonists/main characters in this episode? 
a. Jack Ryan, Jim Grear 
2. How would you describe the protagonist character(s)? 
a. Jack: Prototypical hero with past demons, a drive to follow his gut instincts, 
brave, independent, a bit of an egghead, slightly awkward socially, workoholic, 
lonely, can be scheming to get what he thinks is right as with Theresa, defiant of 
hierarchical commands and a bit preppy-looking. 
b. Jim: Antipathetic initially (I had written asshole and shithead…) but emotionally 
hurt, depressed, work as a refuge, competent through anticipation, bossy but trusts 
his team. A field person grounded in an office longing to return to the field. 
Fighting spirit with tactical smarts. 
3. Do you feel any sympathy for the protagonist character(s)? Do you know why they have 
chosen this life path? 
a. Jack is sympathetic for his current personality + past trauma. Jim starts as the 
least sympathetic but makes it up in the rest of the episode. 
4. Who are the primary antagonists/villains in this episode? 
a. Suleiman: Smart. Very Prototypical life story for a terrorist in this kind of show. 
Sympathetic for his attachment to Ali and drive despite his past. Strategic 
mastermind. 
b. Ali: Action person. A bit less sympathetic to me as a viewer because he is a 
follower and because of the gory plan he executed. I suspect he might be easily 
manipulated by Suleiman because of the debt he perceives he owes him. 
5. How would you describe the antagonist character(s)? 
a. Do you feel any sympathy for the antagonist character(s)? Do you know why they 
have chosen this life path? 
b. Suleiman's backstory also makes him pretty sympathetic and we understand both 
of their paths. I am more reserved about Ali.  
6. How are Muslims treated/discussed in this episode? 
a. Split between backstories of victimhood and violent actions. The family portraits 
in the Lebanon flashbacks humanize them greatly but the schemes and actions 
they deploy at the military base male them bloodthirsty and ready to do whatever 
it takes presumably to retaliate against the perceived invader. 
7. How are Christians treated/discussed in this episode? 
a. N/a because we can only assume that some characters are Christian due to the fact 
that they are Americans. 
8. How are Jews treated/discussed in this episode? N/a 
9. How are Hispanics treated/discussed in this episode? N/a 
10. How are Whites treated/discussed in this episode? 
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a. Whites as generally depicted under a positive light. Most of them due to their role 
on the 'hero' side of the story. Two characters are more negative: Joe Mueller, the 
stereotypical wealthy guy indulging in splurging and putting his bling on display 
and Matice Who is generally seen as nice but perhaps too nice, possibly deceiving 
and overly proud of his Americanness (remember I am not American myself so 
this may be more salient to me). The tower soldier also depicted as a cocky 
asshole (jack ryan himself has a cocky aspect to him.) Most whites as 
overconfident in this episode. 
11. How are Blacks treated/discussed in this episode? 
a. Only Jim is a black character and his depiction is ambivalent but this has to do 
more with his position and current mood due to life events than his race in my 
perception. (+ the soldier who warns jack of Ali’s entrance who is a hero through 
his valiant sacrifice) 
12. How are other minorities treated/discussed in this episode? 
a. Muslims are shown as having normal family relations before being victims of 
hardships which then lead them to act for retaliation. 
13. Do you feel there are any strong explicit messages in this episode? 
a. I perceived strong dualism between the agents and the terrorists even despite the 
terrorists backstory. There was something more visibly despicable in the terrorists' 
means of action than in the ones used by the bombing planes in Lebanon.  
14. Do you feel there are any strongly implied messages in this episode? 
15. Are there any scenes that really moved you? Please describe them and explain how you 
felt. 
a. The flashback scenes to Ali and Suleiman's childhoods are moving. They made 
me feel pity and I contemplated accepting their motivations as legitimate but the 
rest of the episode counterbalances these feelings of forgiveness. 
16. Are there any character that you felt strongly about? How did you feel? Why? 
a. I think Suleiman is an intriguing character. Made me feel curious and anxious at 
times. He’s the kind of mastermind acting from behind the scenes in cold-blood. 
He’s the most genuinely moving character to me in this episode. Ali has even a 
greater potential to be moving but for now I only felt strong disgust at the cadaver 
and gun episode. 
b. I also felt compassion for the glimpses of Jim’s story that I got in the episode. 
Some pride/enthusiasm in seeing that he had followed up in his own way on 
Jack’s red flags. 
Content Analysis, Jack Ryan, Episode 2 
For each episode, answer the following questions: 
1. Who are the primary protagonists/main characters in this episode? 
a. Jack Ryan: Slight trauma, smart, irreverent to authority, Macho men (no pain), 
obsessive. 
b. Jim Grear: Straight-to-the-point., not buying it, Muslim 
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c. Suleiman/Mousa: Grateful to his brother, strong family bonds, although risk of 
Suleiman manipulating Ali and family?, religious zealot? Has followers who 
seem devout,  
d. Ali: Foot soldier for Mousa, blinded by his love for his brother?, reckless, driven 
by his mission, blurred moral compass 
2. How would you describe the protagonist character(s)? 
3. Do you feel any sympathy for the protagonist character(s)? Do you know why they have 
chosen this life path?  
a. Jack Ryan described as even more flawless than in the first episode but humble as 
well (scene with the operative who offered him to bypass Jim)→ More 
sympathetic in this episode also because of the love story with Cathy. 
b. Jim: Interesting development in his life story with the discovery that he may be 
Muslim. However, storyline not developed enough yet + very tough on Jack after 
having sided with him. Only looks out for himself. 
4. Who are the primary antagonists/villains in this episode? 
a. Suleiman, Ali, Yazid, and a few others whose role isn’t clear yet.  
5. How would you describe the antagonist character(s)? 
6. Do you feel any sympathy for the antagonist character(s)? Do you know why they have 
chosen this life path? 
a. A bit less sympathy for Suleiman after this episode. Seems a bit manipulative. His 
past might drive him but makes him insensitive to people who are dear to him in 
the present.  
b. Slightly more sympathy for Ali who could be the victim of that manipulation but 
not clear yet. Still depicted mostly as a heartless perpetrator in the events in Paris. 
7. How are Muslims treated/discussed in this episode? 
a. Most of them are violent in this episode except for the women back at Suleiman’s 
headquarters. Difficult to say that the acts of the brothers are driven by their 
religion for now.  
8. How are Christians treated/discussed in this episode? 
a. Opening of the episode pointing to Christianity as the enemy of Islam with the 
stabbing of the priest. Not yet developed enough though. 
9. How are Jews treated/discussed in this episode? n/a  
10. How are Hispanics treated/discussed in this episode? n/a 
11. How are Whites treated/discussed in this episode? 
a. Whites in positions of command as a bit arrogant and losing sight of their main 
duties. Jack Ryan as redeeming Whites of course by being the super hero who’s 
incredibly smart, brave, and nice. Less cracks in his personality in this episode. 
Losing sight of his potential trauma/PTSD. 
12. How are Blacks treated/discussed in this episode? 
a. A bit impulsive and limited. Good for action but not for command in the words of 
the operative who talked to Jack. A pretty negative portrayal continued with the 
French SWAT commander who is seen as a hurdle to Jack’s mission at the end. 
13. How are other minorities treated/discussed in this episode? 
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a. White women in the episode as all strong and benevolent (Cathy volunteering in 
Africa, the French commander as strong-willed and unwilling to cave in to the 
American team.) 
14. Do you feel there are any strong explicit messages in this episode? 
15. Do you feel there are any strongly implied messages in this episode? 
a. More Manichean episode than the first one. No redeeming storyline for the 
actions of the terrorists. Clash of civilizations mediated through religion.  
16. Are there any scenes that really moved you? Please describe them and explain how you 
felt. 
a. The scene with Sara and Yazid seems to be an attempt at moving the public but 
the storyline needs more development for it to be really moving. We just got 
introduced to both characters when Yazid starts his borderline sexual harassment.   
17. Are there any character that you felt strongly about? How did you feel? Why? 
a. Suleiman’s wife as an interesting character. Made me feel empathetic and curious 
about how the relationship is going to evolve. Seems strong-willed at times but 
awestruck or fearful of her husband.  
Content Analysis, Jack Ryan, Episode 3 
For each episode, answer the following questions: 
1. Who are the primary protagonists/main characters in this episode? 
a. Jack Ryan, Victor, Hanin, Mousa, Ali, Yazid, and Fatih 
2. How would you describe the protagonist character(s)? 
a. Hanin: Strong-willed, trying to escape, poor background, committed to her kids, 
likeable character with determination.  
b. Uncle Fatih: Generous, disinterested, aware of risk for Hanin but also obeying 
Mousa’s orders. Dual allegiance although his family ties with Hanin seem to have 
come first. 
c. Mousa: Wary of Hanin, heartless, does not value human life outside of his own 
relations, loves his wife, tries to keep her with him, went to war, moving story 
accepted by his son not necessarily by his daughter, strong hold over his family 
(soft tyrant). First time his character becomes that obviously evil. Manichean 
figure.  
d. Omer: Generous, not inquisitive, considerate neighbor for Ali, great person, 
Innocent, dragged into it because of his good heart. Likeable character. 
e. Ali: Drawing as making him more human, dreamer, artistic, emotional, 
successful, smart, Opposite dynamics from Mousa Suleiman. More backstory = 
more likeability whereas the first two episodes only showed him as a tool for his 
brother who was ready to do anything. 
f. Jack: More of a secondary character in this episode. Still showing signs of shock 
of what he witnesses on the ground, but conversation with Sandrine implying that 
he likes being on the frontlines. Connecting the dots quicker than his colleagues. 
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g. Yazid: Foot soldier devoted to Mousa but also out for himself if the opportunity 
arises. Gets his comeuppance at the end of the episode which is everything I 
asked for as a viewer. Most unlikeable character in the series so far. 
3. Do you feel any sympathy for the protagonist character(s)? Do you know why they have 
chosen this life path?  
a. Sympathy for Omer, Hanin, and Fatih for this episode. Omer as a wholesome 
person. Prime example of integration in France and good heart. Hanin as the 
dedicated mother who is aware of the danger that Mousa represents and is brave 
enough to risk it all to escape. Fatih as an ambivalent character who seemed 
committed to help but constrained by his allegiance to Mousa’s movement.  
b. Very little change on the side of the “good” (police forces) in terms of sympathy. 
Only Jim elicited a little bit more sympathy with his interactions at the mosque 
but still an ambivalent character for now.  
4. Who are the primary antagonists/villains in this episode?  
a. Mousa Suleiman and Yazid as pure villains. Ali as a villain provided with a little 
bit of a backstory that rehabilitates him very slightly. 
5. How would you describe the antagonist character(s)? 
a. Do you feel any sympathy for the antagonist character(s)? Do you know why they 
have chosen this life path? 
b. Yazid and Mousa depicted as very evil. Even though episodes one and two did 
make me feel more sympathy for Ali than Mousa, this episode establishes Mousa 
as the arch-villain in the series without a doubt. Very manipulative with Hanin 
and his kids as well as Ali. Not sure that the brotherly bond seen in their 
backstory in episodes 1 and 2 is reciprocal. Feeling like Ali is being fooled by 
Mousa which made Ali himself a bit more sympathetic (although his backstory 
led to clichés about integration in France that are egregious simplifications that 
made me mad but that’s off topic.) 
6. How are Muslims treated/discussed in this episode? 
a. Very negative image of male Muslims in general in this episode. Paternalistic and 
male-dominated vision of Muslim private lives. A few references to Muslims as 
impossible to integrate to the body politic in Western countries as long as they 
retain their ‘Muslim allegiance’ (in Jack and Sandrine’s discussion in the car.) 
Muslim women depicted as oppressed (embodied by Hanin and her daughters) 
and falling prey to men’s predatory behavior. Need to escape that. 
7. How are Christians treated/discussed in this episode? n/a 
8. How are Jews treated/discussed in this episode? n/a  
9. How are Hispanics treated/discussed in this episode? 
a. Only a glimpse of a Hispanic character with Ava who is not really likeable so far 
but nothing representing being Hispanic for now. 
10. How are Whites treated/discussed in this episode? 
a. Whites took a backseat in this episode except for the character of Victor. No 
generalizable patterns about whites in this one. Victor’s character as a mess. 
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Probably nothing to do with his race but epitomizes aimless characters who go 
with the flow. 
11. How are Blacks treated/discussed in this episode? 
a. Jim as again the only Black character. More likeable in this episode. Seems 
spiritual when it comes to his Muslim faith. 
12. How are other minorities treated/discussed in this episode? 
a. Strong portrayal of women in this episode through Hanin and Sandrine. Strong-
willed, not afraid to assert themselves in front of men (Sandrine) or to take the 
steps necessary to escape their grip (Hanin). More agentic and positive than in 
episode 1 and to a lesser extent 2. 
13. Do you feel there are any strong explicit messages in this episode? 
a. This episode is much more dualistic/Manichean. Strong good v. evil dichotomy at 
both the explicit and implicit level.  
14. Do you feel there are any strongly implied messages in this episode? 
a. Implicit message about the need to free women from the yoke of Muslim 
traditionalism. Simplistic account. 
15. Are there any scenes that really moved you? Please describe them and explain how you 
felt. 
a. The final scene to an extent. Yazid shooting Fatih and the drone strike on Yazid. I 
wasn’t really moved because I don’t feel any attachment for the characters yet but 
the tension was high and I was hoping to see a punishment for Yazid. 
16. Are there any character that you felt strongly about? How did you feel? Why? 
a. I felt anger at the prospect of Ali killing Omer and relief when I realized he did 
not. Still feeling a lot of empathy for Hanin’s situation and she is the character I 
would like to see achieve her goal most. 
b. I felt strongly about a topic: As a Frenchman, I felt quite upset at some of the 
quick discussions of minorities in France, especially the allusion to the benefits of 
hyphenated identities in the US compared to our dichotomous acceptance v. 
rejection of minorities in France. I feel like the whole discussion was very short-
sighted and it was absolutely not necessary to develop the scenario.  
 
Character Analysis: Adrien Halliez, Part 1 
Ep Absorb Character Gend. Race Hisp. Nationality Religion Age 
1.
1 
5 Jack Ryan Male White No American n/a adult, 30s 
  
Jim Grear Male Black No American n/a adult, late 40s   













Ali Male White No Lebanese Muslim 
(assume
d) 



























Male White no American n/a adult 40s 
1.
2 
3 Jack Ryan Male White No American n/a adult, 30s 
  
Jim Grear Male Black No American n/a adult, late 40s   
Ali Male Middle 
Easterner 






No Lebanese Muslim adult, 30s 
  
Yazid Male Middle 
Easterner 
No ? Muslim 
(assume
d) 






































no ? Muslim  adult, 30s 
  
Ali Male Middle 
Easterner 
No Lebanese Muslim  adult, late 20s 
  










Yazid Male Middle 
Easterner 
No ? Muslim 
(assume
d) 
adult, late 20s 
  




Fatih Male Middle 
Easterner 
No ? Muslim adult, late 50s 
  





White No French ? adult, early 
40s   
Ava Femal
e 
























Ryan 4 Y Y Y N N n/a N 
 
Jim 
Grear 2 Y Y Y N N n/a N 
 
Suleima
n 3 N N N N Y Active N 




Wife 4 N N N N Y Passive N 
 
Cathy 
Mueller 4 N N N N N n/a N 
 
Joe 
Mueller 1 N N n n n n/a n 
 Theresa 5 Y Y n n n n/a n 
 
Matice 
(?) 3 Y 
unsu





Ryan 5 Y Y Y N N n/a N 
 
Jim 
Grear 1 Y Y Y N N n/a N 




n 2 N N N N Y Active N 
 Yazid 1 N N N N Y not sure N 
 Sara 4 N N N N N n/a N 
 
Cathy 













1 (0 if 
lowest 
level) N N N N Y Active N 
 Hanin 5 N N N N N n/a N 
 Ali 3 N N N N Y Active N 






1 (0 if 
lowest 
level) N N N N Y Active Y 
 Victor 2 Y N Y Y N n/a N 
 Fatih 4 N N N N Y Active Y 
 
Jim 




Arnaud 4 Y N N N N n/a N 

















Ryan Y N N Y N Y N 
 
Jim 
Grear Y N N Y N N N 
 
Suleima
n Y N N N N Y N 
 Ali Y Y Y Y N Y Y 
 
Suleima
n's Wife Y N N Y N N N 
 
Cathy 
Mueller Y N N Y N Y N 
 
Joe 
Mueller Y N N Y Y Y Y 
 Theresa Y Y N N N Y N 
 
Matice 
(?) Y N N N N N N 
1.2 
Jack 




Grear Y N N Y N Y N 




n Y N Y Y N N Y 
 Yazid Y N Y Y N N Y 
 Sara Y N N Y N Y N 
 
Cathy 
Mueller Y N N Y N Y N 
 
Sandrine 
Arnaud Y N N Y N Y N 
1.2 
Jack 




n Y N N N Y N N 
 Hanin Y Y N Y N Y N 
 Ali Y N N N N Y N 
 Omer Y N N N N Y N 
 Yazid Y N N N N N N 
 Victor Y Y N N N Y N 
 Fatih Y N Y N Y N Y 
 
Jim 
Grear Y N N Y Y Y N 
 
Sandrine 
Arnaud Y N N Y N N N 





Appendix B: Surveys 
Appendix B.1: Mechanical Turk Survey 
1. Informed Consent 
I.                    Purpose:  You are invited to participate in a research study. The purpose of this 
study is to examine the effects of fictional media consumption on individual attitudes. You are 
invited to participate because you are over the age of 18 and represent a portion of the adult 
population. A total of 800 participants will be recruited for this study. Participation will require 
around 30 to 40 minutes of your time for a single online session.     II.                  Procedures:  If 
you decide to participate, you will fill out a questionnaire. The survey will take approximately 30 
to 40 minutes and the compensation for this time will be $2.00.     III.                Risks:  In this 
study, you will not have any more risks than you would in a normal day of life. You should be 
aware that data sent over the Internet may not be secure. As with any online study, data sent over 
the Internet may not be secure even though the site is encrypted. You are free to discontinue 
participation at any time without adverse consequence.     IV.                Benefits:  Participation in 
this study may not benefit you personally. Overall, we hope to gain information about how 
individual consumption of and interaction with fictional media affects social and political 
attitudes; data that may provide research that is beneficial to society as a 
whole.     V.                  Voluntary Participation and Withdrawal:  Participation in research is 
voluntary. You do not have to be in this study. If you decide to be in the study and change your 
mind, you have the right to drop out at any time. You may skip questions or stop participating at 
any time. Whatever you decide, you will not lose any benefits to which you are otherwise 
entitled.     VI.                Confidentiality  We will keep your records private to the extent allowed 
by law. The research team will have access to the information you provide. Information may also 
be shared with those who make sure the study is done correctly (GSU Institutional Review 
Board, the Office for Human Research Protection (OHRP)). We will use a study number rather 
than your name on study records. The information you provide will be stored in password- and 
firewall-protected computers and encrypted USB drive. The key code used to identify subjects 
will be stored separately from the data to protect privacy. Your name and other facts that might 
point to you will not appear when we present this study or publish its results. The findings will 
be summarized and reported in group form. You will not be identified 
personally.     VII.              Contact Persons:  Contact Alexandra Pauley at apauley1@gsu.edu if 
you have questions, concerns, or complaints about this study. You can also call if you think you 
have been harmed by this study. Contact Susan Vogtner in the Georgia State University Office of 
Research Integrity at 404-413-3513 or svogtner1@gsu.edu if you want to talk to someone who is 
not part of the study team. You can talk about questions, concerns, offer input, obtain 
information, or suggestions about the study. You can also call Susan Vogtner if you have 
questions or concerns about your rights in this study.     VIII.            Copy of Consent Form to 
212 
Subject:  Each participant can print a copy of this consent form for his/her records.        If you 
agree to participate in this research, please click “I Agree” to continue with the survey. 
a. Yes, I agree to participate in this research.  (1)  
2. Please enter your MTurk user ID number below. At the conclusion of this study, you 
will create a unique confirmation code to enter on the MTurk website. This confirmation 
code will be necessary to receive payment. 
________________________________________________________________ 
3. Are you 18 or older? 
a. Yes  (1)  
b. No, I am under 18  (2)  
 
4. Thank you for agreeing to participate in our survey. Your participation is very important 
to the study, and we appreciate you taking the time to answer our questions. Please 
answer each of the questions carefully and honestly. Your responses are anonymous. 
There are three sections in this study. In the first section, you will be asked some 
demographic questions. In the second section, you will be asked about some social and 
political issues, then some about your background. If you are not sure about your 
response, please make your best guess. In the final section, you will be asked about your 
media consumption. 
a. Continue to Section One  (1)  
5. What is your gender? 
a. Male  (1)  
b. Female  (2)  
c. Nonbinary/Other  (3)  
6. What is your age? 
________________________________________________________________ 
213 
7. What, if any, is your religious preference? 
a. Catholic  (1)  
b. Protestant  (2)  
c. Muslim  (3)  
d. Hindu  (4)  
e. Jewish  (5)  
f. Pagan  (6)  
g. Other  (7)  
h. No preference  (8)  
i. Prefer not to say  (9)  
8. How important is your religious affiliation to you? 
a. Extremely important  (1)  
b. Very important  (2)  
c. Moderately imporant  (6)  
d. Slightly important  (3)  
e. Not at all important  (4)  
f. Don't know/Undecided  (5)  
9. How likely are you to vote in the 2020 election? 
a. Extremely likely  (1)  
b. Moderately likely  (2)  
c. Slightly likely  (3)  
d. Neither likely nor unlikely  (4)  
e. Slightly unlikely  (5)  
f. Moderately unlikely  (6)  
g. Extremely unlikely  (7)  
h. I am not eligible to vote in the 2020 election.  (8)  
10. What is the highest level of education you have completed? 
a. Elementary school  (1)  
b. Middle school  (2)  
c. High school/GED  (3)  
d. Some college  (4)  
e. Associate's degree  (5)  
f. Bachelor's degree  (6)  
g. Some graduate work  (7)  
h. Completed Master's or professional degree  (8)  
i. Advanced graduate work or Ph.D.  (9)  
11. Which of the following best describes your marital status? 
a. Single, never married  (1)  
b. Married  (2)  
c. Divorced/separated  (3)  
d. Widowed  (4)  
e. Prefer not to say  (5)  
12. Have you traveled outside of the country in the past five years? 
a. Yes  (1)  
b. No  (2)  
c. Prefer not to say  (3)  
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13. How would you describe yourself? 
(Select all that apply) 
a. American Indian or Alaska Native  (1)  
b. Asian  (2)  
c. Black or African American  (3)  
d. Hispanic, Latinx, or Spanish origin  (4)  
e. Middle Eastern or North African  (8)  
f. Native Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander  (6)  
g. White  (5)  
h. Other, please describe:  (7) 
________________________________________________ 
14. How would you best describe your current employment status? 
a. Employed full-time  (1)  
b. Employed part-time  (2)  
c. Unemployed/looking for work  (3)  
d. Student  (4)  
e. Homemaker  (5)  
f. Retired  (6)  
15. What do you expect your 2019 family income to be before taxes (from all sources)? 
a. Under $25,000  (1)  
b. $25,000-$39,999  (2)  
c. $40,000-$49,999  (3)  
d. $50,000-$74,999  (4)  
e. $75,000-$99,999  (5)  
f. $100,000-$124,999  (6)  
g. $125,000-$149,999  (7)  
h. Over $150,000  (8)  
16. Generally speaking, do you consider yourself to be a(n): 
a. Democrat  (1)  
b. Republican  (2)  
c. Independent  (3)  
d. Libertarian  (4)  
e. Other  (5)  
f. Don't know/Undecided  (6)  
17. How important is your political party affiliation to you? 
a. Extremely important  (1)  
b. Very important  (2)  
c. Moderately important  (3)  
d. Slightly important  (4)  
e. Not at all important  (5)  
f. Don't know/Undecided  (6)  
18. Do your parents associate with one of the following parties? 
a. Democrat  (1)  
b. Republican  (2)  
c. Independent  (3)  
d. Different Parties  (7)  
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e. Libertarian  (4)  
f. Other  (5)  
g. Don't know/Undecided  (6)  
19. How important is your parents' political party affiliation to them? 
a. Extremely important  (1)  
b. Very important  (2)  
c. Moderately important  (3)  
d. Slightly important  (4)  
e. Not at all important  (5)  
f. Don't know/Undecided  (6)  
20. How often do you pay attention to what's going on in government and politics? 
a. Always  (1)  
b. Most of the time  (2)  
c. About half the time  (6)  
d. Some of the time  (7)  
e. Never  (8)  
21. What do you consider to be the MOST important problem facing America today?  
(Choose one) 
a. Abortion  (1)  
b. National debt  (2)  
c. Environment and climate change  (3)  
d. Gay rights  (4)  
e. Gun control  (5)  
f. Health care  (6)  
g. Immigration  (7)  
h. Poverty  (8)  
i. Income inequality  (9)  
j. Unemployment  (10)  
k. Economic growth  (11)  
l. Military strength  (12)  
m. Morality and religion in society  (13)  
n. Racism  (14)  
o. Social security  (15)  
p. Taxes  (16)  
q. Women's rights  (17)  
r. Crime  (18)  
s. Foreign policy  (19)  
t. Education  (20)  
u. Terrorism and homeland security  (21)  
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22. What should be the priority for dealing with illegal immigration in the U.S.? 
a. Better border security and stronger enforcement of our immigration laws  (1)  
b. Creating a way for immigrants already here illegally to become citizens if they 
meet certain requirements  (2)  
c. Both should be given equal priority  (3)  
d. None of these  (4)  
e. Don't know/No opinion  (5)  
23. All in all, would you favor or oppose building a wall along the entire U.S. border with 
Mexico? 
a. Favor a great deal  (1)  
b. Favor moderately  (7)  
c. Favor a little  (8)  
d. Neither favor nor oppose  (9)  
e. Oppose a little  (10)  
f. Oppose moderately  (11)  
g. Oppose a great deal  (12)  
24. Do you favor or oppose the current use of detention centers at the U.S. border with 
Mexico? 
a. Favor a great deal  (1)  
b. Favor moderately  (7)  
c. Favor a little  (8)  
d. Neither favor nor oppose  (9)  
e. Oppose a little  (10)  
f. Oppose moderately  (11)  
g. Oppose a great deal  (12)  
25. Do you favor or oppose making it a crime to seek asylum at the U.S. border with 
Mexico? 
a. Favor a great deal  (1)  
b. Favor moderately  (7)  
c. Favor a little  (8)  
d. Neither favor nor oppose  (9)  
e. Oppose a little  (10)  
f. Oppose moderately  (11)  
g. Oppose a great deal  (12)  
26. When it comes to asylum seekers coming to the U.S. which comes closer to your view—
even if neither is exactly right? 
a. Asylum seekers usually come to this country legally and should have access to the 
best social, legal, and health care possible  (1)  
b. Asylum seekers do not always come to the country legally and should not be 
given special treatment at the expense of U.S. tax dollars  (2)  
27. When it comes to asylum seekers coming to the U.S. which comes closer to your view—
even if neither is exactly right? 
a. In general asylum seekers should be treated with caution and some suspicion upon 
entering this country  (1)  
b. In general asylum seekers should be taken at their word and assumed innocent 
upon entering this country  (2)  
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28. When it comes to undocumented immigrants currently in the U.S. which comes closer 
to your view—even if neither is exactly right? 
a. Undocumented immigrants living in the U.S. are more likely than American 
citizens to commit serious crimes  (1)  
b. Undocumented immigrants living in the U.S. are NO more likely than American 
citizens to commit serious crimes  (2)  
29. When it comes to undocumented immigrants currently in the U.S. which comes closer 
to your view—even if neither is exactly right? 
a. Undocumented immigrants mostly fill jobs that American citizens would like to 
have  (1)  
b. Undocumented immigrants mostly fill jobs American citizens don't want  (2)  
30. When it comes to undocumented immigrants currently in the U.S. which comes closer 
to your view—even if neither is exactly right? 
a. In general undocumented immigrants are as honest and hardworking as American 
citizens  (1)  
b. In general undocumented immigrants are not as honest and hardworking as 
American citizens  (2)  
31. Should the number of people who are allowed to legally move to the United States to live 
and work be increased, decreased, or kept the same as it is now? 
a. Increased a lot  (1)  
b. Increased a moderate amount  (2)  
c. Increased a little  (3)  
d. Kept the same  (4)  
e. Decreased a little  (5)  
f. Decreased a moderate amount  (6)  
g. Decreased a lot  (7)  
32. When people from other countries legally move to the United States to live and work, is 
this generally good for the U.S., generally bad for the U.S., or neither good or bad? 
a. Extremely good  (1)  
b. Moderately good  (2)  
c. A little good  (3)  
d. Neither good nor bad  (4)  
e. A little bad  (5)  
f. Moderately bad  (6)  
g. Extremely bad  (7)  
33. Which of the following statements comes closer to your own views—even if neither is 
exactly right? 
a. Immigrants today strengthen our country because of their hard work and talents  
(1)  
b. Immigrants today are a burden on our country because they take our jobs, housing 
and health care  (2)  
34. How worried are you that the United States will experience a terrorist attack in the near 
future? 
a. Extremely worried  (1)  
b. Very worried  (2)  
c. Slightly worried  (3)  
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d. Not at all worried  (4)  
35. How worried are you about a terrorist attack in the area where you live? 
a. Extremely worried  (1)  
b. Very worried  (2)  
c. Moderately worried  (3)  
d. Slightly worried  (4)  
e. Not at all worried  (5)  
 
36. How likely is it that the United States will experience a terrorist attack from members of 
the following groups in the near future? 

























(1)  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
Whites 
(2)  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
Muslims 
(3)  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
Christian









o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
Russians 
(7)  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
Chinese 




37. Do you favor or oppose allowing Syrian refugees to come to the United States? 
a. Favor a great deal  (1)  
b. Favor moderately  (2)  
c. Favor a little  (3)  
d. Neither favor nor oppose  (4)  
e. Oppose a little  (5)  
f. Oppose moderately  (6)  
g. Oppose a great deal  (7)  
38. Do you favor or oppose the U.S. sending ground troops to fight Islamic militants, such as 
ISIS, in Iraq and Syria? 
a. Favor a great deal  (1)  
b. Favor moderately  (2)  
c. Favor a little  (3)  
d. Neither favor nor oppose  (4)  
e. Oppose a little  (5)  
f. Oppose moderately  (6)  
g. Oppose a great deal  (7)  
39. Which of the following statements comes closer to your own views—even if neither is 
exactly right? 
a. Americans need to sacrifice some privacy and freedoms in order to be safe from 
terrorism  (1)  
b. Americans do NOT need to sacrifice privacy and freedoms in order to be safe 
from terrorism  (2)  
40. Which of the following statements comes closer to your own views—even if neither is 
exactly right? 
a. The Islamic religion is more likely than other religions to encourage violence 
among its believers  (1)  
b. The Islamic religion does not encourage violence more than other religions  (2)  
41. Which of the following statements comes closer to your own views—even if neither is 
exactly right? 
a. The obstacles that once made it harder for women to get ahead are now largely 
gone  (1)  
b. There are still significant obstacles that make it harder for women to get ahead 
than men  (2)  
42. How much discrimination is there in the United States today against each of the 
following groups? 
(Select one answer for each group listed) 
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A great deal 
(1) 
A lot (2) 
A moderate 
amount (3) 
A little (4) 
None at all 
(5) 
Blacks (1)  o  o  o  o  o  
Hispanics (2)  o  o  o  o  o  
Whites (3)  o  o  o  o  o  
Gays & 
lesbians (4)  o  o  o  o  o  
Women (5)  o  o  o  o  o  
Men (6)  o  o  o  o  o  
Transgender 
people (7)  o  o  o  o  o  
Muslims (8)  o  o  o  o  o  
Christians (9)  o  o  o  o  o  
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43. In general, does the federal government treat whites better than blacks, treat blacks 
better than whites, or treat them both the same? 
a. Treats whites much better  (1)   
b. Treats whites moderately better  (2)  
c. Treats whites a little better  (3)  
d. Treats both the same  (4)  
e. Treats blacks a little better  (5)  
f. Treats blacks moderately better  (6)  
g. Treats blacks much better  (7)  
44. In general, do the the police treat whites better than blacks, treat blacks better than 
whites, or treat them both the same? 
a. Police treat whites much better  (1)  
b. Police treat whites moderately better  (2)  
c. Police treat whites a little better  (3)  
d. Police treat both the same  (4)  
e. Police treat blacks a little better  (5)  
f. Police treat blacks moderately better  (6)  
g. Police treat blacks much better  (7)  
45. Should federal spending on crime be increased, decreased, or kept the same? 
a. Increased a great deal  (1)  
b. Increased a moderate amount  (2)  
c. Increased a little  (3)  
d. Kept the same  (4)  
e. Decreased a little  (5)  
f. Decreased a moderate amount  (6)  
g. Decreased a great deal  (7)  
46. Do you favor or oppose using private, for-profit prisons in the U.S.? 
a. Favor a great deal  (1)  
b. Favor moderately  (4)  
c. Favor a little  (5)  
d. Neither favor nor oppose  (6)  
e. Oppose a little  (7)  
f. Oppose moderately  (8)  
g. Oppose a great deal  (9)  
47. Do you favor or oppose reforming the criminal justice system to reduce the number of 
people incarcerated in the U.S.? 
a. Favor a great deal  (1)  
b. Favor moderately  (4)  
c. Favor a little  (5)  
d. Neither favor nor oppose  (6)  
e. Oppose a little  (7)  
f. Oppose moderately  (8)  
g. Oppose a great deal  (9)  
48. Do you favor or oppose having the death penalty for persons convicted of murder? 
a. Favor a great deal  (1)  
b. Favor moderately  (2)  
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c. Favor a little  (3)  
d. Neither favor nor oppose  (4)  
e. Oppose a little  (5)  
f. Oppose moderately  (6)  
g. Oppose a great deal  (7)  
49. Who is the current Secretary of State? 
a. Mike Pompeo  (1)  
b. John Kerry  (2)  
c. Rex Tillerson  (3)  
d. Scott Pruitt  (4)  
e. Don't know  (5)  
50. Who is the current President of France? 
a. Emmanuel Macron  (1)  
b. Justin Trudeau  (2)  
c. Malcolm Turnbull  (3)  
d. Theresa May  (4)  
e. Don't know  (5)  
51. Neil Gorsuch is... 
a. a Senator  (1)  
b. the Solicitor General  (2)  
c. a Supreme Court Justice  (3)  
d. the head of the EPA  (4)  
e. Don't know  (5)  
52. Who is led the Justice Department's investigation into Russian involvement in the 2016 
election? 
a. James Comey  (1)  
b. Sean Spicer  (2)  
c. Sally Yates  (3)  
d. Robert Mueller  (4)  
e. Don't know  (5)  
53. The tap water in Flint, Michigan is unsafe because it contains too much... 
a. Lead  (1)  
b. Arsenic  (2)  
c. Asbestos  (3)  
d. Mold  (4)  
e. Don't know  (5)  
54. Many conservative Republicans in the House of Representatives are members of which 
of the following groups? 
a. The Tuesday Group  (1)  
b. The Lincoln Group  (2)  
c. The Freedom Caucus  (3)  
d. The Blue Dogs  (4)  
e. Don't know  (5)  
55. Which of the following countries has officially started the process of leaving the 
European Union?  
a. Greece  (1)  
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b. Germany  (2)  
c. Hungary  (3)  
d. The United Kingdom  (4)  
e. Don't know  (5)  
56. Who is the current Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives? 
a. Paul Ryan  (1)  
b. Nancy Pelosi  (2)  
c. Jason Chaffetz  (3)  
d. Mitch McConnell  (4)  
e. Don't know  (5)  
57. The national unemployment rate as reported by the government is currently closer to... 
a. 4%  (1)  
b. 7%  (2)  
c. 12%  (3)  
d. 17%  (4)  
e. Don't know  (5)  
58. How much would you say you agree with the following statement? 
I trust the federal government to run the United States successfully. 
a. Strongly agree  (1)  
b. Agree  (2)  
c. Somewhat agree  (3)  
d. Neither agree nor disagree  (4)  
e. Somewhat disagree  (5)  
f. Disagree  (6)  
g. Strongly disagree  (7)  
59. How much would you say you trust the federal government? 
a. Always  (1)  
b. Most of the time  (8)  
c. Some of the time  (9)  
d. Rarely  (2)  
e. Never  (3)  
60. How much would you say you trust Congress? 
a. Always  (1)  
b. Most of the time  (8)  
c. Some of the time  (9)  
d. Rarely  (2)  
e. Never  (3)  
61. How much would you say you trust the court system? 
a. Always  (1)  
b. Most of the time  (8)  
c. Some of the time  (9)  
d. Rarely  (2)  
e. Never  (3)  
62. How much would you say you trust law enforcement? 
a. Always  (1)  
b. Most of the time  (8)  
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c. Some of the time  (9)  
d. Rarely  (2)  
e. Never  (3)  
63. How much would you say you trust the executive branch? 
a. Always  (1)  
b. Most of the time  (8)  
c. Some of the time  (9)  
d. Rarely  (2)  
e. Never  (3)  
64. Do you approve or disapprove of the way Donald Trump is handling his job as President? 
a. Approve  (1)  
b. Disapprove  (2)  
c. Don't know/No opinion  (3)  
65. Do you approve very strongly, or not so strongly? 
a. Very strongly  (1)  
b. Not so strongly  (2)  
c. Don't know  (3)  
66. Do you disapprove very strongly, or not so strongly? 
a. Very strongly  (1)  
b. Not so strongly  (2)  
c. Don't know  (3)  
67. All in all, are you satisfied or dissatisfied with the way things are going in this country 
today? 
a. Satisfied  (1)  
b. Dissatisfied  (2)  
c. Don't know/No opinion  (3)  
68. Would you say your overall opinion of the Republican Party is very favorable, mostly 
favorable, mostly UNfavorable, or very unfavorable? 
a. Very favorable  (1)  
b. Mostly favorable  (2)  
c. Mostly Unfavorable  (3)  
d. Very unfavorable  (4)  
e. Can't rate/No opinion  (5)  
69. Would you say your overall opinion of the Democratic Party is very favorable, mostly 
favorable, mostly UNfavorable, or very unfavorable? 
a. Very favorable  (1)  
b. Mostly favorable  (2)  
c. Mostly Unfavorable  (3)  
d. Very unfavorable  (4)  
e. Can't rate/No opinion  (5)  
70. If you had to choose, would you rather have a smaller government providing fewer 
services, or a bigger government providing more services? 
a. Smaller government, fewer services  (1)  
b. Bigger government, more services  (2)  
c. Depends  (3)  
d. Don't know/No opinion  (4)  
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71. Which of the following statements comes closer to your own views—even if neither is 
exactly right? 
a. Government is almost always wasteful and inefficient  (1)  
b. Government often does a better job than people give it credit for  (2)  
72. Which of the following statements comes closer to your own views—even if neither is 
exactly right? 
a. Government regulation of business is necessary to protect the public interest  (1)  
b. Government regulation of business usually does more harm than good  (2)  
73. During a typical week, how many days do you watch, read, or listen to news on TV, 
radio, printed newspapers, or the Internet, not including sports?  
a. None  (1)  
b. One day  (2)  
c. Two days  (3)  
d. Three days  (4)  
e. Four days  (5)  
f. Five days  (6)  
g. Six days  (7)  
h. Seven days  (8)  
74. How much attention do you pay to news about national politics on TV, radio, printed 
newspapers, or the Internet? 
a. A great deal  (1)  
b. A lot  (2)  
c. A moderate amount  (3)  
d. A little  (4)  
e. None at all  (5)  
75. During a typical week, how many days do you watch, read, or listen to NON-news on 
TV, radio, printed newspapers, or the Internet? 
a. None  (1)  
b. One day  (2)  
c. Two days  (3)  
d. Three days  (4)  
e. Four days  (5)  
f. Five days  (6)  
g. Six days  (7)  
h. Seven days  (8)  
76. During a typical week, how many days do you engage with social media? 
a. None  (1)  
b. One day  (2)  
c. Two days  (3)  
d. Three days  (4)  
e. Four days  (5)  
f. Five days  (6)  
g. Six days  (7)  
h. Seven days  (8)  
77. During a typical week, how many days do you watch shows that could be described as a 
crime or legal drama, like Law & Order or CSI? 
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a. None  (1)  
b. One day  (2)  
c. Two days  (3)  
d. Three days  (4)  
e. Four days  (5)  
f. Five days  (6)  
g. Six days  (7)  
h. Seven days  (8)  
78. During a typical week, how many days do you watch shows that could be described as a 
medical drama, like Grey's Anatomy? 
a. None  (1)  
b. One day  (2)  
c. Two days  (3)  
d. Three days  (4)  
e. Four days  (5)  
f. Five days  (6)  
g. Six days  (7)  
h. Seven days  (8)  
79. During a typical week, how many days do you watch unscripted dramas, often called 
reality shows? 
a. None  (1)  
b. One day  (2)  
c. Two days  (3)  
d. Three days  (4)  
e. Four days  (5)  
f. Five days  (6)  
g. Six days  (7)  
h. Seven days  (8)  
80. Which genres do you typically choose when you watch shows or films?  
(Choose up to three) 
a. Action/Adventure  (1)  
b. Comedy  (2)  
c. Sci-fi/Fantasy  (3)  
d. Suspense  (4)  
e. Based on comic books  (5)  
f. Animation  (6)  
g. Horror  (7)  
h. Drama  (8)  
i. Romantic comedy  (9)  
j. Kids & family  (10)  
k. Romance  (11)  
l. Re-releases  (12)  
m. Musicals  (13)  
n. Art house/Indie  (14)  
81. Which of the following statements comes closer to your own views—even if neither is 
exactly right? 
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a. I prefer to watch shows as they air on television—watching one episode per week.  
(1)  
b. I prefer to wait and binge-watch shows after they have aired—watching many 
episodes in one sitting.  (2) 
 How much have you watched of the show 24: Legacy (Fox)? 
c. Never watched  (1)  
d. 1-3 episodes  (2)  
e. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season  (3)  
f. At least 1 season  (4)  
82. How much have you watched of the show Allegiance (NBC)? 
a. Never watched  (1)  
b. 1-3 episodes  (2)  
c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season  (3)  
d. At least 1 season  (4) 
83. How much have you watched of the show American Crime (ABC)? 
a. Never watched  (1)  
b. 1-3 episodes  (2)  
c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season  (3)  
d. At least 1 season  (4) 
84. How much have you watched of the show Bodyguard (Netflix)? 
a. Never watched  (1)  
b. 1-3 episodes  (2)  
c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season  (3)  
d. At least 1 season  (4) 
85. How much have you watched of the show Containment (The CW)? 
a. Never watched  (1)  
b. 1-3 episodes  (2)  
c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season  (3)  
d. At least 1 season  (4) 
86. How much have you watched of the show Crisis (NBC)? 
a. Never watched  (1)  
b. 1-3 episodes  (2)  
c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season  (3)  
d. At least 1 season  (4) 
87. How much have you watched of the show Designated Survivor (ABC)? 
a. Never watched  (1)  
b. 1-3 episodes  (2)  
c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season  (3)  
d. At least 1 season  (4) 
88. How much have you watched of the show FBI (CBS)? 
a. Never watched  (1)  
b. 1-3 episodes  (2)  
c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season  (3)  
d. At least 1 season  (4) 
89. How much have you watched of the show Gang Related (Fox)? 
a. Never watched  (1)  
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b. 1-3 episodes  (2)  
c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season  (3)  
d. At least 1 season  (4) 
90. How much have you watched of the show Homeland (HBO)? 
a. Never watched  (1)  
b. 1-3 episodes  (2)  
c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season  (3)  
d. At least 1 season  (4) 
91. How much have you watched of the show House of Cards (Netflix)? 
a. Never watched  (1)  
b. 1-3 episodes  (2)  
c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season  (3)  
d. At least 1 season  (4) 
92. How much have you watched of the show Hostages (CBS)? 
a. Never watched  (1)  
b. 1-3 episodes  (2)  
c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season  (3)  
d. At least 1 season  (4) 
93. How much have you watched of the show Jack Ryan (Amazon Prime)? 
a. Never watched  (1)  
b. 1-3 episodes  (2)  
c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season  (3)  
d. At least 1 season  (4) 
94. How much have you watched of the show Jane the Virgin (The CW)? 
a. Never watched  (1)  
b. 1-3 episodes  (2)  
c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season  (3)  
d. At least 1 season  (4) 
95. How much have you watched of the show Madam Secretary (CBS)? 
a. Never watched  (1)  
b. 1-3 episodes  (2)  
c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season  (3)  
d. At least 1 season  (4) 
96. How much have you watched of the show Mr. Robot (USA)? 
a. Never watched  (1)  
b. 1-3 episodes  (2)  
c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season  (3)  
d. At least 1 season  (4) 
97. How much have you watched of the show Odyssey (NBC)? 
a. Never watched  (1)  
b. 1-3 episodes  (2)  
c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season  (3)  
d. At least 1 season  (4) 
98. How much have you watched of the show Orange is the New Black (Netflix)? 
a. Never watched  (1)  
b. 1-3 episodes  (2)  
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c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season  (3)  
d. At least 1 season  (4) 
99. How much have you watched of the show Ozark (Netflix)? 
a. Never watched  (1)  
b. 1-3 episodes  (2)  
c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season  (3)  
d. At least 1 season  (4) 
100. How much have you watched of the show Power (Starz)? 
a. Never watched  (1)  
b. 1-3 episodes  (2)  
c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season  (3)  
d. At least 1 season  (4) 
101. How much have you watched of the show Quantico (ABC)? 
a. Never watched  (1)  
b. 1-3 episodes  (2)  
c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season  (3)  
d. At least 1 season  (4) 
102. How much have you watched of the show Scandal (ABC)? 
a. Never watched  (1)  
b. 1-3 episodes  (2)  
c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season  (3)  
d. At least 1 season  (4) 
103. How much have you watched of the show Seven Seconds (Netflix)? 
a. Never watched  (1)  
b. 1-3 episodes  (2)  
c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season  (3)  
d. At least 1 season  (4) 
104. How much have you watched of the show Shades of Blue (NBC)? 
a. Never watched  (1)  
b. 1-3 episodes  (2)  
c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season  (3)  
d. At least 1 season  (4) 
105. How much have you watched of the show Shots Fired (Fox)? 
a. Never watched  (1)  
b. 1-3 episodes  (2)  
c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season  (3)  
d. At least 1 season  (4) 
106. How much have you watched of the show State of Affairs (NBC)? 
a. Never watched  (1)  
b. 1-3 episodes  (2)  
c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season  (3)  
d. At least 1 season  (4) 
107. How much have you watched of the show Taken (NBC)? 
a. Never watched  (1)  
b. 1-3 episodes  (2)  
c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season  (3)  
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d. At least 1 season  (4) 
108. How much have you watched of the show The Americans (FX)? 
a. Never watched  (1)  
b. 1-3 episodes  (2)  
c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season  (3)  
d. At least 1 season  (4) 
109. How much have you watched of the show The Blacklist (NBC)? 
a. Never watched  (1)  
b. 1-3 episodes  (2)  
c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season  (3)  
d. At least 1 season  (4) 
110. How much have you watched of the show The Blacklist: Redemption (NBC)? 
a. Never watched  (1)  
b. 1-3 episodes  (2)  
c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season  (3)  
d. At least 1 season  (4) 
111. How much have you watched of the show The Crossing (ABC)? 
a. Never watched  (1)  
b. 1-3 episodes  (2)  
c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season  (3)  
d. At least 1 season  (4) 
112. How much have you watched of the show The Informer (Amazon Prime)? 
a. Never watched  (1)  
b. 1-3 episodes  (2)  
c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season  (3)  
d. At least 1 season  (4) 
113. How much have you watched of the show The Night Of (HBO)? 
a. Never watched  (1)  
b. 1-3 episodes  (2)  
c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season  (3)  
d. At least 1 season  (4) 
114. How much have you watched of the show The Passage (Fox)? 
a. Never watched  (1)  
b. 1-3 episodes  (2)  
c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season  (3)  
d. At least 1 season  (4) 
115. How much have you watched of the show Valor (The CW)? 
a. Never watched  (1)  
b. 1-3 episodes  (2)  
c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season  (3)  
d. At least 1 season  (4) 
 
116. We are interested in whether you actually take the time to read directions; if not, 
some results may not tell us very much about decision making in the real world. To show 
that you have read the instructions, please ignore the question below about your favorite 
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color and choose yellow as your answer. Again, please answer the question as we have 
instructed rather than choosing your favorite color. 
What is your favorite color? 
a. Red  (1)  
b. Pink  (2)  
c. Orange  (3)  
d. Yellow  (4)  
e. Green  (5)  
f. Blue  (6)  
g. Purple  (7)  
h. None of the above  (8)  
 
117. Finally, to confirm you have completed the survey, please enter a confirmation 
code of your choosing in the text box below. It should include the term PAWS and a 
number (for example: "PAWS1234"). You will need to also enter the same code in the 
box on the Mechanical Turk HIT. We will use this code to verify that you have 
completed the survey and approve your payment. Your answers will not be linked with 
your personal information in any way. 
 





Appendix B.2: Experiment Surveys 
Pre-treatment Survey 
1. Please provide your 5-digit SONA ID number so that you may be compensated: 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Are you 18 or older? 
a. Yes  (1)  
b. No, I am under 18  (2)  
3. Please review the following Informed Consent information before continuing to the rest 
of the survey.    
Introduction and Key Information  You are invited to take part in a research study. It is 
up to you to decide if you would like to take part in the study. The purpose of this study 
is to examine the effects of fictional media consumption on individual attitudes. Your 
role in the study will last approximately 4.5 hours over the span of 5 weeks. You will be 
asked to do the following: 1) Take a pre-treatment survey; 2) Watch three episodes of a 
popular dramatic show by EITHER attending one long session that lasts 4 hours OR 
attending three sessions that last approximately 1 hour each; 3) Take a post-treatment 
survey; and 4) Take a follow-up survey in the fifth and final week of the study.  
Participating in this study will not expose you to any more risks than you would 
experience in a typical day. However, please be aware that some episodes may contain 
adult content. This study is not designed to benefit you. Overall, we hope to gain 
information about how interaction with fictional media affects social and political 
attitudes; data that may provide research that is beneficial to society as a whole. If you do 
not wish to take part in this study, you may choose another study available to the Political 
Science Research Pool through the SONA system.   Purpose  The purpose of the study is 
to learn how binge-watching a show and watching it weekly affect long-term individual 
attitudes differently, if at all. You are invited to take part in this research study because 
you are taking an introductory political science class and are therefore part of the Political 
Science Research Pool. A total of 240 people will be invited to take part in this study.   
Procedures   If you decide to take part, you will be asked to participate in several 
research activities. First, you are asked to take the pre-test survey online. Next, you will 
be asked to attend screenings of three episodes of a popular dramatic show. This will be 
either a single screening of all three episodes in one day or three separate screenings of 
each episode. After you have watched the episodes, you will be asked to take a post-test 
survey to complete your in-person participation. Four weeks after the first session, you 
will receive an email asking you to complete a follow-up survey for additional 
compensation.  You can expect to fill out all surveys online using a computer or 
smartphone. For individuals who do not have a computer or smartphone available, you 
can request a paper copy to fill out. Each screening session will take place on the GSU 
campus.  Future Research  Researchers will remove information that may identify you 
and may use your data for future research. If we do this, we will not ask for any 
additional consent from you.  Risks   In this study, you will not have any more risks than 
you would in a normal day of life. You will be asked to watch episodes from a dramatic 
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show. Be aware that the show may contain adult content, including adult language, 
violence, and sexual situations. Please know that you may discontinue your participation 
at any time without adverse consequence. No injury is expected from this study, but if 
you believe you have been harmed, contact the research team as soon as possible. 
Georgia State University and the research team have not set aside funds to compensate 
for any injury.   Benefits   This study is not designed to benefit you personally. Overall, 
we hope to gain information about how interaction with fictional media affects social and 
political attitudes; data that may provide research that is beneficial to society as a whole.  
Alternatives  As part of the Political Science Research Pool, you have access to multiple 
studies over the course of the semester. If you do not wish to participate in this study, you 
may choose another.    
    Select CONTINUE to continue reading this document.  
4. Please review the following Informed Consent information before continuing to the 
rest of the survey.    Compensation   You may receive up to 3 points of extra credit and 
$10 in the form of an Amazon digital gift card for participating in this study. However, 
this compensation is based upon how long you stay in the study. Participants who only 
complete the pre-test survey will only be eligible to receive 0.5 extra credit point on their 
final grade. If you continue with the study, you will be compensated per episode.   
Participants who only come in for episode 1 will be compensated with 1 extra credit point 
total.  Participants who come in for episodes 1-2 will be compensated with 2 extra credit 
points total.  Participants who come in for episodes 1-3 and complete the post-test 
survey will be compensated with 3 extra credit points total and a $5 Amazon digital gift 
card.   Participants who come in for episodes 1-3, take the post-test survey, and take the 
follow-up survey will be compensated with an additional $5 Amazon gift card, bringing 
total compensation to 3 extra credit point and a $10 Amazon digital gift card.   
Voluntary Participation and Withdrawal   You do not have to be in this study. If you 
decide to be in the study and change your mind, you have the right to drop out at any 
time. You may skip questions or stop participating at any time. You may refuse to take 
part in the study or stop at any time. This will not cause you to lose any benefits to which 
you are otherwise entitled. You will be compensated for all participation up to that point 
(see above compensation scale).  Confidentiality   We will keep your records private to 
the extent allowed by law. The following people and entities will have access to the 
information you provide:     Researchers Dr. Lakeyta Bonnette-Bailey and Alexandra 
Pauley   GSU Institutional Review Board  Office for Human Research 
Protection (OHRP)    We will use a study number rather than your name on study 
records. The information you provide will be stored in a locked cabinet (paper copies) 
and password- and firewall-protected computers (electronic data). All paper copies will 
have identifying information removed and replaced with the study number. A key of 
study numbers will be stored separately from the data to protect privacy. When we 
present or publish the results of this study, we will not use your name or other 
information that may identify you.  Contact Information   Contact Alexandra Pauley at 
apauley1@gsu.edu or 6788969488:     If you have questions about the study or 
your part in it  If you have questions, concerns, or complaints about the study   The IRB 
at Georgia State University reviews all research that involves human participants. You 
can contact the IRB if you would like to speak to someone who is not involved directly 
with the study. You can contact the IRB for questions, concerns, problems, information, 
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input, or questions about your rights as a research participant. Contact the IRB at 404-
413-3500 or irb@gsu.edu.    Consent   We recommend you print out a copy of this page 
for your records. Upon request, we will give you a copy of this consent form to 
keep.      If you agree to participate in this study, please select “I Agree” to continue 
with the pre-test survey. 
a. I Agree  (1)  
b. I do not wish to participate  (2)  
5. What is your gender? 
a. Male  (1)  
b. Female  (2)  
c. Nonbinary/Other  (3)  
6. What is your age? 
________________________________________________________________ 
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7. What, if any, is your religious preference? 
a. Catholic  (1)  
b. Protestant  (2)  
c. Muslim  (3)  
d. Hindu  (4)  
e. Jewish  (5)  
f. Pagan  (6)  
g. Other  (7)  
h. No preference  (8)  
i. Prefer not to say  (9)  
8. How important is your religious affiliation to you? 
a. Extremely important  (1)  
b. Very important  (2)  
c. Moderately imporant  (6)  
d. Slightly important  (3)  
e. Not at all important  (4)  
f. Don't know/Undecided  (5)  
9. How likely are you to vote in the 2020 election? 
a. Extremely likely  (1)  
b. Moderately likely  (2)  
c. Slightly likely  (3)  
d. Neither likely nor unlikely  (4)  
e. Slightly unlikely  (5)  
f. Moderately unlikely  (6)  
g. Extremely unlikely  (7)  
h. I am not eligible to vote in the 2020 election.  (8)  
10. What is the highest level of education you have completed? 
a. Elementary school  (1)  
b. Middle school  (2)  
c. High school/GED  (3)  
d. Some college  (4)  
e. Associate's degree  (5)  
f. Bachelor's degree  (6)  
g. Some graduate work  (7)  
h. Completed Master's or professional degree  (8)  
i. Advanced graduate work or Ph.D.  (9)  
11. Which of the following best describes your marital status? 
a. Single, never married  (1)  
b. Married  (2)  
c. Divorced/separated  (3)  
d. Widowed  (4)  
e. Prefer not to say  (5)  
12. Have you traveled outside of the country in the past five years? 
a. Yes  (1)  
b. No  (2)  
c. Prefer not to say  (3)  
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13. How would you describe yourself? 
(Select all that apply) 
a. American Indian or Alaska Native  (1)  
b. Asian  (2)  
c. Black or African American  (3)  
d. Hispanic, Latinx, or Spanish origin  (4)  
e. Middle Eastern or North African  (8)  
f. Native Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander  (6)  
g. White  (5)  
h. Other, please describe:  (7) 
________________________________________________ 
 
14. How would you best describe your current employment status? 
a. Employed full-time  (1)  
b. Employed part-time  (2)  
c. Unemployed/looking for work  (3)  
d. Student  (4)  
e. Homemaker  (5)  
f. Retired  (6)  
15. What do you expect your 2019 family income to be before taxes (from all sources)? 
a. Under $25,000  (1) 
b. $25,000-$39,999  (2)  
c. $40,000-$49,999  (3)  
d. $50,000-$74,999  (4)  
e. $75,000-$99,999  (5)  
f. $100,000-$124,999  (6)  
g. $125,000-$149,999  (7)  
h. Over $150,000  (8)  
16. Generally speaking, do you consider yourself to be a(n): 
a. Democrat  (1)  
b. Republican  (2)  
c. Independent  (3)  
d. Libertarian  (4)  
e. Other  (5)  
f. Don't know/Undecided  (6)  
17. How important is your political party affiliation to you? 
a. Extremely important  (1)  
b. Very important  (2)  
c. Moderately important  (3)  
d. Slightly important  (4)  
e. Not at all important  (5)  
f. Don't know/Undecided  (6)  
18. Do your parents associate with one of the following parties? 
a. Democrat  (1)  
b. Republican  (2)  
c. Independent  (3)  
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d. Different Parties  (7)  
e. Libertarian  (4)  
f. Other  (5)  
g. Don't know/Undecided  (6)  
19. How important is your parents' political party affiliation to them? 
a. Extremely important  (1)  
b. Very important  (2)  
c. Moderately important  (3)  
d. Slightly important  (4)  
e. Not at all important  (5)  
f. Don't know/Undecided  (6)  
20. How often do you pay attention to what's going on in government and politics? 
a. Always  (1)  
b. Most of the time  (2)  
c. About half the time  (6)  
d. Some of the time  (7)  
e. Never  (8)  
21. What do you consider to be the MOST important problem facing America today?  
(Choose one) 
a. Abortion  (1)  
b. National debt  (2)  
c. Environment and climate change  (3)  
d. Gay rights  (4)  
e. Gun control  (5)  
f. Health care  (6)  
g. Immigration  (7)  
h. Poverty  (8)  
i. Income inequality  (9)  
j. Unemployment  (10)  
k. Economic growth  (11)  
l. Military strength  (12)  
m. Morality and religion in society  (13)  
n. Racism  (14)  
o. Social security  (15)  
p. Taxes  (16)  
q. Women's rights  (17)  
r. Crime  (18)  
s. Foreign policy  (19)  
t. Education  (20)  
u. Terrorism and homeland security  (21)  
22. Who is the current Secretary of State? 
a. Mike Pompeo  (1)  
b. John Kerry  (2)  
c. Rex Tillerson  (3)  
d. Scott Pruitt  (4)  
e. Don't know  (5)  
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23. Who is the current President of France? 
a. Emmanuel Macron  (1)  
b. Justin Trudeau  (2)  
c. Malcolm Turnbull  (3)  
d. Theresa May  (4)  
e. Don't know  (5)  
24. Brett Kavanaugh is... 
a. a Senator  (1)  
b. the Solicitor General  (2)  
c. a Supreme Court Justice  (3)  
d. the head of the EPA  (4)  
e. Don't know  (5)  
25. Who led the Justice Department's investigation into Russian involvement in the 2016 
election? 
a. James Comey  (1)  
b. Sean Spicer  (2)  
c. Sally Yates  (3)  
d. Robert Mueller  (4)  
e. Don't know  (5)  
26. The tap water in Flint, Michigan is unsafe because it contains too much... 
a. Lead  (1)  
b. Arsenic  (2)  
c. Asbestos  (3)  
d. Mold  (4)  
e. Don't know  (5)  
27. Many conservative Republicans in the House of Representatives are members of which 
of the following groups? 
a. The Tuesday Group  (1)  
b. The Lincoln Group  (2)  
c. The Freedom Caucus  (3)  
d. The Blue Dogs  (4)  
e. Don't know  (5)  
28. Which of the following countries has officially started the process of leaving the 
European Union? 
a. Greece  (1)  
b. Germany  (2)  
c. Hungary  (3)  
d. The United Kingdom  (4)  
e. Don't know  (5)  
29. Who is the current Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives? 
a. Paul Ryan  (1)  
b. Nancy Pelosi  (2)  
c. Jason Chaffetz  (3)  
d. Mitch McConnell  (4)  
e. Don't know  (5)  
30. The national unemployment rate as reported by the government is currently closer to... 
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a. 4%  (1)  
b. 7%  (2)  
c. 12%  (3)  
d. 17%  (4)  
e. Don't know  (5)  
31. How worried are you that the United States will experience a terrorist attack in the near 
future? 
a. Extremely worried  (1)  
b. Very worried  (2)  
c. Slightly worried  (3)  
d. Not at all worried  (4) 
32. How worried are you about a terrorist attack in the area where you live? 
a. Extremely worried  (1)  
b. Very worried  (2)  
c. Moderately worried  (3)  
d. Slightly worried  (4)  
e. Not at all worried  (5)  
33. How likely is it that the United States will experience a terrorist attack from members of 
the following groups in the near future?  
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34. Do you favor or oppose allowing Syrian refugees to come to the United States? 
a. Favor a great deal  (1)  
b. Favor moderately  (2)  
c. Favor a little  (3)  
d. Neither favor nor oppose  (4)  
e. Oppose a little  (5)  
f. Oppose moderately  (6)  
g. Oppose a great deal  (7)  
35. Do you favor or oppose the U.S. sending ground troops to fight Islamic militants, such as 
ISIS, in Iraq and Syria? 
a. Favor a great deal  (1)  
b. Favor moderately  (2)  
c. Favor a little  (3)  
d. Neither favor nor oppose  (4)  
e. Oppose a little  (5)  
f. Oppose moderately  (6)  
g. Oppose a great deal  (7)  
36. Do you favor or oppose the U.S. using drone strikes to target and kill terrorists in other 
countries? 
a. Favor a great deal  (1)  
b. Favor moderately  (2)  
c. Favor a little  (3)  
d. Neither favor nor oppose  (4)  
e. Oppose a little  (5)  
f. Oppose moderately  (6)  
g. Oppose a great deal  (7)  
37. Which of the following statements comes closer to your own views—even if neither is 
exactly right? 
a. Americans need to sacrifice some privacy and freedoms in order to be safe from 
terrorism  (1)  
b. Americans do NOT need to sacrifice privacy and freedoms in order to be safe 
from terrorism  (2)  
38. Which of the following statements comes closer to your own views—even if neither is 
exactly right? 
a. The Islamic religion is more likely than other religions to encourage violence 
among its believers  (0)  
b. The Islamic religion does not encourage violence more than other religions  (1)  
39. Which of the following statements comes closer to your own views—even if neither is 
exactly right? 
a. Jihadists are a good representation of what the majority of Muslims believe  (0)  
b. Jihadists are NOT a good representation of what the majority of Muslims believe  
(1)  
40. During a typical week, how many days do you watch, read, or listen to news on TV, 
radio, printed newspapers, or the Internet, not including sports?  
a. None  (1)  
b. One day  (2)  
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c. Two days  (3)  
d. Three days  (4)  
e. Four days  (5)  
f. Five days  (6)  
g. Six days  (7)  
h. Seven days  (8)  
41. How much attention do you pay to news about national politics on TV, radio, printed 
newspapers, or the Internet? 
a. A great deal  (1)  
b. A lot  (2)  
c. A moderate amount  (3)  
d. A little  (4)  
e. None at all  (5)  
42. During a typical week, how many days do you watch, read, or listen to NON-news on 
TV, radio, printed newspapers, or the Internet? 
a. None  (1)  
b. One day  (2)  
c. Two days  (3)  
d. Three days  (4)  
e. Four days  (5)  
f. Five days  (6)  
g. Six days  (7)  
h. Seven days  (8)  
43. During a typical week, how many days do you engage with social media? 
a. None  (1)  
b. One day  (2)  
c. Two days  (3)  
d. Three days  (4)  
e. Four days  (5)  
f. Five days  (6)  
g. Six days  (7)  
h. Seven days  (8)  
44. During a typical week, how many days do you watch shows that could be described as a 
crime or legal drama, like Law & Order or CSI? 
a. None  (1)  
b. One day  (2)  
c. Two days  (3)  
d. Three days  (4)  
e. Four days  (5)  
f. Five days  (6)  
g. Six days  (7)  
h. Seven days  (8)  
45. During a typical week, how many days do you watch shows that could be described as a 
medical drama, like Grey's Anatomy? 
a. None  (1)  
b. One day  (2)  
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c. Two days  (3)  
d. Three days  (4)  
e. Four days  (5)  
f. Five days  (6)  
g. Six days  (7)  
h. Seven days  (8)  
46. During a typical week, how many days do you watch unscripted dramas, often called 
reality shows? 
a. None  (1)  
b. One day  (2)  
c. Two days  (3)  
d. Three days  (4)  
e. Four days  (5)  
f. Five days  (6)  
g. Six days  (7)  
h. Seven days  (8)  
47. Which genres do you typically choose when you watch shows or films?  
(Choose up to three) 
a. Action/Adventure  (1)  
b. Comedy  (2)  
c. Sci-fi/Fantasy  (3)  
d. Suspense  (4)  
e. Based on comic books  (5)  
f. Animation  (6)  
g. Horror  (7)  
h. Drama  (8)  
i. Romantic comedy  (9)  
j. Kids & family  (10)  
k. Romance  (11)  
l. Re-releases  (12)  
m. Musicals  (13)  
n. Art house/Indie  (14)  
48. Which of the following statements comes closer to your own views—even if neither is 
exactly right? 
a. I prefer to watch shows as they air on television—watching one episode per week.  
(1)  
b. I prefer to wait and binge-watch shows after they have aired—watching many 
episodes in one sitting.  (2) 
49. How much have you watched of the show 24: Legacy (Fox)? 
a. Never watched  (1)  
b. 1-3 episodes  (2)  
c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season  (3)  
d. At least 1 season  (4)  
50. How much have you watched of the show Allegiance (NBC)? 
a. Never watched  (1)  
b. 1-3 episodes  (2)  
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c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season  (3)  
d. At least 1 season  (4) 
51. How much have you watched of the show American Crime (ABC)? 
a. Never watched  (1)  
b. 1-3 episodes  (2)  
c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season  (3)  
d. At least 1 season  (4) 
52. How much have you watched of the show Bodyguard (Netflix)? 
a. Never watched  (1)  
b. 1-3 episodes  (2)  
c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season  (3)  
d. At least 1 season  (4) 
53. How much have you watched of the show Containment (The CW)? 
a. Never watched  (1)  
b. 1-3 episodes  (2)  
c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season  (3)  
d. At least 1 season  (4) 
54. How much have you watched of the show Crisis (NBC)? 
a. Never watched  (1)  
b. 1-3 episodes  (2)  
c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season  (3)  
d. At least 1 season  (4) 
55. How much have you watched of the show Designated Survivor (ABC)? 
a. Never watched  (1)  
b. 1-3 episodes  (2)  
c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season  (3)  
d. At least 1 season  (4) 
56. How much have you watched of the show FBI (CBS)? 
a. Never watched  (1)  
b. 1-3 episodes  (2)  
c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season  (3)  
d. At least 1 season  (4) 
57. How much have you watched of the show Gang Related (Fox)? 
a. Never watched  (1)  
b. 1-3 episodes  (2)  
c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season  (3)  
d. At least 1 season  (4) 
58. How much have you watched of the show Homeland (HBO)? 
a. Never watched  (1)  
b. 1-3 episodes  (2)  
c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season  (3)  
d. At least 1 season  (4) 
59. How much have you watched of the show House of Cards (Netflix)? 
a. Never watched  (1)  
b. 1-3 episodes  (2)  
c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season  (3)  
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d. At least 1 season  (4) 
60. How much have you watched of the show Hostages (CBS)? 
a. Never watched  (1)  
b. 1-3 episodes  (2)  
c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season  (3)  
d. At least 1 season  (4) 
61. How much have you watched of the show Jack Ryan (Amazon Prime)? 
a. Never watched  (1)  
b. 1-3 episodes  (2)  
c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season  (3)  
d. At least 1 season  (4) 
62. How much have you watched of the show Jane the Virgin (The CW)? 
a. Never watched  (1)  
b. 1-3 episodes  (2)  
c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season  (3)  
d. At least 1 season  (4) 
63. How much have you watched of the show Madam Secretary (CBS)? 
a. Never watched  (1)  
b. 1-3 episodes  (2)  
c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season  (3)  
d. At least 1 season  (4) 
64. How much have you watched of the show Mr. Robot (USA)? 
a. Never watched  (1)  
b. 1-3 episodes  (2)  
c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season  (3)  
d. At least 1 season  (4) 
65. How much have you watched of the show Odyssey (NBC)? 
a. Never watched  (1)  
b. 1-3 episodes  (2)  
c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season  (3)  
d. At least 1 season  (4) 
66. How much have you watched of the show Orange is the New Black (Netflix)? 
a. Never watched  (1)  
b. 1-3 episodes  (2)  
c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season  (3)  
d. At least 1 season  (4) 
67. How much have you watched of the show Ozark (Netflix)? 
a. Never watched  (1)  
b. 1-3 episodes  (2)  
c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season  (3)  
d. At least 1 season  (4) 
68. How much have you watched of the show Power (Starz)? 
a. Never watched  (1)  
b. 1-3 episodes  (2)  
c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season  (3)  
d. At least 1 season  (4) 
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69. How much have you watched of the show Quantico (ABC)? 
a. Never watched  (1)  
b. 1-3 episodes  (2)  
c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season  (3)  
d. At least 1 season  (4) 
70. How much have you watched of the show Scandal (ABC)? 
a. Never watched  (1)  
b. 1-3 episodes  (2)  
c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season  (3)  
d. At least 1 season  (4) 
71. How much have you watched of the show Seven Seconds (Netflix)? 
a. Never watched  (1)  
b. 1-3 episodes  (2)  
c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season  (3)  
d. At least 1 season  (4) 
72. How much have you watched of the show Shades of Blue (NBC)? 
a. Never watched  (1)  
b. 1-3 episodes  (2)  
c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season  (3)  
d. At least 1 season  (4) 
73. How much have you watched of the show Shots Fired (Fox)? 
a. Never watched  (1)  
b. 1-3 episodes  (2)  
c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season  (3)  
d. At least 1 season  (4) 
74. How much have you watched of the show State of Affairs (NBC)? 
a. Never watched  (1)  
b. 1-3 episodes  (2)  
c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season  (3)  
d. At least 1 season  (4) 
75. How much have you watched of the show Taken (NBC)? 
a. Never watched  (1)  
b. 1-3 episodes  (2)  
c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season  (3)  
d. At least 1 season  (4) 
76. How much have you watched of the show The Americans (FX)? 
a. Never watched  (1)  
b. 1-3 episodes  (2)  
c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season  (3)  
d. At least 1 season  (4) 
77. How much have you watched of the show The Blacklist (NBC)? 
a. Never watched  (1)  
b. 1-3 episodes  (2)  
c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season  (3)  
d. At least 1 season  (4) 
78. How much have you watched of the show The Blacklist: Redemption (NBC)? 
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a. Never watched  (1)  
b. 1-3 episodes  (2)  
c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season  (3)  
d. At least 1 season  (4) 
79. How much have you watched of the show The Crossing (ABC)? 
a. Never watched  (1)  
b. 1-3 episodes  (2)  
c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season  (3)  
d. At least 1 season  (4) 
80. How much have you watched of the show The Informer (Amazon Prime)? 
a. Never watched  (1)  
b. 1-3 episodes  (2)  
c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season  (3)  
d. At least 1 season  (4) 
81. How much have you watched of the show The Night Of (HBO)? 
a. Never watched  (1)  
b. 1-3 episodes  (2)  
c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season  (3)  
d. At least 1 season  (4) 
82. How much have you watched of the show The Passage (Fox)? 
a. Never watched  (1)  
b. 1-3 episodes  (2)  
c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season  (3)  
d. At least 1 season  (4) 
83. How much have you watched of the show Valor (The CW)? 
a. Never watched  (1)  
b. 1-3 episodes  (2)  
c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season  (3)  
d. At least 1 season  (4) 
 
Thank you for participating! Remember to sign up for PART 2 of this study in SONA. Once 
you sign up, you will receive an email by Wednesday 2/12 with further instructions about your 
participation.   
Please continue to submit your survey. 
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Post-treatment Survey: Control Groups 
1. Please provide your 5-digit SONA ID number: 
____________________________________________________________ 
2. How likely are you to vote in the 2020 election? 
a. Extremely likely  (1)  
b. Moderately likely  (2)  
c. Slightly likely  (3)  
d. Neither likely nor unlikely  (4)  
e. Slightly unlikely  (5)  
f. Moderately unlikely  (6)  
g. Extremely unlikely  (7)  
h. I am not eligible to vote in the 2020 election.  (8)  
3. Generally speaking, do you consider yourself to be a(n): 
a. Democrat  (1)  
b. Republican  (2)  
c. Independent  (3)  
d. Libertarian  (4)  
e. Other  (5)  
f. Don't know/Undecided  (6)  
4. How important is your political party affiliation to you? 
a. Extremely important  (1)  
b. Very important  (2)  
c. Moderately important  (3)  
d. Slightly important  (4)  
e. Not at all important  (5)  
f. Don't know/Undecided  (6)  
5. How often do you pay attention to what's going on in government and politics? 
a. Always  (1)  
b. Most of the time  (2)  
c. About half the time  (6)  
d. Some of the time  (7)  
e. Never  (8)  
6. What do you consider to be the MOST important problem facing America today?  
(Choose one) 
a. Abortion  (1)  
b. National debt  (2)  
c. Environment and climate change  (3)  
d. Gay rights  (4)  
e. Gun control  (5)  
f. Health care  (6)  
g. Immigration  (7)  
h. Poverty  (8)  
i. Income inequality  (9)  
j. Unemployment  (10)  
k. Economic growth  (11)  
l. Military strength  (12)  
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m. Morality and religion in society  (13)  
n. Racism  (14)  
o. Social security  (15)  
p. Taxes  (16)  
q. Women's rights  (17)  
r. Crime  (18)  
s. Foreign policy  (19)  
t. Education  (20)  
u. Terrorism and homeland security  (21)  
7. How worried are you that the United States will experience a terrorist attack in the near 
future? 
a. Extremely worried  (1)  
b. Very worried  (2)  
c. Slightly worried  (3)  
d. Not at all worried  (4)  
8. How worried are you about a terrorist attack in the area where you live? 
a. Extremely worried  (1)  
b. Very worried  (2)  
c. Moderately worried  (3)  
d. Slightly worried  (4)  
e. Not at all worried  (5)  
9. How likely is it that the United States will experience a terrorist attack from members of 
the following groups in the near future?  
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10. Do you favor or oppose allowing Syrian refugees to come to the United States? 
a. Favor a great deal  (1)  
b. Favor moderately  (2)  
c. Favor a little  (3)  
d. Neither favor nor oppose  (4)  
e. Oppose a little  (5)  
f. Oppose moderately  (6)  
g. Oppose a great deal  (7)  
11. Do you favor or oppose the U.S. sending ground troops to fight Islamic militants, such as 
ISIS, in Iraq and Syria? 
a. Favor a great deal  (1)  
b. Favor moderately  (2)  
c. Favor a little  (3)  
d. Neither favor nor oppose  (4)  
e. Oppose a little  (5)  
f. Oppose moderately  (6)  
g. Oppose a great deal  (7)  
12. Do you favor or oppose the U.S. using drone strikes to target and kill terrorists in other 
countries? 
a. Favor a great deal  (1)  
b. Favor moderately  (2)  
c. Favor a little  (3)  
d. Neither favor nor oppose  (4)  
e. Oppose a little  (5)  
f. Oppose moderately  (6)  
g. Oppose a great deal  (7)  
13. Which of the following statements comes closer to your own views—even if neither is 
exactly right? 
a. Americans need to sacrifice some privacy and freedoms in order to be safe from 
terrorism  (1)  
b. Americans do NOT need to sacrifice privacy and freedoms in order to be safe 
from terrorism  (2)  
14. Which of the following statements comes closer to your own views—even if neither is 
exactly right? 
a. The Islamic religion is more likely than other religions to encourage violence 
among its believers  (1)  
b. The Islamic religion does not encourage violence more than other religions  (2)  
15. Which of the following statements comes closer to your own views—even if neither is 
exactly right? 
a. Jihadists are a good representation of what the majority of Muslims believe  (2)  
b. Jihadists are NOT a good representation of what the majority of Muslims believe  
(3)  
16. How much would you say you agree with the following statement? 
I trust the federal government to run the United States successfully. 
a. Strongly agree  (1)  
b. Agree  (2)  
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c. Somewhat agree  (3)  
d. Neither agree nor disagree  (4)  
e. Somewhat disagree  (5)  
f. Disagree  (6)  
g. Strongly disagree  (7)  
17. How much would you say you trust the federal government? 
a. Always  (1)  
b. Most of the time  (8)  
c. Some of the time  (9)  
d. Rarely  (2)  
e. Never  (3)  
18. How much would you say you trust Congress? 
a. Always  (1)  
b. Most of the time  (8)  
c. Some of the time  (9)  
d. Rarely  (2)  
e. Never  (3)  
19. How much would you say you trust the court system? 
a. Always  (1)  
b. Most of the time  (8)  
c. Some of the time  (9)  
d. Rarely  (2)  
e. Never  (3)  
20. How much would you say you trust law enforcement? 
a. Always  (1)  
b. Most of the time  (8)  
c. Some of the time  (9)  
d. Rarely  (2)  
e. Never  (3)  
21. How much would you say you trust the executive branch? 
a. Always  (1)  
b. Most of the time  (8)  
c. Some of the time  (9)  
d. Rarely  (2)  
e. Never  (3)  
22. Do you approve or disapprove of the way Donald Trump is handling his job as President? 
a. Approve  (1)  
b. Disapprove  (2)  
c. Don't know/No opinion  (3)  
23. Do you approve very strongly, or not so strongly? 
a. Very strongly  (1)  
b. Not so strongly  (2)  
c. Don't know  (3)  
24. All in all, are you satisfied or dissatisfied with the way things are going in this country 
today? 
a. Satisfied  (1)  
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b. Dissatisfied  (2)  
c. Don't know/No opinion  (3)  
25. Would you say your overall opinion of the Republican Party is very favorable, mostly 
favorable, mostly UNfavorable, or very unfavorable? 
a. Very favorable  (1)  
b. Mostly favorable  (2)  
c. Mostly Unfavorable  (3)  
d. Very unfavorable  (4)  
e. Can't rate/No opinion  (5)  
26. Would you say your overall opinion of the Democratic Party is very favorable, mostly 
favorable, mostly UNfavorable, or very unfavorable? 
a. Very favorable  (1)  
b. Mostly favorable  (2)  
c. Mostly Unfavorable  (3)  
d. Very unfavorable  (4)  
e. Can't rate/No opinion  (5)  
27. If you had to choose, would you rather have a smaller government providing fewer 
services, or a bigger government providing more services? 
a. Smaller government, fewer services  (1)  
b. Bigger government, more services  (2)  
c. Depends  (3)  
d. Don't know/No opinion  (4)  
28. Which of the following statements comes closer to your own views—even if neither is 
exactly right? 
a. Government is almost always wasteful and inefficient  (1)  
b. Government often does a better job than people give it credit for  (2)  
29. Which of the following statements comes closer to your own views—even if neither is 
exactly right? 
a. Government regulation of business is necessary to protect the public interest  (1)  
b. Government regulation of business usually does more harm than good  (2)  
30. While you were watching the show, how interested did you feel about what was going 
on? 
a. Very interested  (1)  
b. Somewhat interested  (2)  
c. A little interested  (3)  
d. Not at all interested  (4)  
31. Q196 How absorbed/"sucked in" did you feel by the show? 
a. Very absorbed  (1)  
b. Somewhat absorbed  (2)  
c. A little absorbed  (3)  
d. Not at all absorbed  (4)  
32. Did you feel like the show was realistic? 
a. Very realistic  (1)  
b. Somewhat realistic  (2)  
c. A little realistic  (3)  
d. Not at all realistic  (4)  
254 
33. Were there any characters that you felt you identified with while watching the show? 
This could mean you personally identify with the character, you want to be more like the 
character, you could see yourself being friends with the character, or you just generally 
like the character. 
a. Yes, I identified with at least one character  (1)  
b. No, I didn't identify with any of the characters  (3)  
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Post-treatment Survey: Treatment Groups 
1. Please provide your 5-digit SONA ID number: 
____________________________________________________________ 
2. How likely are you to vote in the 2020 election? 
a. Extremely likely  (1)  
b. Moderately likely  (2)  
c. Slightly likely  (3)  
d. Neither likely nor unlikely  (4)  
e. Slightly unlikely  (5)  
f. Moderately unlikely  (6)  
g. Extremely unlikely  (7)  
h. I am not eligible to vote in the 2020 election.  (8)  
3. Generally speaking, do you consider yourself to be a(n): 
a. Democrat  (1)  
b. Republican  (2)  
c. Independent  (3)  
d. Libertarian  (4)  
e. Other  (5)  
f. Don't know/Undecided  (6)  
4. How important is your political party affiliation to you? 
a. Extremely important  (1)  
b. Very important  (2)  
c. Moderately important  (3)  
d. Slightly important  (4)  
e. Not at all important  (5)  
f. Don't know/Undecided  (6)  
5. How often do you pay attention to what's going on in government and politics? 
a. Always  (1)  
b. Most of the time  (2)  
c. About half the time  (6)  
d. Some of the time  (7)  
e. Never  (8)  
6. What do you consider to be the MOST important problem facing America today?  
(Choose one) 
a. Abortion  (1)  
b. National debt  (2)  
c. Environment and climate change  (3)  
d. Gay rights  (4)  
e. Gun control  (5)  
f. Health care  (6)  
g. Immigration  (7)  
h. Poverty  (8)  
i. Income inequality  (9)  
j. Unemployment  (10)  
k. Economic growth  (11)  
l. Military strength  (12)  
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m. Morality and religion in society  (13)  
n. Racism  (14)  
o. Social security  (15)  
p. Taxes  (16)  
q. Women's rights  (17)  
r. Crime  (18)  
s. Foreign policy  (19)  
t. Education  (20)  
u. Terrorism and homeland security  (21)  
7. How worried are you that the United States will experience a terrorist attack in the near 
future? 
a. Extremely worried  (1)  
b. Very worried  (2)  
c. Slightly worried  (3)  
d. Not at all worried  (4)  
8. How worried are you about a terrorist attack in the area where you live? 
a. Extremely worried  (1)  
b. Very worried  (2)  
c. Moderately worried  (3)  
d. Slightly worried  (4)  
e. Not at all worried  (5)  
9. How likely is it that the United States will experience a terrorist attack from members of 


























(1)  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
Whites 
(2)  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
Muslims 
(3)  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
Christian









o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
Russians 
(7)  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
Chinese 




10. Do you favor or oppose allowing Syrian refugees to come to the United States? 
a. Favor a great deal  (1)  
b. Favor moderately  (2)  
c. Favor a little  (3)  
d. Neither favor nor oppose  (4)  
e. Oppose a little  (5)  
f. Oppose moderately  (6)  
g. Oppose a great deal  (7)  
11. Do you favor or oppose the U.S. sending ground troops to fight Islamic militants, such as 
ISIS, in Iraq and Syria? 
a. Favor a great deal  (1)  
b. Favor moderately  (2)  
c. Favor a little  (3)  
d. Neither favor nor oppose  (4)  
e. Oppose a little  (5)  
f. Oppose moderately  (6)  
g. Oppose a great deal  (7)  
12. Do you favor or oppose the U.S. using drone strikes to target and kill terrorists in other 
countries? 
a. Favor a great deal  (1)  
b. Favor moderately  (2)  
c. Favor a little  (3)  
d. Neither favor nor oppose  (4)  
e. Oppose a little  (5)  
f. Oppose moderately  (6)  
g. Oppose a great deal  (7)  
13. Which of the following statements comes closer to your own views—even if neither is 
exactly right? 
a. Americans need to sacrifice some privacy and freedoms in order to be safe from 
terrorism  (1)  
b. Americans do NOT need to sacrifice privacy and freedoms in order to be safe 
from terrorism  (2)  
14. Which of the following statements comes closer to your own views—even if neither is 
exactly right? 
a. The Islamic religion is more likely than other religions to encourage violence 
among its believers  (1)  
b. The Islamic religion does not encourage violence more than other religions  (2)  
15. Which of the following statements comes closer to your own views—even if neither is 
exactly right? 
a. Jihadists are a good representation of what the majority of Muslims believe  (2)  
b. Jihadists are NOT a good representation of what the majority of Muslims believe  
(3)  
16. How much would you say you agree with the following statement? 
I trust the federal government to run the United States successfully. 
a. Strongly agree  (1)  
b. Agree  (2)  
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c. Somewhat agree  (3)  
d. Neither agree nor disagree  (4)  
e. Somewhat disagree  (5)  
f. Disagree  (6)  
g. Strongly disagree  (7)  
17. How much would you say you trust the federal government? 
a. Always  (1)  
b. Most of the time  (8)  
c. Some of the time  (9)  
d. Rarely  (2)  
e. Never  (3)  
18. How much would you say you trust Congress? 
a. Always  (1)  
b. Most of the time  (8)  
c. Some of the time  (9)  
d. Rarely  (2)  
e. Never  (3)  
19. How much would you say you trust the court system? 
a. Always  (1)  
b. Most of the time  (8)  
c. Some of the time  (9)  
d. Rarely  (2)  
e. Never  (3)  
20. How much would you say you trust law enforcement? 
a. Always  (1)  
b. Most of the time  (8)  
c. Some of the time  (9)  
d. Rarely  (2)  
e. Never  (3)  
21. How much would you say you trust the executive branch? 
a. Always  (1)  
b. Most of the time  (8)  
c. Some of the time  (9)  
d. Rarely  (2)  
e. Never  (3)  
22. Do you approve or disapprove of the way Donald Trump is handling his job as President? 
a. Approve  (1)  
b. Disapprove  (2)  
c. Don't know/No opinion  (3)  
23. Do you approve very strongly, or not so strongly? 
a. Very strongly  (1)  
b. Not so strongly  (2)  
c. Don't know  (3)  
24. All in all, are you satisfied or dissatisfied with the way things are going in this country 
today? 
a. Satisfied  (1)  
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b. Dissatisfied  (2)  
c. Don't know/No opinion  (3)  
25. Would you say your overall opinion of the Republican Party is very favorable, mostly 
favorable, mostly UNfavorable, or very unfavorable? 
f. Very favorable  (1)  
g. Mostly favorable  (2)  
h. Mostly Unfavorable  (3)  
i. Very unfavorable  (4)  
j. Can't rate/No opinion  (5)  
26. Would you say your overall opinion of the Democratic Party is very favorable, mostly 
favorable, mostly UNfavorable, or very unfavorable? 
a. Very favorable  (1)  
b. Mostly favorable  (2)  
c. Mostly Unfavorable  (3)  
d. Very unfavorable  (4)  
e. Can't rate/No opinion  (5)  
27. If you had to choose, would you rather have a smaller government providing fewer 
services, or a bigger government providing more services? 
a. Smaller government, fewer services  (1)  
b. Bigger government, more services  (2)  
c. Depends  (3)  
d. Don't know/No opinion  (4)  
28. Which of the following statements comes closer to your own views—even if neither is 
exactly right? 
a. Government is almost always wasteful and inefficient  (1)  
b. Government often does a better job than people give it credit for  (2)  
29. Which of the following statements comes closer to your own views—even if neither is 
exactly right? 
a. Government regulation of business is necessary to protect the public interest  (1)  
b. Government regulation of business usually does more harm than good  (2)  
30. While you were watching the show, how interested did you feel about what was going 
on? 
a. Very interested  (1)  
b. Somewhat interested  (2)  
c. A little interested  (3)  
d. Not at all interested  (4)  
31. Q196 How absorbed/"sucked in" did you feel by the show? 
a. Very absorbed  (1)  
b. Somewhat absorbed  (2)  
c. A little absorbed  (3)  
d. Not at all absorbed  (4)  
32. Did you feel like the show was realistic? 
a. Very realistic  (1)  
b. Somewhat realistic  (2)  
c. A little realistic  (3)  
d. Not at all realistic  (4)  
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33. Abbas al-Fathi 
a. I personally identify with this character  (1)  
b. I want to be more like this character  (2)  
c. I could be friends with this character  (3)  
d. I do NOT like this character  (4)  
e. No opinion/Don't know  (5)  
34. Ali bin Suleiman 
a. I personally identify with this character  (1)  
b. I want to be more like this character  (2)  
c. I could be friends with this character  (3)  
d. I do NOT like this character  (4)  
e. No opinion/Don't know  (5)  
35. Dr. Cathy Mueller 
a. I personally identify with this character  (1)  
b. I want to be more like this character  (2)  
c. I could be friends with this character  (3)  
d. I do NOT like this character  (4)  
e. No opinion/Don't know  (5)  
36. Hanin 
a. I personally identify with this character  (1)  
b. I want to be more like this character  (2)  
c. I could be friends with this character  (3)  
d. I do NOT like this character  (4)  
e. No opinion/Don't know  (5)  
37. Jack Ryan 
a. I personally identify with this character  (1)  
b. I want to be more like this character  (2)  
c. I could be friends with this character  (3)  
d. I do NOT like this character  (4)  
e. No opinion/Don't know  (5)  
38. James Greer 
a. I personally identify with this character  (1)  
b. I want to be more like this character  (2)  
c. I could be friends with this character  (3)  
d. I do NOT like this character  (4)  
e. No opinion/Don't know  (5)  
39. Victor Polizzi 
a. I personally identify with this character  (1)  
b. I want to be more like this character  (2)  
c. I could be friends with this character  (3)  
d. I do NOT like this character  (4)  
e. No opinion/Don't know  (5)  
40. Sandrine Arnaud 
a. I personally identify with this character  (1)  
b. I want to be more like this character  (2)  
c. I could be friends with this character  (3)  
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d. I do NOT like this character  (4)  
e. No opinion/Don't know  (5)  
41. Mousa bin Suleiman 
a. I I personally identify with this character  (1)  
b. I want to be more like this character  (2)  
c. I could be friends with this character  (3)  
d. I do NOT like this character  (4)  
e. No opinion/Don't know  (5)  
42. Yazid 
a. I personally identify with this character  (1)  
b. I want to be more like this character  (2)  
c. I could be friends with this character  (3)  
d. I do NOT like this character  (4)  
e. No opinion/Don't know  (5)  
43. Were there any other characters that you felt you identified with other than those already 
mentioned? 
a. Yes  (1)  





1. Please provide your 5-digit SONA ID number: 
__________________________________________________________ 
2. How likely are you to vote in the 2020 election? 
a. Extremely likely  (1)  
b. Moderately likely  (2)  
c. Slightly likely  (3)  
d. Neither likely nor unlikely  (4)  
e. Slightly unlikely  (5)  
f. Moderately unlikely  (6)  
g. Extremely unlikely  (7)  
h. I am not eligible to vote in the 2020 election.  (8)  
3. Generally speaking, do you consider yourself to be a(n): 
a. Democrat  (1)  
b. Republican  (2)  
c. Independent  (3)  
d. Libertarian  (4)  
e. Other  (5)  
f. Don't know/Undecided  (6)  
4. How important is your political party affiliation to you? 
a. Extremely important  (1)  
b. Very important  (2)  
c. Moderately important  (3)  
d. Slightly important  (4)  
e. Not at all important  (5)  
f. Don't know/Undecided  (6)  
5. How often do you pay attention to what's going on in government and politics? 
a. Always  (1)  
b. Most of the time  (2)  
c. About half the time  (6)  
d. Some of the time  (7)  
e. Never  (8)  
6. What do you consider to be the MOST important problem facing America today?  
(Choose one) 
a. Abortion  (1)  
b. National debt  (2)  
c. Environment and climate change  (3)  
d. Gay rights  (4)  
e. Gun control  (5)  
f. Health care  (6)  
g. Immigration  (7)  
h. Poverty  (8)  
i. Income inequality  (9)  
j. Unemployment  (10)  
k. Economic growth  (11)  
l. Military strength  (12)  
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m. Morality and religion in society  (13)  
n. Racism  (14)  
o. Social security  (15)  
p. Taxes  (16)  
q. Women's rights  (17)  
r. Crime  (18)  
s. Foreign policy  (19)  
t. Education  (20)  
u. Terrorism and homeland security  (21)  
7. How worried are you that the United States will experience a terrorist attack in the near 
future? 
a. Extremely worried  (1)  
b. Very worried  (2)  
c. Slightly worried  (3)  
d. Not at all worried  (4)  
8. How worried are you about a terrorist attack in the area where you live? 
a. Extremely worried  (1)  
b. Very worried  (2)  
c. Moderately worried  (3)  
d. Slightly worried  (4)  
e. Not at all worried  (5)  
9. How likely is it that the United States will experience a terrorist attack from members of 
the following groups in the near future? 


























(1)  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
Whites 
(2)  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
Muslims 
(3)  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
Christian









o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
Russians 
(7)  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
Chinese 




10. Do you favor or oppose allowing Syrian refugees to come to the United States? 
a. Favor a great deal  (1)  
b. Favor moderately  (2)  
c. Favor a little  (3)  
d. Neither favor nor oppose  (4)  
e. Oppose a little  (5)  
f. Oppose moderately  (6)  
g. Oppose a great deal  (7)  
11. Do you favor or oppose the U.S. sending ground troops to fight Islamic militants, such as 
ISIS, in Iraq and Syria? 
a. Favor a great deal  (1)  
b. Favor moderately  (2)  
c. Favor a little  (3)  
d. Neither favor nor oppose  (4)  
e. Oppose a little  (5)  
f. Oppose moderately  (6)  
g. Oppose a great deal  (7)  
12. Do you favor or oppose the U.S. using drone strikes to target and kill terrorists in other 
countries? 
a. Favor a great deal  (1)  
b. Favor moderately  (2)  
c. Favor a little  (3)  
d. Neither favor nor oppose  (4)  
e. Oppose a little  (5)  
f. Oppose moderately  (6)  
g. Oppose a great deal  (7)  
13. Which of the following statements comes closer to your own views—even if neither is 
exactly right? 
a. Americans need to sacrifice some privacy and freedoms in order to be safe from 
terrorism  (1)  
b. Americans do NOT need to sacrifice privacy and freedoms in order to be safe 
from terrorism  (2)  
14. Which of the following statements comes closer to your own views—even if neither is 
exactly right? 
a. The Islamic religion is more likely than other religions to encourage violence 
among its believers  (1)  
b. The Islamic religion does not encourage violence more than other religions  (2)  
15. Which of the following statements comes closer to your own views—even if neither is 
exactly right? 
a. Jihadists are a good representation of what the majority of Muslims believe  (2)  
b. Jihadists are NOT a good representation of what the majority of Muslims believe  
(3)  
16. How much would you say you agree with the following statement? 
I trust the federal government to run the United States successfully. 
a. Strongly agree  (1)  
b. Agree  (2)  
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c. Somewhat agree  (3)  
d. Neither agree nor disagree  (4)  
e. Somewhat disagree  (5)  
f. Disagree  (6)  
g. Strongly disagree  (7)  
17. How much would you say you trust the federal government? 
a. Always  (1)  
b. Most of the time  (8)  
c. Some of the time  (9)  
d. Rarely  (2)  
e. Never  (3)  
18. How much would you say you trust Congress? 
a. Always  (1)  
b. Most of the time  (8)  
c. Some of the time  (9)  
d. Rarely  (2)  
e. Never  (3)  
19. How much would you say you trust the court system? 
a. Always  (1)  
b. Most of the time  (8)  
c. Some of the time  (9)  
d. Rarely  (2)  
e. Never  (3)  
20. How much would you say you trust law enforcement? 
a. Always  (1)  
b. Most of the time  (8)  
c. Some of the time  (9)  
d. Rarely  (2)  
e. Never  (3)  
21. How much would you say you trust the executive branch? 
a. Always  (1)  
b. Most of the time  (8)  
c. Some of the time  (9)  
d. Rarely  (2)  
e. Never  (3)  
22. Do you approve or disapprove of the way Donald Trump is handling his job as President? 
a. Approve  (1)  
b. Disapprove  (2)  
c. Don't know/No opinion  (3)  
23. Do you approve very strongly, or not so strongly? 
a. Very strongly  (1)  
b. Not so strongly  (2)  
c. Don't know  (3)  
24. All in all, are you satisfied or dissatisfied with the way things are going in this country 
today? 
a. Satisfied  (1)  
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b. Dissatisfied  (2)  
c. Don't know/No opinion  (3)  
25. Would you say your overall opinion of the Republican Party is very favorable, mostly 
favorable, mostly UNfavorable, or very unfavorable? 
a. Very favorable  (1)  
b. Mostly favorable  (2)  
c. Mostly Unfavorable  (3)  
d. Very unfavorable  (4)  
e. Can't rate/No opinion  (5)  
26. Would you say your overall opinion of the Democratic Party is very favorable, mostly 
favorable, mostly UNfavorable, or very unfavorable? 
a. Very favorable  (1)  
b. Mostly favorable  (2)  
c. Mostly Unfavorable  (3)  
d. Very unfavorable  (4)  
e. Can't rate/No opinion  (5)  
27. If you had to choose, would you rather have a smaller government providing fewer 
services, or a bigger government providing more services? 
a. Smaller government, fewer services  (1)  
b. Bigger government, more services  (2)  
c. Depends  (3)  
d. Don't know/No opinion  (4)  
28. Which of the following statements comes closer to your own views—even if neither is 
exactly right? 
a. Government is almost always wasteful and inefficient  (1)  
b. Government often does a better job than people give it credit for  (2)  
29. Which of the following statements comes closer to your own views—even if neither is 
exactly right? 
a. Government regulation of business is necessary to protect the public interest  (1)  
b. Government regulation of business usually does more harm than good  (2)  
30. Which show were you assigned to watch in this study? 
a. Jack Ryan (Amazon)  (1)  
b. This is Us (NBC)  (2)  
31. Had you seen that show BEFORE this study? 
a. Yes  (1)  
b. No  (2)  
32. Did you watch any more episodes of that show AFTER this study?  
Remember, this survey is anonymous, and your honesty is important. 
a. Yes  (1)  
b. No  (2)  
33. How much have you watched of the show Jack Ryan in total? 
a. Never watched  (1)  
b. 1-3 episodes  (7)  
c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season  (8)  
d. At least 1 season  (9)  
34. How much have you watched of the show This is Us in total? 
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a. Never watched  (1)  
b. 1-3 episodes  (7)  
c. At least 3 episodes, but not 1 season  (8)  
d. At least 1 season  (9)  
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Appendix C: Additional Models 
Appendix C.1: Chapter 5 Models 
The following models compare raw data from specific questions measuring IVs. 
 Believe Islam More Likely to Promote Violence than Other Religions 
 Coefficient Standard Error z-score p-value 
MT Stereotype 0.003 0.002 1.54 0.124 
White 0.047 0.032 1.46 0.144 
Female -0.081 0.029 -2.74 0.006 
Education -0.001 0.010 -0.09 0.925 
Pol 
ID/Republican 
0.117 0.018 6.57 0.000 
Pol Knowledge -0.017 0.006 -2.88 0.004 
Travel Outside 
US 
0.047 0.030 1.57 0.117 
constant 0.403 0.079 5.12 0.000 
 
 
 Believe Islam More Likely to Promote Violence than Other Religions 
 Coefficient Standard Error z-score p-value 
MT Stereotype 0.012 0.008 1.52 0.128 
White 0.198 0.142 1.40 0.162 
Female -0.348 0.129 -2.71 0.007 
Education -0.002 0.045 -0.04 0.968 
Pol ID/Republican 0.502 0.079 6.38 0.000 
Pol Knowledge -0.075 0.026 -2.86 0.004 
Travel Outside US 0.202 0.132 1.53 0.127 
constant -0.415 0.344 -1.21 0.227 
Log likelihood = -697.27569 
 
 Believe a Muslim Terrorist Attack on the US is Likely in the Near Future 
 Coefficient Standard Error z-score p-value 
MT Stereotype 0.015 0.007 2.26 0.024 
White -0.063 0.121 -0.52 0.604 
Female 0.045 0.110 0.41 0.684 
Education -0.113 0.038 -2.94 0.003 
Pol ID/Republican 0.211 0.066 3.18 0.002 
Pol Knowledge 0.022 0.022 1.01 0.313 
Travel Outside US -0.143 0.111 -1.29 0.196 





 Public Policy Beliefs 




MT Stereotype 0.058 (0.006)*** 0.037 (0.006)*** 
White -0.115 (-0.113) -0.441 (0.113)*** 
Female 0.129 (0.103) 0.214 (0.103)* 
Education -0.032 (0.036) 0.135 (0.036)*** 
Pol 
ID/Republican 
0.152 (0.062)* -0.503 (0.062)*** 
Pol Knowledge -0.028 (0.021) 0.011 (0.021) 
Travel Outside 
US 
0.268 (0.104)** 0.209 (0.103)* 
Constant -0.257 (0.277) 0.577 (0.275)* 
Standard errors in parenthesis. *p-value < 0.05, **p-value < 0.01, ***p-value < 0.001 
 
 Level of Discrimination in US Against Muslims 
 Coefficient Std. Error z-score p-value 
MT Stereotype -0.015 0.004 -3.49 0.001 
White -0.092 0.078 -1.18 0.239 
Female 0.096 0.071 1.35 0.178 
Education -0.010 0.025 -0.41 0.685 
Pol 
ID/Republican 
-0.312 0.043 -7.28 0.000 
Pol Knowledge 0.041 0.014 2.83 0.005 
Travel Outside 
US 
-0.112 0.071 -1.57 0.116 
Constant 3.06 0.191 16.05 0.000 
 
 Social Perceptions Policy Attitudes 
 Terrorist Attack Discrimination Send Troops Accept Refugees 
MT Antagonist 0.022 (0.010)* -0.025 (0.007)*** 0.085 (0.010)*** 0.055 (0.009)*** 
White -0.058 (0.121) -0.105 (0.078) -0.099 (0.114) -0.429 (0.113)*** 
Female 0.045 (0.110) 0.092 (0.071) 0.131 (0.103) 0.216 (0.103)* 
Education -0.113 (0.038)* -0.009 (0.025) -0.032 (0.036) 0.135 (0.036)*** 
Pol 
ID/Republican 
0.210 (0.066)** -0.309 (0.043)*** 0.150 (0.062)* -0.504 (0.062)*** 
Pol Knowledge 0.024 (0.022) 0.038 (0.014)** -0.023 (0.021) 0.014 (0.021) 
Travel Outside 
US 
-0.144 (0.111) -0.105 (0.071) 0.268 (0.104)** 0.208 (0.103)* 
Constant 0.503 (0.294) 3.062 (0.190)*** -0.214 (0.277) 0.601 (0.275)* 





 Likely Muslim 
Terror Attack 
 Likely Muslim 
Terror Attack 
Muslim Protagonist 0.034 (0.017)* No Muslim Protagonist 0.023 (0.01)* 
White -0.07 (0.121) White -0.069 (0.12) 
Female 0.031 (0.109) Female 0.049 (0.11) 
Education -0.109 (0.038)** Education -0.113 (0.039)** 
Pol ID/Republican 0.214 (0.066)*** Pol ID/Republican 0.213 (0.066)*** 
Pol Knowledge 0.021 (0.022) Pol Knowledge 0.022 (0.022) 
Travel Outside US -0.134 (0.11) Travel Outside US -0.139 (0.11) 
Constant 0.513 (0.294) Constant 0.496 (0.294) 
Standard errors in parenthesis. *p-value < 0.05, **p-value < 0.01, ***p-value < 0.001 
 
Regression 1 Discrimination 
Against Muslims 




-0.026 (0.011)* No Muslim Protagonist -0.025 
(0.007)*** 
White -0.072 (0.078) White -0.092 (0.077) 
Female 0.112 (0.071) Female 0.088 (0.071) 
Education -0.016 (0.025) Education -0.008 (0.025) 
Pol ID/Republican -0.319 
(0.043)*** 
Pol ID/Republican -0.311 
(0.043)*** 
Pol Knowledge 0.043 (0.012)** Pol Knowledge 0.04 (0.014)** 
Travel Outside US -0.133 (0.071) Travel Outside US -0.109 (0.071) 
Constant 3.02 (0.191)*** Constant 3.07 (0.19)*** 
Standard errors in parenthesis. *p-value < 0.05, **p-value < 0.01, ***p-value < 0.001 
 
The following models compare different versions of combined DV measurements. 
 Belief Muslim will Commit Terror Attack 
 Coefficient Standard Error z-score p-value 
MT Stereotype -0.056 0.025 -2.28 0.023 
White 0.034 0.011 3.21 0.001 
Female 0.008 0.010 0.78 0.425 
Education -0.010 0.003 -3.01 0.003 
Pol 
ID/Republican 
0.019 0.006 3.26 0.001 
Pol Knowledge 0.007 0.002 3.42 0.001 
Travel Outside 
US 
-0.016 0.010 -1.66 0.097 







 Belief Muslim will Commit Terror Attack 
 Coefficient Standard Error z-score p-value 
MT Antagonist -0.064 0.024 -2.66 0.008 
White 0.032 0.011 3.04 0.002 
Female 0.007 0.010 0.73 0.467 
Education -0.010 0.003 -2.95 0.003 
Pol 
ID/Republican 
0.019 0.006 3.33 0.001 
Pol Knowledge 0.006 0.002 3.30 0.001 
Travel Outside 
US 
-0.015 0.010 -1.56 0.120 




 Belief Muslim will Commit Terror Attack 
 Coefficient Standard Error z-score p-value 
Muslim 
Protagonist 
-0.041 0.022 -1.87 0.062 
White 0.035 0.011 3.31 0.001 
Female 0.009   0.010 0.92 0.360 
Education -0.011 0.003 -3.14 0.002 
Pol ID/Republican 0.019 0.006 3.20 0.001 
Pol Knowledge 0.007   0.002 3.51 0.000 
Travel Outside US -0.017 0.010 -1.79 0.074 





Appendix C.2: Chapter 6 Models 
 
The following are linear regressions on the DV measuring association of Muslims with terrorism. 
 
Pre-treatment Survey Results 

































*For this variable, the control group n=67. 
 
Post-treatment Survey Results 

































*For this variable, the control group n=67. 
 
Follow-up Survey Results 


































I created a more complex measure of social bias toward Muslims using responses to three survey 
questions. First, I created a variable comparing participants’ beliefs on how likely it is that a Muslim will 
commit a terrorist attack on the U.S. to that of all groups included on the survey. Responses to eight 
groups were measured on a 7-point Likert scale from “extremely unlikely” to “extremely likely.” I took 
the difference between the average of their answer for all eight groups and their answer for Muslims and 
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then converted it into a percentage of the spectrum of responses. This produced a preliminary bias 
variable. Second, I combined this preliminary variable with responses to two dichotomous questions that 
inquire whether Islam is more likely than other religions to promote violence and whether jihadists are a 
good representation of what the majority of Muslims believe. I again converted this combined response to 
a percentage of the spectrum of responses, which produced my social bias dependent variable.  
 
 Pre-Treatment Post-Treatment Follow-up 
Binge Treatment 0.246 0.294 0.185 
Binge Control 0.302 0.322 0.235 
Weekly Treatment 0.290 0.298 0.208 
Weekly Control 0.289 0.335 0.215 
 
The next two tables include the responses of all 144 participants for the pre-treatment and post-treatment 
measures. 
 Pre-Treatment Post-Treatment Follow-up 
Treatment Groups 3.592 3.498 3.676 
Control Groups 3.765 3.572 3.475 
*Groups: Blacks, Whites, Muslims, Christians, Right-wing Activists, Left-wing Activists, Russians, 
Chinese 
 
 Pre-Treatment Post-Treatment Follow-up 
Treatment Groups 1.158 1 0.786 
Control Groups 1.206 1.029 0.855 
 
I broke down identification by the category of character with which participants identified, and I sorted 
the lead characters into three categories: agent fighting terrorism, Muslim protagonist, and Muslim 
terrorist character. While several of the lead characters could be seen as falling into more than one 
category (for example, Jim Greer is both an agent fighting terrorism and a Muslim) I sorted the characters 
according to how identification may induce the greatest affect. I sorted the characters as follows—Agents: 
Jack Ryan, Victor Polizzi, and Sandrine Arnaud; Muslim Protagonists: Jim Greer, Hanin Ali, and Fathi 
al-Abbas; and Muslim terrorists: Mousa bin Suleiman, Ali bin Suleiman, and Yazid. None of these 
identification categories significantly correlated with the social bias dependent variable. Again, the 
treatment seems to have had little to no effect on social bias. 
 
 Posttest Association of Muslims with Terrorism 
 Coefficient Standard Error z-score p-value 
Pretest Bias 0.515 0.100 5.18 0.000 
Christian 1.050 0.412 2.55 0.013 
Agent 0.305 1.490 -0.20 0.839 
Muslim 
Protagonist 
0.938 0.773 1.21 0.229 
Muslim Terrorist -0.200 0.380 -0.53 0.601 
Constant 1.00 1.704 0.59 0.559 
 
276 
 Posttest Association of Muslims with Terrorism 
 Coefficient Standard Error z-score p-value 
Pretest Bias 0.521 0.100 5.21 0.000 
Christian 1.127 0.431 2.32 0.011 
Jack Ryan 0.222 0.228 0.97 0.335 
Victor Polizzi 0.181 0.141 1.28 0.204 
Sandrine Arnaud 0.200 0.168 1.19 0.237 
Jim Greer 0.201 0.187 1.08 0.285 
Hanin Ali -0.153 0.182 -0.84 0.404 
Fathi al-Abbas 0.107 0.175 0.61 0.544 
Ali bin Suleiman -0.068 0.197 -0.34 0.732 
Mousa bin Suleiman 0.317 0.274 1.16 0.252 
Yazid -1.115 0.652 -1.71 0.092 
Constant 1.076 0.785 1.37 0.176 
 
 Posttest Favor Toward Sending U.S. Troops to Fight Islamic Militants 
 Coefficient Standard Error z-score p-value 
Pretest Favor 0.546 0.095 5.74 0.000 
Agent 0.298 1.310 0.23 0.821 
Muslim 
Protagonist 
1.003 0.701 1.43 0.157 
Muslim Terrorist -0.463 0.337 -1.38 0.173 
Constant -1.003 1.473 -0.68 0.498 
 
 Posttest Favor Toward Sending U.S. Troops 
 Coefficient Standard Error z-score p-value 
Pretest Favor 0.542 0.098 5.56 0.000 
Christian 0.375 0.410 0.91 0.364 
Jack Ryan 0.496 0.916 0.54 0.590 
Victor Polizzi 0.101 0.338 0.30 0.765 
Sandrine Arnaud -0.207 0.382 -0.54 0.589 
Jim Greer -0.034 0.402 -0.08 0.933 
Hanin Ali 0.320 0.730 0.44 0.662 
Fathi al-Abbas 0.342 0.457 0.75 0.456 
Ali bin Suleiman -0.430 0.409 -1.05 0.297 
Mousa bin Suleiman -0.212 0.653 -0.33 0.746 
Yazid -0.802 1.076 -0.75 0.459 
Constant -0.825 0.807 -1.02 0.311 
 
 Posttest Favor Toward Accepting Syrian Refugees to the U.S. 
 Coefficient Standard Error z-score p-value 
Pretest Favor 0.749 0.103 7.25 0.000 
Christian 0.766 0.292 2.63 0.011 
Agent -0.013 1.066 -0.01 0.991 
Muslim 
Protagonist 
-0.201 0.553 -0.36 0.717 
Muslim Terrorist 0.046 0.274 0.17 0.868 
Constant 0.201 1.179 0.17 0.865 
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 Posttest Favor Toward Using Drone Strikes to Target and Kill Terrorists 
 Coefficient Standard Error z-score p-value 
Pretest Favor 0.638 0.107 5.97 0.000 
Christian -0.500 0.342 -1.46 0.148 
Agent 1.007 1.456 0.69 0.492 
Muslim 
Protagonist 
1.132 0.762 1.48 0.142 
Muslim Terrorist -0.434 0.370 -1.17 0.245 
Constant -1.270 1.677 -0.76 0.452 
 
 
The following is a pairwise comparison for treatment groups split by consumption type from a repeated 
measures two-way ANOVA model on the drone strikes DV. 
 
  Mean Difference Standard Error p-value 
Weekly Group    
 Pretest & Posttest 0.200 0.192 0.912 
 Posttest & Follow-up -0.029 0.146 1.000 
 Pretest & Follow-up 0.171 0.169 0.951 
Binge Group    
 Pretest & Posttest 0.190 0.220 1.000 
 Posttest & Follow-up 0.143 0.203 1.000 
 Pretest & Follow-up 0.333 0.298 0.836 
 
 
In reviewing the within-subjects simple effects of the more defined models, both pass Mauchly’s test of 
sphericity at p=0.392 (weekly) and p=0.456 (binge).  However, the only statistically significant 
interaction occurs for weekly watchers who identify with Yazid. 
  Favor Toward Using Drone Strikes to Target and Kill Terrorists 
  p-value F-value df 
Weekly Treatment Group    
 Time Period 0.143 2.009 2 
 Time*Christian 0.435 0.843 2 
 Time*Victor 0.583 0.544 2 
 Time*Yazid 0.071 2.770 2 
 Time*Ali 0.492 0.718 2 
 Error   60 
Binge Treatment Group    
 Time Period 0.309 1.219 2 
 Time*Christian 0.752 0.288 2 
 Time*Victor 0.218 1.600 2 
 Time*Yazid   0 
 Time*Ali 0.715 0.340 2 




The remaining models are linear regressions that use change as the dependent variable. 
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 Change from Pretest to Posttest for Bias DV (Tolerance Only) 
 Coefficient Standard Error t-value p-value 
Binge -0.217 0.449 -0.48 0.630 
Democrat -0.632 0.434 -1.46 0.150 
White 0.130 0.602 0.22 0.830 
Christian -0.291 0.483 -0.60 0.550 
Travel 0.028 0.451 0.06 0.951 
Constant 0.258 0.507 0.51 0.612 
N=66, Prob>F=0.7244, R-sq=0.0452 
 
 Change from Prettest to Follow-up for Bias DV (Tolerance Only) 
 Coefficient Standard Error t-value p-value 
Binge 0.024 0.479 0.05 0.960 
Democrat -0.896 0.474 -1.89 0.065 
White 0.508 0.666 0.76 0.449 
Christian -0.040 0.515 -0.08 0.938 
Travel -0.117 0.503 -0.23 0.817 
Constant -0.199 0.565 -0.35 0.726 
N=54, Prob>F=0.4512, R-sq=0.0910 
 
 Change from Pretest to Posttest for Bias DV (CT Only) 
 Coefficient Standard Error t-value p-value 
Binge -0.229 0.390 -0.59 0.559 
Democrat -0.285 0.410 -0.69 0.489 
White -0.351 0.514 -0.68 0.497 
Christian 1.263 0.475 2.66 0.010 
Travel 0.210 0.412 0.51 0.612 
Constant -0.024 0.484 -0.05 0.960 




 Change from Pretest to Follow-up for Bias DV (CT only) 
 Coefficient Standard Error t-value p-value 
Binge 0.246 0.499 0.49 0.624 
Democrat -0.416 0.506 -0.82 0.415 
White -0.622 0.669 -0.93 0.357 
Christian 1.015 0.559 1.82 0.075 
Travel -0.718 0.532 -1.35 0.183 
Constant 0.446 0.591 0.75 0.455 
N=57, Prob>F=0.3295, R-sq=0.1041 
 
 Change from Pretest to Posttest for Troops DV (Tolerance Only) 
 Coefficient Standard Error t-value p-value 
Binge 0.361 0.387 0.93 0.354 
Democrat 0.093 0.372 0.25 0.802 
White -0.277 0.524 -0.53 0.599 
Christian -0.235 0.419 -0.68 0.498 
Travel -0.034 0.392 -0.09 0.930 
Constant     
N=68, Prob>F=0.8871, R-sq=0.0266 
 
 Change from Pretest to Follow-up for Troops DV (Tolerance Only) 
 Coefficient Standard Error t-value p-value 
Binge 0.132 0.474 0.28 0.782 
Democrat -0.045 0.469 -0.10 0.924 
White 0.624 0.660 0.09 0.925 
Christian -0.446 0.512 -0.87 0.387 
Travel -0.168 0.499 -0.34 0.738 
Constant 0.233 0.561 0.41 0.680 




 Change from Pretest to Posttest for Troops DV (CT Only) 
 Coefficient Standard Error t-value p-value 
Binge -0.532 0.352 -1.51 0.135 
Democrat -0.003 0.370 -0.01 0.994 
White -0.254 0.464 -0.55 0.586 
Christian 0.269 0.428 0.63 0.532 
Travel 0.342 0.372 0.92 0.360 
Constant 0.228 0.436 0.27 0.788 
N=76, Prob>F=0.5360, R-sq=0.0557 
 
 Change from Pretest to Follow-up for Troops DV (CT Only) 
 Coefficient Standard Error t-value p-value 
Binge -0.156 0.432 -0.36 0.720 
Democrat 0.155 0.439 0.35 0.726 
White -0.789 0.581 -1.36 0.180 
Christian 0.928 0.485 0.06 0.954 
Travel 0.771 0.462 1.67 0.101 
Constant -0.579 0.513 -1.13 0.264 
N=57, Prob>F=0.4210, R-sq=0.0902 
 
 Change from Pretest to Posttest for Refugees DV (Tolerance Only) 
 Coefficient Standard Error t-value p-value 
Binge -0.095 0.291 -0.33 0.745 
Democrat -0.535 0.280 -1.92 0.060 
White -0.400 0.394 -1.02 0.314 
Christian -0.075 0.315 -0.24 0.812 
Travel 0.117 0.295 0.40 0.694 
Constant 0.310 0.331 0.94 0.352 




 Change from Pretest to Follow-up for Refugees DV (Tolerance Only) 
 Coefficient Standard Error t-value p-value 
Binge 0.020 0.276 -0.07 0.941 
Democrat -0.516 0.273 -1.85 0.070 
White -0.663 0.383 -1.73 0.090 
Christian -0.556 0.297 -1.87 0.067 
Travel 0.145 0.291 0.50 0.621 
Constant 0.428 0.326 1.31 0.196 
N=55, Prob>F=0.0831, R-sq=0.1755 
 
 Change from Pretest to Posttest for Refugees DV (CT Only) 
 Coefficient Standard Error t-value p-value 
Binge -0.130 0.240 -0.54 0.590 
Democrat -0.389 0.253 -1.54 0.129 
White -0.302 0.317 -0.95 0.343 
Christian 0.790 0.293 2.70 0.009 
Travel -0.373 0.254 -1.47 0.147 
Constant 0.206 0.298 0.69 0.492 
N=76, Prob>F=0.0688, R-sq=0.1335 
 
 Change from Pretest to Follow-up for Refugees DV (CT Only) 
 Coefficient Standard Error t-value p-value 
Binge -0.091 0.320 -0.28 0.777 
Democrat -0.331 0.325 -1.02 0.313 
White -0.707 0.430 -1.65 0.106 
Christian 0.241 0.359 0.67 0.506 
Travel -0.379 0.342 -1.11 0.273 
Constant 0.341 0.380 0.90 0.373 




 Change from Pretest to Posttest for Drones DV (Tolerance Only) 
 Coefficient Standard Error t-value p-value 
Binge -0.075 0.364 -0.21 0.838 
Democrat -0.096 0.350 -0.27 0.785 
White 0.142 0.493 0.29 0.775 
Christian 0.400 0.394 1.01 0.314 
Travel 0.492 0.369 1.61 0.113 
Constant -0.486 0.414 -1.17 0.246 
N=68, Prob>F=0.5983, R-sq=0.0561 
 
 Change from Pretest to Follow-up for Drones DV (Tolerance Only) 
 Coefficient Standard Error t-value p-value 
Binge -0.187 0.382 -0.49 0.627 
Democrat 0.030 0.377 0.08 0.937 
White -0.091 0.531 -0.17 0.864 
Christian 0.321 0.411 0.78 0.438 
Travel 0.339 0.402 0.84 0.403 
Constant -0.436 0.452 -0.97 0.339 
N=55, Prob>F=0.9238, R-sq=0.0274 
 
 Change from Pretest to Posttest for Drones DV (CT Only) 
 Coefficient Standard Error t-value p-value 
Binge -0.808 0.372 -2.17 0.033 
Democrat -0.205 0.391 -0.52 0.602 
White 0.328 0.491 0.67 0.506 
Christian 0.261 0.453 0.57 0.567 
Travel -0.004 0.393 -0.01 0.992 
Constant 0.888 0.462 1.92 0.059 




 Change from Pretest to Follow-up for Drones DV (CT Only) 
 Coefficient Standard Error t-value p-value 
Binge -0.445 0.398 -1.12 0.269 
Democrat -0.127 0.404 -0.31 0.755 
White -0.489 0.534 -0.92 0.364 
Christian 0.577 0.446 1.29 0.201 
Travel 0.266 0.425 0.63 0.533 
Constant 0.171 0.472 0.36 0.718 
N=57, Prob>F=0.5509, R-sq=0.0732 
 
